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1 
REGULATION OF SECURITIES OFFERINGS IN 
CALIFORNIA: IS IT TIME FOR A CHANGE 
AFTER A CENTURY OF MERIT 
REGULATION? 
Neal H. Brockmeyer*
          The California securities law originated in 1913 from a populist 
movement that embodied a paternalistic attitude toward the protection of 
investors. It was characterized by the registration of offerings of securi-
ties with few exemptions and exclusions, a qualitative review of the merits 
of those offerings and an administrator with broad authority to imple-
ment and enforce the law. While the California securities law is still 
based on merit review, exclusions and exemptions have been added and 
expanded over the years by the California legislature and securities reg-
ulators. More recently, Congress has preempted state registration and 
merit review of various securities and transactions and this has been im-
plemented and expanded by administrative action. 
          These developments raise a question as to whether it is time to 
consider a change in the method of regulating securities offerings in Cal-
ifornia and, in that connection, to determine whether the system of merit 
review has outgrown any usefulness it may have had originally. In my 
view, addressing this issue requires an empirical analysis of the regula-
tion of securities offerings in California and its evolution over the past 
century. 
          The analysis begins in Part II with an overview of the history of 
the California securities law focused on issuer transactions from 1913 to 
the comprehensive revision of the law in 1968. This is followed in Part 
III by a more in-depth review and chronology of changes in the law and 
practice from 1917 to the present pertaining to each of three types of 
issuer transactions: private stock offerings, real estate syndications, and 
public stock offerings. Included are developments in the federal securi-
ties law and actions taken by self-regulatory organizations that have had 
an impact on the regulation of these transactions in California. To put 
 
 * J.D., University of California School of Law; B.A., Stanford University. Mr. Brockmeyer 
practiced corporate and securities law in California for 53 years, from 1964 to 2017, most recently 
at Locke Lord LLP. He is a former chair of the Corporations Committee of The State Bar of Cali-
fornia’s Business Law Section and of the Los Angeles County Bar Association’s Business and 
Corporations Law Section. 
(6) 54.1_BROCKMEYER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/21  2:51 PM 
2 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1 
this in perspective, the review of each type of issuer transaction is pre-
ceded by a brief history of capital formation pertaining to that transac-
tion. 
          Part IV presents data showing the number and types of securities 
offerings in California for which notices of exemption or applications for 
qualification by coordination, notification or permit have been filed with 
the Department. With this background, the rationale for revisiting the 
method of regulating the offer and sale of securities and the system of 
merit review in California is set forth in Part V. 
          In conclusion, I believe it is time to change the method of regulat-
ing the offer and sale of securities in California in a manner that would 
include eliminating or limiting the system of merit review, with a view to 
enhancing the antifraud enforcement of the California securities law. 
Several courses of action are explored to accomplish that result. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For years, virtually every offer, sale, or issuance of securities in 
California by a corporation or other entity required a permit from the 
department administering the California securities law (“Depart-
ment”).1 This is because the securities law in California has been based 
on merit review2 that empowers the senior administrator of the De-
partment (“Commissioner”)3 to review and evaluate the merits of pro-
posed offers, sales, and issuances of securities to determine whether 
the applicable standards have been met. 
While still being based on merit review, the California securities 
law has undergone many changes over the last 107 years in an effort 
to strike a more reasonable balance between protecting the interests of 
investors and facilitating the raising of capital. A comprehensive revi-
sion of the law occurred in 1968.4 Since then, key exemptions have 
been added and, more recently, Congress has passed legislation to 
preempt state registration and merit review with respect to various se-
curities and transactions, which has been implemented and expanded 
by administrative action. While the Department has periodically re-
viewed and updated portions of its regulations during this period, the 
 
 1. The California securities law at first was administered by the State Corporation Depart-
ment and later by a division of the Department of Investments. From 1968 to 2013, it was admin-
istered by the Department of Corporations. In 2013, the Department of Corporations and the De-
partment of Financial Institutions were combined to form the Department of Business Oversight 
(DBO). See 1 HAROLD MARSH, JR. & ROBERT H. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA 
SECURITIES LAW §§ 1.01, 2.01[1] (Keith Paul Bishop ed., Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2020). Re-
cently, the Department’s name was changed to the Department of Financial Protection and Innova-
tion. See infra text accompanying notes 7–9.  
 2. There does not appear to be a widely accepted definition of merit review (sometimes in a 
broader sense called “merit regulation”). In general, it refers to the discretion of a state securities 
administrator to make substantive decisions regarding the merits of a proposed offering. The level 
of merit review will depend on the formulation of the standard. An offering that becomes effective 
automatically, subject to the issuance of a stop order, will receive less scrutiny than an offering that 
becomes effective only upon an affirmative finding that the prescribed standard has been met. See 
generally Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regul. of the State Regul. of Sec. Comm., Report on State 
Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785, 801–09 (1986) [hereinafter A.B.A. 
Report] (an exhaustive study of merit review under state law in the United States). 
 3. The senior administrator was the Commissioner of Corporations until the DBO was 
formed, at which time the senior administrator became the Commissioner of Business Oversight. 
See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 2.01[1]. With the recent change in the Department’s name, 
the senior administrator is now the Commissioner of Financial Protection and Innovation. See infra 
text accompanying notes 7–9.  
 4. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 2.01[1]. 
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California legislature has been slow in making significant changes to 
the law and these changes have been made only on a piecemeal basis. 
The purpose of this Article is to determine whether there should 
be a change in the method of regulating the offer and sale of securities 
in California and, in that connection, whether the system of merit re-
view has outgrown any usefulness it may have had originally. This 
entails describing the evolution of the California securities law in gen-
eral and as it pertains to certain types of issuer transactions, as well as 
examining data regarding the extent to which issuers are relying on 
exemptions or filing applications to qualify offers and sales of securi-
ties. With this background, the rationale for revisiting the method of 
regulating the offer and sale of securities is presented, conclusions are 
reached, and various courses of action are explored. 
This Article is particularly timely for several reasons. First, it has 
now been over fifty years since the last comprehensive review and re-
vision of the California securities law. Second, the COVID-19 pan-
demic has significantly impacted the global, U.S. and California econ-
omies. Small businesses in particular have been adversely affected by 
the shutdown and shelter-in-place orders.5 Their sustainability and re-
turn to profitability will depend in part on their ability to obtain suffi-
cient equity capital and credit in the future,6 a need that could be ame-
liorated by easing some of the restrictions on capital formation. 
Finally, the Department will be undergoing a reorganization over the 
next few years. The California legislature in August 2020 passed the 
California Consumer Financial Protection Law.7 This legislation was 
signed by the Governor in September 2020 and became effective Jan-
uary 1, 2021. It is tied to Governor’s 2020–2021 Budget that provides 
for significant increases in the Department’s funding and personnel to 
expand its authority and capacity to protect consumers of financial 
products and services.8 In an effort to better reflect this new role, its 
 
 5. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFF. OF ADVOC. FOR SMALL BUS. CAP. 
FORMATION, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2020, at 11 (2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/
2020-oasb-annual-report.pdf (highlighting initial reported impacts of COVID-19 and providing 
data and analysis of demographic trends for crafting policy solutions). 
 6. See id. at 19–35. 
 7. Act of Aug. 31, 2020, ch. 157, §§ 1–11, 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1, 3–27 (West). 
 8. See Governor’s Budget Summary 2020–21, Gavin Newsom, Governor, State of Cal. 173–
74 (Jan. 10, 2020), http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/2020-21/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudget-
Summary.pdf; S.B. 74, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess., at 113 (Cal. 2020); Keith Paul Bishop, Despite 
“Massive Job Losses and Revenue Shortfalls,” Governor Continues to Propose Large Increase in 
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name has been changed to the Department of Financial Protection and 
Innovation, and it is now headed by the Commissioner of Financial 
Protection and Innovation.9 
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAW (1913 TO 1968) 
Between 1911 and 1931, forty-seven states had adopted statutes 
that regulated the sale of securities (commonly called “Blue Sky 
Laws”).10 The first securities legislation in California, the Investment 
Companies Act, was enacted in 1913.11 It was the product of a pro-
gressive program launched after the election in 1911 of Governor Hi-
ram W. Johnson.12 The Investment Companies Act was said to be: 
designed to protect investors from promoters selling stocks 
and bonds in illegitimate ventures or for prices fraudulently 
out of proportion to the value of the stocks and bonds so sold. 
This law is enlightened legislation for the protection of the 
public against swindlers. It will make the securities of Cali-
fornia corporations respected at home and abroad.13 
The Act required an application only for the original offer or sale of 
securities by an issuer, focused on public sales, required a finding that 
the proposed plan of business was not “unfair, unjust, or inequitable,” 
and permitted “investment brokers” to obtain a general permit to sell 
securities upon a showing of a good business reputation and dealing 
only in “good” securities.14 
The Corporate Securities Act15 was adopted in 1917 to replace the 
Investment Companies Act. While it was characterized basically as a 
 
DBO Staffing, ALLEN MATKINS (May 15, 2020), https://www.calcorporatelaw.com/despite-mas-
sive-job-losses-and-revenue-shortfalls-governor-continues-to-propose-large-increase-in-dbo-
staffing. 
 9. Act of Sept. 29, 2020, ch. 264, § 6, 2020 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1, 15–16 (West); see California 
Consumer Financial Protection Law, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN. PROT. AND INNOVATION, 
https://dfpi.ca.gov/california-consumer-financial-protection-law/ (last updated Dec. 3, 2020, 7:02 
PM). 
 10. For a history of the Blue Sky Laws, see Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky 
Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 46 J. L. & ECON. 229, 229 (2003); Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 348 (1991). 
 11. Act of May 28, 1913, ch. 353, §§ 1–25, 1913 Cal. Stat. 715, 715–22 (repealed 1917). 
 12. See John G. Sobieski, Securities Regulation in California: Recent Developments, 11 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1963). Mr. Sobieski served as Commissioner from 1959 to 1963. 
 13. Id. at 2–3. 
 14. Act of May 28, 1913 §§ 2(e), 4(a), 4(b), 5, 6. 
 15. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 532, §§ 1–29, 1917 Cal. Stat. 672, 673–86 (repealed 1949). 
 
(6) 54.1_BROCKMEYER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/21  2:51 PM 
2020] REGULATING SECURITIES OFFERINGS IN CALIFORNIA 7 
rewrite and reorganization of the Investment Companies Act, it greatly 
expanded the jurisdiction and regulatory authority of the Commis-
sioner.16 In 1949, the Corporate Securities Act was codified in the Cal-
ifornia Corporations Code as the Corporate Securities Law (collec-
tively, with the Corporate Securities Act, the “1917 Act”).17 
The 1917 Act was totally revised and modernized with the adop-
tion of the Corporate Securities Law of 1968 (“1968 Law”),18 which 
still governs securities transactions in California. 
A.  1917 Act (1917 to 1968) 
To highlight the basic differences in approach and to point out the 
scope and limitations of the various types of state securities laws, Pro-
fessor Richard W. Jennings divided them into four classes or combi-
nations of classes as follows: “(1) fraud prevention; (2) licensing of 
broker-dealers; (3) qualification of securities, restricted to fraud pre-
vention by compelling ‘full disclosure’; and (4) qualification of secu-
rities, with the imposition of varying degrees of substantive regulation 
of the terms and conditions under which securities may be sold or is-
sued.”19 
The 1917 Act, according to Professor Jennings, “combines bro-
ker-dealer regulation, fraud prevention, and disclosure with adminis-
trative supervision over sales or issues of new securities in the state by 
an issuer; alteration of outstanding securities through charter amend-
ments; and exchanges of securities effected through merger, consoli-
dation, or voluntary recapitalization.”20 It was characterized by him as 
one of the “more far-reaching systems of securities regulation.”21 He 
 
 16. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[1][a]. 
 17. Act of May 23, 1949, ch. 384, § 1, 1949 Cal. Stat. 698, 698–722 (codified as amended at 
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000–25104). 
 18. Act of May 9, 1968, ch. 88, § 2, 1968 Cal. Stat. 243, 243–56 (codified as amended at CAL. 
CORP. CODE §§ 25000–25804). 
 19. Richard W. Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Pro-
tection, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 208 (1958). Professor Jennings, an internationally known 
expert on corporate law and securities regulation, was a faculty member at the University of Cali-
fornia, School of Law from 1947 to 1983. Professor Jennings and Professor Harold Marsh, Jr. were 
the coauthors of the first casebook on securities regulation, RICHARD W. JENNINGS & HAROLD 
MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (1963), and were responsible for 
later editions and supplements until 1998. See David S. Ruder, A Tribute to Richard W. Jennings, 
88 CALIF. L. REV. 272, 272–73 (2000). 
 20. Jennings, supra note 19, at 213. 
 21. Id. at 212. 
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wrote further that “the California statute may be regarded as an inte-
gral part of a broad scheme for correcting some of the inequities and 
defects which may otherwise arise in the practices of corporation fi-
nance.”22 
The key provision of the 1917 Act was section 3 that read in part 
as follows: “No company shall sell . . . or offer for sale, negotiate for 
sale of, or take subscriptions for any security of its own issue until it 
shall have first applied for and secured from the commissioner a per-
mit authorizing it so to do.”23 Section 12 of the 1917 Act then provided 
that every security issued without a permit or not conforming to the 
provisions required by a permit shall be void.24 These sections, in 
combination, were interpreted to mean that it was the original issu-
ance, not the sale, of securities that was subject to the permit require-
ments.25 
Because the trigger was the issuance of securities, the 1917 Act 
was construed to require a permit for some issuances that arguably 
might not be considered a sale.26 For example, the Commissioner took 
the position that a permit was required for the issuance of securities as 
a share dividend, in an exchange of securities with existing sharehold-
ers, or in a statutory merger or consolidation.27 The issuance of treas-
ury shares also required a permit since the outstanding shares had been 
 
 22. Id. at 213. 
 23. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 532, § 3, 1917 Cal. Stat. 672, 673, 675–76 (repealed 1949) (em-
phasis added); see John E. Dalton, The California Corporate Securities Act—Its Legislative, Ad-
ministrative and Financial Aspects, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 130 (1930) [hereinafter Dalton I]. The 
wording was changed slightly in the 1949 codification to read: “No company shall sell any security 
of its own issue, . . . or offer for sale, negotiate for the sale of, or take subscriptions for any such 
security, until it has first applied for and secured from the commissioner a permit authorizing it so 
to do.” Act of May 23, 1949, ch. 384, § 1, 1949 Cal. Stat. 698, 698–722 (codified at CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 25500); see William R. Bickford, California Corporate Securities Law of 1968: Some In-
terpretations, Some Problem Areas, 2 PAC. L.J. 497, 499 (1971). 
 24. Act of May 18, 1917 § 12. For the legislative history of this provision, see T.W. Dahlquist, 
Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act: III, 34 CALIF. L. 
REV. 543, 545 (1946) [hereinafter Dahlquist III]. The words “sold or” had been added before the 
word “issued” by the time of the 1949 codification. Act of May 23, 1949 § 1; see also Bickford, 
supra note 23, at 502 (detailing the evolution of California securities law as to voiding securities 
issued without a permit). 
 25. See T.W. Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Secu-
rities Act, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 350 (1945) [hereinafter Dahlquist I]. 
 26. See id. at 351. 
 27. See id. 
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reacquired and were later reissued.28 Interestingly, the statute was in-
terpreted to require a permit for the original issuance of securities if 
the issuer was a California corporation, regardless of where the issu-
ance took place.29 The Commissioner ultimately took the position that 
this would also apply to any corporation whose principal place of busi-
ness activity was located in California, regardless of its state of incor-
poration.30 Otherwise, if the securities of a foreign corporation located 
elsewhere were issued outside California, as in a firm-commitment 
underwritten offering, no permit would be required for the resale of 
those securities in California.31 
Section 3 of the 1917 Act also extended the permit requirements 
to offers for sale, negotiations for sale, or taking subscriptions for a 
security.32 This raised a question as to how these types of preliminary 
acts of an issuer would be treated short of an actual sale or issuance.33 
The Department was fairly liberal in enforcement when executory 
contracts were expressly made subject to approval of the Commis-
sioner and a permit was subsequently obtained.34 However, given the 
wording of section 3 and the “void” concept in section 12, there was 
considerable doubt among lawyers as to whether anything could be 
done to validate a transaction once such a contract had been signed.35 
The Commissioner adopted a practice, which was later authorized by 
statute, of issuing negotiating or “offering” permits so that issuers 
could enter into a contract or engage in other preliminary acts without 
being concerned about violating the law.36 Eventually, most issuers 
began applying for negotiating permits before engaging in these 
 
 28. See T.W. Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California Corporate Secu-
rities Act: II, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 344, 374 (1946) [hereinafter Dahlquist II]. Treasury shares were 
eliminated in California effective January 1, 1977. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2309 (Deering 2020). 
 29. See Dahlquist II, supra note 28, at 384. 
 30. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[2][a]. 
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 375–79. The Commissioner had no permit jurisdiction 
over a nonissuer transaction unless it was in substance an issuer transaction. See Marc Levin, Note, 
California Corporate Securities Law of 1968: The Issue of the Nonissuer, 2 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 87, 
88 (1969). 
 32. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 532, § 3, 1917 Cal. Stat. 672, 673, 675 (repealed 1949). 
 33. For a discussion of preliminary acts prior to sale, see Dahlquist I, supra note 25, at 353–
56. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[3][b]. 
 34. See Dahlquist I, supra note 25, at 354. 
 35. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 3.01[3]. 
 36. See generally id. § 3.01[2]–[3] (discussing negotiating permits under the 1917 Act). 
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preliminary acts, especially when any of the negotiations with pro-
spective investors might take place in California.37 
The definition of “security” in section 2(6) of the 1917 Act enu-
merated various instruments, including one issued or offered to the 
public evidencing a right to participate or share in the profits or earn-
ings or distribution of assets, but excepted any security listed in a 
standard manual upon a finding by the Commissioner that it was ac-
curately described and a sale would not work a fraud upon the pur-
chaser.38 This definition was amended in 1929 to limit the instruments 
enumerated, eliminate the reference to instruments issued or offered 
to the public, and substitute any “beneficial interest in title to property, 
profits or earnings.”39 Referring to this language, T.W. Dahlquist 
wrote, “it is clear that there has been an unmistakable trend in the Cal-
ifornia decisions to interpret the Act liberally and to sweep almost 
every conceivable sort of interest within the definition.”40 However, 
its application to offers and sales of partnership interests, particularly 
limited partnership interests, was subject to some uncertainty, as will 
be discussed below.41 
The definition of “sale” in the 1917 Act was fairly straight-for-
ward.42 It was amended in 1945, to include “any change in the rights, 
preferences, privileges or restrictions on outstanding securities.”43 
This codified a position taken by the Commissioner and the Attorney 
General with respect to changes in outstanding securities,44 whether 
they were adverse or beneficial to security holders. 
Unlike the securities laws of many other states, there were no ex-
emptions from the permit requirements for securities listed on a na-
tional securities exchange (generally called a “marketplace” exemp-
tion) or for some of the most common types of transactions involving 
 
 37. See id. § 1.03[3][b]. 
 38. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 532, § 2, 1917 Cal. Stat. 672, 673, 674 (repealed 1949). 
 39. Act of Aug. 14, 1929, ch. 707, § 2, 1929 Cal. Stat. 1251, 1254–56 (repealed 1949); see 
MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[4]. 
 40. Dahlquist I, supra note 25, at 357. 
 41. See infra text accompanying notes 303–06. 
 42. See Act of May 18, 1917 § 2(70). 
 43. Act of May 18, 1945, ch. 399, § 1, 1945 Cal. Stat. 853, 853–54 (repealed 1949); see Mar-
shall L. Small, Changes in Rights, Preferences, Privileges and Restrictions on Outstanding Secu-
rities Under the California Corporate Securities Law, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 94, 96 (1962); MARSH & 
VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[1][d]. 
 44. See Small, supra note 43, at 95. 
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the offer, sale, or issuance of securities.45 The securities laws of other 
states included, for example, exemptions for securities of corporations 
that had been in existence for a prescribed number of years and with 
certain profits earned, securities issued by local companies organized 
within the state, stock issued to shareholders in connection with a mer-
ger or reorganization, and stock sold to existing shareholders.46 
Except for an exemption for securities issued under a plan con-
firmed by a court under the federal Bankruptcy Act, there was no ex-
emption for recapitalizations, reorganizations, or other exchanges of 
securities.47 
The process of issuing securities usually began with the prepara-
tion and filing with the Department of an application for a negotiating 
or “offering” permit.48 As discussed later, this posed a dilemma for 
lawyers because they had to obtain financial and other information to 
support the sophistication of prospective investors before an applica-
tion was even filed and a permit issued.49 An issuer could then file an 
application for what was called an “open permit” for a public offering 
or a “closed permit” in which the prospective purchasers were 
named.50 This distinction would be used to determine how the appli-
cations would be reviewed by the Department.51 There was no pre-
scribed form for applications for negotiating or definitive permits, and 
they tended to take somewhat the same form as pleadings in litigation, 
using legal-sized paper with bluebacks. 
The Commissioner was given the power to establish rules and 
regulations to provide the standards for issuing permits and to author-
ize the conditions that could be included in permits.52 Professor Jen-
nings summarized the Commissioner’s overriding standard for author-
izing and denying permits under the 1917 Act as follows: 
On original issues of securities, the Commissioner is to issue 
a permit only if he finds “that the proposed plan of 
 
 45. See Jennings, supra note 19, at 216. 
 46. See Dalton I, supra note 23, at 132–34; Ronald M. Shapiro & Alan R. Sachs, Blue Sky 
Law and Practice: An Overview, 4 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 15–19 (1974). 
 47. See Dahlquist II, supra note 28, at 350. 
 48. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 6.05[2]. 
 49. See infra text accompanying notes 310–12. 
 50. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 6.05[3][a]. 
 51. See id. § 6.05[3][c]. 
 52. See Dalton I, supra note 23, at 130. 
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business . . . and the proposed issuance of the securities are 
fair, just, and equitable, that the applicant intends to transact 
its business fairly and honestly,” and that the securities pro-
posed to be issued and the methods of issuing and disposing 
of them, “are not such as, in his opinion, will work a fraud 
upon the purchaser”; otherwise, he shall deny the application, 
refuse the permit, and notify the applicant in writing of his 
decision.53 
The specific standards in these rules were generally applied by the 
staff without granting variances and were interpreted as having the full 
force and effect of law.54 
In offerings involving the issuance of promotional shares or 
shares of highly-speculative ventures, the Commissioner could im-
pose voting switches that entitle a group of shareholders to elect a ma-
jority of the board upon a default in the payment of dividends and 
could require waivers of a promoter’s right to receive dividends and 
liquidating distributions until certain financial or other results were 
achieved.55 The Commissioner could also condition the issuance of a 
permit on the deposit of the securities in escrow, as well as impound-
ing the proceeds and limiting the selling expenses.56 In the sale of 
shares to existing shareholders, the Department often required that 
they first be offered to all shareholders in proportion to the number of 
shares each held to the total number of new shares to be issued.57 
The “void” concept also extended to any security sold or issued 
in nonconformity with any provision in a permit,58 making compliance 
 
 53. Jennings, supra note 19, at 214–15 (alteration in original) (quoting Act of July 12, 1965, 
ch. 1078, § 1, 1965 Cal. Stat. 2727, 2727 (repealed 1968)). Initially, the standard had been worded 
in the negative, and the Commissioner was authorized to issue a permit on a finding that, among 
other things, the proposed plan of business was not “unfair, unjust, or inequitable.” Act of May 18, 
1917, ch. 532, § 4 Cal. Stat. 672, 673, 676–77 (repealed 1949). This was amended in 1947 to the 
language that was eventually codified at Act of July 12 § 1. See Act of May 2, 1947, ch. 130, § 1, 
1947 Cal. Stat. 650, 650–51 (repealed 1949); Harriett R. Buhler, 1947 California Corporations 
Code and Other Corporations Legislation, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 423, 432 (1947). 
 54. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 8.01[4][b]. 
 55. See Jennings, supra note 19, at 215–16; see also Charles L. Gladson, Comment, Securities 
Regulation: The Voting Switch Condition in a Permit to Issue Securities, 14 HASTINGS L.J. 169, 
169 (1962). 
 56. See Jennings, supra note 19, at 215–16; Donald A. Pearce, Escrows—Burden or Boon?, 
14 HASTINGS L.J. 124, 125 (1962). 
 57. See John E. Dalton, The California Corporate Securities Act, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 255, 263 
(1930) [hereinafter Dalton II]. 
 58. See Dahlquist III, supra note 24, at 545–46. 
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with these conditions more important. Even though the statute pro-
vided that securities issued in violation of the permit requirements, or 
in nonconformity with a permit, were void, this was generally inter-
preted in the case law as meaning they were voidable whenever nec-
essary for the protection of innocent, original purchasers, or subse-
quent assignees.59 A provision was added to the 1917 Act in 1967 
allowing an issuer to apply for a curative permit, but the “void” con-
cept remained.60 
Over the years, the 1917 Act came under increasing criticism. 
Among the issues cited were the following: 
• its discrimination against corporations that were incorpo-
rated or had their principal place of business in California, 
• overly broad definitions of the terms “security” and 
“sale,” 
• a lack of exemptions for exchange listed securities and for 
certain limited sales, 
• its application to most mergers, recapitalizations, and re-
organizations, 
• a lack of coordination with the federal securities law, 
• the inadequacy of its fraud provisions, 
• the overly broad discretion given the Commissioner, and 
• the concept that securities issued without, or in noncon-
formity with, a permit were “void.”61 
The 1917 Act remained in effect for fifty-one years.62 Although 
it was amended nearly every year, there had been no substantial mod-
ifications.63 Professor Harold Marsh Jr. and Robert H. Volk, the au-
thors of the leading treatise on California securities regulation, wrote 
that to understand the 1917 Act one had to put it in perspective.64 They 
 
 59. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[6][b] (citing Dahlquist III, supra note 24, at 
553); William A. Dorland, Note, Noncomplying Securities in California: Judicial Protection of 
Interests Under Corporations Code § 26100, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1184, 1184 (1966). 
 60. Act of Aug. 14, 1967, ch. 1120, § 1.5, 1967 Cal. Stat. 2781, 2781–82 (codified at CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 25518). The process of applying for a curative permit was carried over to the 1968 
Law, see Act of May 9, 1968, ch. 88, § 2, 1968 Cal. Stat. 243, 243–56 (codified as amended at 
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000–25804), but it only applied to securities issued or sold before Janu-
ary 2, 1969, and expired on January 2, 1972. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[8][g]. 
 61. See generally MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[8][a]–[j] (discussing major defects in 
the 1917 Act). 
 62. See id. § 1.03[1][d]. 
 63. See id. 
 64. See id. § 1.03[1][c]. 
 
(6) 54.1_BROCKMEYER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/21  2:51 PM 
14 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1 
pointed out that because of problems with the securities markets and 
their structure, as well as the limited communications and transporta-
tion facilities of the time, most securities transactions in the early 
twentieth century were intrastate in nature, involving only the local 
capital markets.65 Accordingly, the 1917 Act sought to regulate only 
issuances of securities by companies within the jurisdiction of the 
State of California and sales in California by brokers and agents.66 
Walter G. Olson, who had practiced under the 1917 Act for many 
years, offered the following comment about the need for a change: 
No one can deny that the old law functioned adequately in 
the performance of its assigned task of protecting California 
investors. During those years when it stood alone in provid-
ing investor protection, it achieved this protection, for the 
most part, with reasonable efficiency and without unduly 
burdening legitimate business processes. 
On the other hand, it is equally indisputable that fundamental 
changes in California’s approach to securities regulation 
were long overdue. A law designed to regulate securities 
transactions and markets essentially local in character, unas-
sisted by controls at the federal and industry levels, could 
hardly be expected to function effectively and efficiently 
when applied to vast interstate securities markets which have 
been subjected to a major degree of supervision by other reg-
ulatory bodies.67 
While there seemed to be general agreement, with isolated dis-
sents, that a new or substantially revised securities law was desirable, 
various attempts to obtain major new securities legislation failed.68 In 
1959 and again in 1961, these efforts were directed to adopting the 
 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Walter G. Olson, The California Corporate Securities Law of 1968, 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 
75, 75 (1968). 
 68. Id. at 76. 
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Uniform Securities Act69 or a modified version of that Act.70 Assem-
bly Bill (A.B.) 2531, which was introduced in 1959, did not contain 
the “fair, just, and equitable” standard, but specified other grounds on 
which the Commissioner was empowered to deny, suspend, or revoke 
the registration of securities.71 “These attempts failed and, in 1967, 
somewhat in desperation, limited amendments to the [1917 Act] were 
proposed.”72 When the new Commissioner, Robert H. Volk, appointed 
a committee to undertake a comprehensive reevaluation of securities 
regulation in California, these proposed amendments were aban-
doned.73 This study led to adoption of the 1968 Law by the California 
legislature in 1968 that replaced the 1917 Act effective January 1, 
1969.74 
B.  Adoption of the 1968 Law 
While the 1968 Law incorporated some new concepts, the draft-
ing committee and its reporter, Professor Harold Marsh Jr.,75 also 
 
 69. This was the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, which was a product of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and was designed to guide states in drafting their 
own securities laws. The Act was revised in 1985 and again in 1988. The latest version is the Uni-
form Securities Act of 2002, which was last revised in 2005. See Joel Seligman, The New Uniform 
Securities Act, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. 243 (2003). 
 70. See Olson, supra note 67, at 76. See generally Howard C. Ellis & Kenneth D. McCloskey, 
The Future of Corporate Securities Regulation in California—Effect of Proposed Uniform Act, 12 
HASTINGS L.J. 256 (1961) (discussing the possible ramifications of adopting the Uniform Securi-
ties Act during the 1961 session of the California legislature); Robert H. Edwards, California 
Measures the Uniform Securities Act Against its Corporate Securities Law, 15 BUS. LAW. 814 
(1960) (discussing the possible ramifications of adopting the Uniform Securities Act during the 
1959 session of the California legislature); Donald A. Pearce, California Corporate Securities Law 
vs. Proposed Uniform Securities Law, 9 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1957) (discussing the history of the se-
curities law in California and other states and of the Uniform Securities Act). 
 71. See Edwards, supra note 70, at 817–21. 
 72. Olson, supra note 67, at 76. 
 73. See id. In addition to Professors Richard W. Jennings and Harold Marsh, Jr., the committee 
consisted of prominent practitioners, legislators, and then current and prior regulators. See Robert 
H. Volk, The California Corporate Securities Law of 1968—a Significant Change from Prior Law, 
24 BUS. LAW. 77, 77 n.2 (1968); MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.05[1][c]. 
 74. Act of May 9, 1968, ch. 88, § 2, 1968 Cal. Stat. 242, 243, 243–56 (codified as amended at 
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000–25804). For a detailed description of the process that resulted in re-
placing the 1917 Act, see MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.05. 
 75. Professor Marsh was a faculty member at the UCLA School of Law, and an expert on 
securities and corporate law. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, at xiii. As the reporter for the 
committee, he was the principal draftsman of the new securities law. Together with Robert H. Volk, 
Professor Marsh guided the 1968 Law through the California legislature. See id. § 1.05[1][b]. 
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borrowed from the 1917 Act, the Uniform Securities Act, and the fed-
eral securities laws.76 
Several of the criticisms of the 1917 Act were addressed in sec-
tion 25110 of the 1968 Law.77 This section provides: “It is unlawful 
for any person to offer or sell in this state any security in an issuer 
transaction . . . , whether or not by or through underwriters, unless 
such sale has been qualified . . . or unless such security or transaction 
is exempted or not subject to qualification . . . .”78 It is the offer or sale 
of securities, not the issuance, that triggers the need for qualification. 
In addition, the offer or sale must be made “in this state,” which is a 
new defined term.79 Under this definition, an offer or sale is deemed 
to have been made in California if: 
• an offer to sell or buy originates from California, 
• an offer to sell or buy (wherever originated) is directed to 
and received in California, 
• an offer to sell or buy (wherever originated) is accepted in 
California or, 
• if both the seller and purchaser are domiciled in Califor-
nia, the security is delivered to the purchaser in Califor-
nia.80 
This was intended to clarify the jurisdictional reach of the California 
securities law. With this change, the domicile or principal place of 
business of the issuer and the jurisdiction in which the securities are 
initially issued were no longer determinative as to whether qualifica-
tion is required. 
While the term “issuer transaction” is not defined, a “nonissuer 
transaction” is defined in section 25011 as any transaction not directly 
or indirectly for the benefit of the issuer.81 This section provides fur-
ther that a transaction is indirectly for the benefit of the issuer if any 
portion of the purchase price of any securities involved in the 
 
 76. Olson, supra note 67, at 77. 
 77. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25110 (Deering 2020). Unless otherwise indicated, references in 
the text to sections of the 1968 Law shall be to Title 4, Division 1, of the California Corporations 
Code and the complete citation will be set forth in the first note citing each section. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. § 25008. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. § 25011. 
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transaction will be received indirectly by the issuer.82 The intent was 
that any transaction directly or indirectly for the benefit of an issuer is 
to be treated as an issuer transaction; otherwise it is to be treated as a 
nonissuer transaction.83 Qualification of nonissuer transactions was 
for the first time required by section 25130, subject to the availability 
of an exemption.84 
The definitions of “security” and “sale” were also modified. The 
clause “beneficial interest in title to property, profits, or earnings” was 
dropped from the definition of “security” in an effort to “curb the ten-
dency of some administrators to find anything and everything to be a 
‘security.’”85 Retained in the definition were a “certificate of interest 
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement” and an “investment 
contract,” which had been interpreted more narrowly.86 
The revised definition of “sale” requires that a securities transac-
tion be “for value.” Section 25017(e) provides that an offer or sale of 
a warrant or right to subscribe to another security or of a convertible 
security is deemed to include an offer and sale of the underlying secu-
rity.87 Therefore, qualification is required at the time of issuance of 
options, warrants, rights, or convertible securities, and not when the 
underlying securities are ultimately issued.88 The definition also ex-
cludes certain stock dividends.89 
A number of exemptions from qualification were added by the 
1968 Law, many of which will be described in detail in Part III. In-
cluded are exemptions for securities (including certain listed securi-
ties), for transactions by an issuer (including small and limited 
 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Keith Paul Bishop, A Taxonomy of Issuer and Nonissuer Transactions, ALLEN 
MATKINS (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.calcorporatelaw.com/a-taxonomy-of-issuer-and-nonissuer-
transacations (citing MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 10.03[2]). 
 84. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25130. 
 85. Olson, supra note 67, at 80–81. 
 86. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019. For a discussion of how the definition of a “security” has been 
interpreted by the courts, see generally Georg Behrens, What Is a Security? The California Synthe-
sis on the 50th Anniversary of the Corporate Securities Act of 1968, 46 & 47 LINCOLN L. REV. 23 
(2019/2020) (discussing the different approaches and tests used to determine what falls within the 
definition of a security). 
 87. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25017(e). 
 88. This is in contrast to the position of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 
not requiring registration of options separate and apart from the underlying shares until the time 
they become exercisable. See Alan H. Hyde, Employee Stock Plans and the Securities Act of 1933, 
16 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 75, 85–86 (1964). 
 89. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25017(f)(2). 
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offerings), for reorganizations and recapitalizations, and for nonissuer 
transactions.90 The use of negotiating permits was essentially elimi-
nated through the addition of exemptions for offers, negotiations, and 
agreements for which applications for negotiating permits would oth-
erwise have been required.91 
The Commissioner was empowered to exempt by rule any trans-
actions as not being comprehended within the purposes of the 1968 
Law on a finding that qualification would not be necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.92 This 
authority has been used extensively and provides the Commissioner 
with considerable flexibility in exempting transactions without having 
to go through the extensive legislative process that would otherwise 
be required.93 Equally important is a provision authorizing the Com-
missioner to issue interpretative opinions that can be relied upon by 
the recipient.94 The Commissioner also issues administrative and in-
terpretative releases to provide guidance under the 1968 Law.95 
One of the most significant changes in the 1968 Law was to pro-
vide for three different procedures for qualification of the offer and 
sale of securities: 
• qualification by coordination96 applies to offerings for 
which a registration statement has been filed with the SEC 
 
 90. See Olson, supra note 67, at 82–91; Levin, supra note 31, at 94–100. 
 91. See Olson, supra note 67, at 87. A definitive permit will normally be issued if a negotiating 
permit would be issued, except where the material terms of the offering remain to be negotiated. 
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.102 (2020). There is no civil liability if a sale is qualified prior to 
the payment or receipt of any part of the consideration, even though an offer to sell or a contract of 
sale may have been made or entered into without qualification. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25503. 
 92. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25105. 
 93. Olson, supra note 67, at 91. 
 94. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25618, 25700; Olson, supra note 67, at 91. 
 95. These releases had been available by mail, but it was not until 1972 that a compilation of 
releases from 1969 to 1971 was published. See CAL. DEP’T OF CORPS., CALIFORNIA 
COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS OFFICIAL OPINIONS: POLICY LETTERS 1969–1971 (1972). 
Some of the releases are now available on the Department’s website at Commissioner’s Releases, 
Selected Opinions, Bulletins and Notices, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN. PROT. AND INNOVATION, 
https://dfpi.ca.gov/commissioners-releases-selected-opinions-bulletins-and-notices/ (last updated 
Dec. 11, 2019). The releases can also be found in 3 HAROLD MARSH, JR. & ROBERT H. VOLK, 
PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA SECURITIES LAW app. a-1 (Keith Paul Bishop ed., Matthew 
Bender rev. ed. 2020) and in LEXISNEXIS, CALIFORNIA CORPORATIONS CODE AND COMMERCIAL 
CODE WITH SECURITIES RULES AND RELEASES (2021 ed.). 
 96. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25111. 
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under the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Securities 
Act”),97 
• qualification by notification98 applies to offerings of secu-
rities registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (“1934 Exchange Act”),99 and 
• qualification by permit100 applies to all other issuer trans-
actions. 
 Qualification by coordination and notification becomes effective au-
tomatically if, in the case of qualification by coordination, certain con-
ditions have been met, and in the case of qualification by notification, 
the requisite time period has elapsed.101 Qualification by permit, as 
before, becomes effective upon the Commissioner issuing a permit au-
thorizing the sale of the securities.102 
The form for applications became standardized. A facing page 
was adopted by rule of the Commissioner that requires information 
about the type of qualification, the applicant, and the offering,103 and 
the rules pertaining to each type of qualification contain the infor-
mation and documents to be included in and to accompany the appli-
cation.104 
While the 1968 Law preserves the “fair, just, and equitable” 
standard, it shifts the burden to the Commissioner in the case of qual-
ification by coordination and notification. The Commissioner may is-
sue a stop order denying, suspending, or revoking effectiveness of 
qualification by coordination or notification of an underwritten offer-
ing on a finding that the order is in the public interest, that the proposed 
plan of business or issuance or sale is not “fair, just, and equitable,” 
 
 97. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa). 
 98. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25112. 
 99. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq). 
 100. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25113. 
 101. See id. §§ 25111–25112; Olson, supra note 67, at 92–93. 
 102. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25113; Olson, supra note 67, at 93. There is no time limit within 
which the Commissioner must act, but it has been argued that the Commissioner can be forced to 
issue or deny a permit within the period required for holding a hearing if it is believed that an 
unreasonably long delay has occurred. See Marc H. Cochran, Comment, Close Corporation Secu-
rities Qualification: A Call for an Extension of Prior Intent, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 147, 160 
(1979). 
 103. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.110 (2020). 
 104. Id. §§ 260.111–.113. 
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that the issuer does not intend to transact its business fairly and hon-
estly, or that the securities proposed to be issued or the method to be 
used in issuing them will tend to work a fraud upon the purchasers.105 
For qualification by coordination or notification of an offering that is 
not underwritten, the standard is worded somewhat differently.106 In 
addition, the Commissioner’s authority to issue a stop order is limited 
in the case of the qualification by coordination of certain types of reg-
istered offerings.107 In the case of qualification by permit, the Com-
missioner must make an affirmative finding with respect to these same 
standards, including that the proposed plan of business and the pro-
posed issuance of securities are “fair, just, and equitable.”108 
The rules adopted by the Commissioner establish standards to 
evaluate a wide variety of proposed offerings of securities and differ 
depending upon whether a “limited offering qualification” or an “open 
qualification” is being sought.109 They are presented as guidelines in 
the situations covered for the exercise of the Commissioner’s discre-
tion and, unlike the practice under the 1917 Act, are not meant to pre-
clude the application of more liberal or stringent standards if justified 
by the circumstances.110 A variation will be granted at the request of 
an applicant in the case of a limited offering qualification if it is pos-
sible to find that the offer and sale will not be “unfair, unjust or ineq-
uitable” to the initial purchasers.111 
Finally, the 1968 Law eliminated the concept that securities is-
sued without a permit or in nonconformity with a permit were 
“void.”112 This was always a particularly troublesome problem for 
lawyers and had generated a considerable amount of litigation.113 Wal-
ter G. Olson, commenting on the elimination of the “void” concept, 
wrote: “A more glaring failure to provide legislative guidance for the 
courts is difficult to find, and it is no wonder that the result has been 
 
 105. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140(a)(1). 
 106. See id. § 25140(a)(2). 
 107. See infra text accompanying note 412. 
 108. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140(b). 
 109. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.001(e)–(f). The distinction is whether the offer and 
sale of the securities is only to persons designated by name or class or is without restriction as to 
the persons or class of persons. 
 110. See id. § 260.140; MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 8.01[4][c]. 
 111. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.140. 
 112. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 14.06[1]. 
 113. For a discussion of this litigation up to 1946, see Dahlquist III, supra note 24, at 551–54. 
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irremedial [sic] chaos for the honest issuer and frustrating ineffective-
ness for the practitioner seeking proper redress for his injured cli-
ent.”114 In lieu of this concept, the 1968 Law provides for specific civil 
remedies and time limits for an investor to make a claim. In the case 
of a permit violation, it allows an issuer to make a written repurchase 
offer to cut off an investor’s private right of action.115 
III.  CHANGES AFFECTING CERTAIN ISSUER TRANSACTIONS 
With this overview, we will now examine how changes in the 
California securities law over time affected each of three types of is-
suer transactions: private stock offerings, real estate syndications, and 
public stock offerings.116 To put this in perspective, each of these sec-
tions begins with a brief history of capital formation pertaining to that 
type of transaction. This is followed first by a description of practice 
under the 1917 Act through 1968 and then of practice under the 1968 
Law to the present. Included are developments in the federal securities 
law, as well as actions taken by self-regulatory organizations, that 
have had an impact on the California securities law as applied to each 
of these types of issuer transactions. Many of these changes are pre-
sented by category (e.g., exemptions and qualification) roughly in 
chronological order to give a sense of timing and the rate at which they 
were made. 
A.  Private Stock Offerings 
The discussion begins with private offerings of stock, which for 
this purpose means the nonpublic offer and sale of stock only to per-
sons designated by name or class.117 
 
 114. Olson, supra note 67, at 96. 
 115. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25507(b) (Deering 2020); Olson, supra note 67, at 97. 
 116. These are all issuer transactions and were selected as being those that arguably were im-
pacted the most by the changes in the California securities law. Other transactions that were also 
impacted include changes in rights, preferences, privileges, and restrictions; mergers and acquisi-
tions; and nonissuer offers and sales of securities. 
 117. This is taken from CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.001(e) (2020), which defines a “Limited 
Offering Qualification” as “a qualification which authorizes the offer and sale of securities only to 
persons designated therein by name or class.” 
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1.  Background 
During the first part of the twentieth century, merchant banks and 
the public would buy shares in, or lend money to, companies with tan-
gible assets or recurring revenues.118 Ventures that fit in neither cate-
gory presented a greater risk and were forced to rely for capital on 
wealthy individuals and families.119 Most of this investment activity 
originated in the eastern United States. An exception was William H. 
Crocker, a well-respected San Francisco financier and son of Charles 
Crocker (one of the “big four” railroad entrepreneurs), who began in-
vesting in startups in the early 1900s, including the Federal Telegraph 
Company.120 
Another innovator from that era was A.P. Giannini, who through 
his Bank of Italy, focused on a neglected market, taking deposits from 
and making loans to small businesses and individuals.121 The bank 
spread throughout California in the 1920s by establishing branches 
and eventually was renamed the Bank of America.122 By 1921, it had 
four hundred thousand depositors, the most in the United States, and 
six years later it surpassed one million depositors and was the nation’s 
third largest bank by assets.123 It survived the Great Depression and in 
1945 became the world’s largest bank. 
California was spared the full impact of the Great Depression un-
til the early 1930s.124 Because the California economy was diversified, 
it was not crippled as much as many of the industrialized states of the 
Northeast or the Midwestern states whose economies were based on 
agriculture.125 
Among the laws enacted by Congress after the stock market crash 
in 1929 were the following: 
• The 1933 Securities Act that requires the registration with 
the SEC of offers and sales of securities using interstate 
 
 118. See Nicolas Colin, A Brief History of the World (of Venture Capital), THE FAMILY (May 4, 
2016), https://salon.thefamily.co/a-brief-history-of-the-world-of-venture-capital-65a8610e7dc2. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See TOM NICHOLAS, VC: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 84–85 (2019). 
 121. See Jason Zweig, An Unlikely Hero for 1906, 1929 . . . and Today, WALL ST. J. (May 29, 
2020, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-unlikely-hero-for-1906-1929-and-today-
11590764100; see also KEVIN STARR, CALIFORNIA: A HISTORY 187–89 (2005). 
 122. Zweig, supra note 121. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. STARR, supra note 121, at 193. 
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transportation, commerce, or the mails absent the availa-
bility of an exemption and prohibits misrepresentations 
and other fraud in the sale of securities.126 
• The 1934 Exchange Act that empowers the SEC to regis-
ter, regulate, and oversee brokers, transfer agents, and 
clearing agencies, as well as self-regulatory organizations 
such as securities exchanges.127 It also prohibits certain 
types of conduct in the securities markets and provides for 
registration, reporting, and disclosures by companies hav-
ing publicly-traded securities. 
• The Banking Act of 1933 (“1933 Banking Act”) (better 
known as the Glass-Steagall Act)128 that, in an effort to 
curb conflicts of interest and excessive risk taking, sepa-
rated commercial banking from underwriting and securi-
ties trading. 
The 1933 Securities Act created dual federal and state regulation 
of securities transactions.129 Its limitations on the solicitation of inves-
tors, together with the requirements imposed by the states, made it 
more difficult for startups and smaller businesses to raise capital. Con-
sequently, funding usually came from the founders, their families, and 
others with whom the founders had social or business relationships. 
World War II had a significant impact on the California economy. 
The federal government spent more than $35 billion in California dur-
ing the war years.130 This influx of funds multiplied California’s man-
ufacturing economy “by a factor of 2.5 and tripled the average 
 
 126. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a–77aa). 
 127. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq). 
 128. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 12 U.S.C.); see JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 204 (1997). The 1933 Banking Act was largely repealed in 1999 when Con-
gress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.) which allowed commercial banks to 
again engage in investment banking and securities trading. 
 129. For an interesting discussion of the scope of the state and the newly-adopted federal secu-
rities laws, the extent to which they were concurrently applicable, and the need, if any, for correla-
tion of the regulatory functions of each, see Russell A. Smith, The Relation of Federal and State 
Securities Law, 4 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (1937). 
 130. STARR, supra note 121, at 237. 
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personal income.”131 There was also a huge increase in the population 
caused in part by the growing economy and the opportunities it pre-
sented. The new challenge after World War II was to provide the cap-
ital necessary to convert U.S. industry from manufacturing weapons 
and other military systems to manufacturing consumer goods.132 In the 
mid-1940s, a few wealthy individuals and families created their own 
investment firms to make equity investments.133 In these firms, pro-
fessional management teams took responsibility for sourcing opportu-
nities, evaluating risks, and negotiating the terms of the invest-
ments.134 By 1946, several of these firms were based in San 
Francisco,135 and later others were established in Southern California. 
Since these firms did not rely on government support with the at-
tendant regulatory requirements, they were somewhat more attractive 
to entrepreneurs. The source of equity capital for startups and smaller 
businesses, however, continued largely unchanged. 
The Small Business Act of 1953,136 enacted by Congress in 1953, 
created the Small Business Administration (SBA). The authority of 
the SBA was limited to making direct loans to businesses or arranging 
for loans to be made by qualified lenders that are partially guaranteed 
by the federal government.137 In order to encourage technological ad-
vances during the Cold War, Congress passed the Small Business In-
vestment Act of 1958.138 This Act allowed licensed private firms, 
known as Small Business Investment Companies (SBICs), to borrow 
funds from the federal government at below-market rates that could 
be leveraged against privately-raised funds for investment in debt or 
equity of entrepreneurial ventures.139 Over 700 SBICs were in opera-
tion by the mid-1960s.140 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Colin, supra note 118. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See NICHOLAS, supra note 120, at 97 tbl.3-1. 
 136. Small Business Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 232 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 631–657u). 
 137. Id. at 235–36. 
 138. Small Business Investment Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-699, 72 Stat. 689 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 661). 
 139. See generally The History of Private Equity, INVESTMENT U, https://investmentu.com/pri-
vate-equity-history/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2020); NICHOLAS, supra note 120, at 135–42 (discussing 
the rise and development of SBICs). 
 140. See NICHOLAS, supra note 120, at 137 fig.4.5. 
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By this time, “aspects of the modern [venture capital] investment 
model had started to be established.”141 Independent venture capital 
firms were formed with professional managers, many of whom had 
prior experience with SBICs, to meet the demand that arose from 
small, newly-created companies with high growth potential.142 This 
category of investment was known as risk or venture capital and was 
a subset of private equity.143 
When the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974144 
was enacted in 1974, a prudence rule made it uncertain as to whether 
corporate pension funds could invest in risky investments, including 
investments in small or new companies. In 1979, an amendment was 
introduced that made it possible for pension plans to use a total port-
folio approach to managing risk exposure, rather than to subject single 
investments to a risk analysis in isolation.145 As a result, more institu-
tional investors, such as pension funds, foundations, and endowment 
funds, made investments in private equity and venture capital firms.146 
An example is the California Public Employees’ Retirement System. 
Beginning in the 1980s, many large corporations began to spon-
sor in-house venture capital units for financial gain as well as to ex-
pand their technological reach.147 Outside the formal venture capital 
investing channel, capital also became available from individuals 
(called “angel investors”), typically having a net worth in the millions 
of dollars. It was estimated that by the late 1980s, about 250,000 angel 
investors existed (roughly 100,000 being active at any point in time), 
and they collectively accounted for a pool of capital at least twice the 
size of that managed by organized venture capital firms.148 
 
 141. Id. at 142–43. 
 142. Id. 
 143. The other subset of private equity consists of firms that were formed to effect and manage 
leveraged buyouts of existing companies. 
 144. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
 145. See NICHOLAS, supra note 120, at 176–77. In 2020, the Department of Labor issued an 
information letter that allowed investments in private equity as a component of professionally-
managed defined contribution plans, such as 401(k) plans. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. 
Department of Labor Issues Information Letter on Private Equity Investments (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/ebsa/ebsa20200603-0. 
 146. See NICHOLAS, supra note 120, at 176–77. 
 147. Id. at 243–46. 
 148. Id. at 239. 
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A major development that had a significant impact on private and 
public offerings was the enactment by Congress of the National Secu-
rities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (NSMIA).149 NSMIA ex-
panded the source of private equity and venture capital by increasing 
the number and type of persons who could invest in private investment 
companies before they would be required to register under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”).150 The Act 
added an exclusion from registration allowing private investment 
companies to sell interests to “qualified purchasers,” which include 
natural persons, family-owned companies, and institutional investors 
that own not less than a specified dollar amount of investments.151 
As time went on, the venture capital and private equity firms 
achieved scale through a combination of government policy and loans 
from the banking sector, as well as a robust market for initial public 
offerings (IPOs) that, along with the sale of portfolio companies, cre-
ated an opportunity for liquidity.152 In 2019, 10,430 companies re-
ceived $133 billion in venture capital funding, with California firms 
accounting for 33.7 percent of the investment in these companies, 49.2 
percent of the capital invested, and $257.7 billion of assets under man-
agement.153 It was also estimated that the number of active angel in-
vestors reached over 330,000 and the amount invested exceeded $23 
billion in fiscal 2019.154 
 
 149. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 
3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 150. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a-64). 
 151. See Privately Offered Investment Companies, Investment Companies Act Release No. 
22,597, 62 Fed. Reg. 17,512 (Apr. 9, 1997) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270). The Invest-
ment Company Act was amended by the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Pro-
tection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018), to increase another exclusion from no 
more than one hundred investors to no more than 250 investors with other limitations. 
 152. See NICHOLAS, supra note 120, at 239. 
 153. See Yearbook, NVCA 2020 Yearbook, Nat’l Venture Cap. Ass’n 17, 24, 28 (Mar. 2020), 
https://nvca.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/NVCA-2020-Yearbook.pdf (includes angel investor 
and corporate venture capital participation). While the number of venture capital transactions de-
clined significantly in the first half of 2020, there was only a small decline in total dollar volume. 
See Yuliya Chernova, Venture Capital Deals Stay Strong, Despite Pandemic, WALL ST. J., July 15, 
2020, at B4. 
 154. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFF. OF ADVOC. FOR SMALL BUS. CAP. FORMATION, 
ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 18 (2020), https://www.sec.gov/files/2019_OASB_
Annual%20Report.pdf [U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019]. 
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One cannot overlook, however, the significance of small busi-
nesses in the economy, many of which are not dependent on institu-
tional investment sources. It is estimated that in 2019 a majority of the 
early-stage small businesses relied on personal funds, retained earn-
ings, loans, or credit cards for capital, while only 7 percent relied on 
equity investments.155 
While agriculture, entertainment, tourism, manufacturing, and 
other sectors continue to be important for the growth of the California 
economy, Silicon Valley has become the leading center for high-tech 
innovation and development. In 2019, California represented 15 per-
cent of the U.S. economy, and if it had been considered separately, it 
would have been the fifth largest economy in the world, ranked be-
tween Germany and the United Kingdom.156 This of course does not 
reflect the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in 2020. It is 
still too early to predict how long this condition might last, and what 
the new “normal” might look like. 
2.  Practice Under the 1917 Act (1917 to 1968) 
Under the 1917 Act, almost every offer, sale, and issuance of 
stock in a private offering in California had to be qualified by permit. 
As previously discussed, the exemptions were few in number. Profes-
sor Jennings wrote that “the California statute rejects the idea of a 
small issues exemption of corporate securities, based upon private of-
fers, amount of securities, or the number of offers or sales, the theory 
being that such exemptions are neither necessary nor advisable,” and 
further that “[a] ‘private-offering’ exemption when applied to corpo-
rate securities has proved to be much too vague and susceptible of 
evasion.”157 Consequently, issuers were required to obtain permits for 
the issuance of shares to one person, to existing shareholders, to indi-
viduals and their spouses upon the initial organization of a so-called 
“mom and pop” business, or to a public company in connection with 
the formation of a wholly-owned subsidiary. In addition, there was no 
exemption for sales by companies that had securities listed on a na-
tional securities exchange, the theory being “that merely listing a 
 
 155. Id. at 16. 
 156. See Best States for Business 2019, FORBES (Dec. 2019), www.forbes.com/places/ca/. 
 157. Jennings, supra note 19, at 217. 
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security for trading confers no badge entitling it to immunity from reg-
ulation.”158 
The process often began with the filing of an application for a 
negotiating or “offering” permit.159 The dilemma for lawyers in apply-
ing for these permits is covered later in some detail in the discussion 
of real estate syndications. To obtain a permit covering the actual is-
suance, a separate application for a definitive or “closed” permit had 
to be filed with the Department.160 Applications for negotiating and 
definitive permits generated a lot of work for lawyers and were a sig-
nificant burden in terms of time and expense for issuers, particularly 
small businesses. 
Even in the most straight-forward transactions, it was common 
for an examiner to send a letter asking questions or pointing out what 
were viewed as deficiencies in an application. Given the limited meth-
ods of communication of the day, the policies adopted by the Depart-
ment were not widely known. Communications with the examiner 
were conducted by mail, telephone and, when necessary, personal ap-
pearances at the Department. Any deficiencies could be remedied by 
filing an amended application. Unresolved issues were often appealed 
to a supervisor or Deputy or Assistant Commissioner. When there 
were particular issues that lawyers would like to have considered by 
the Department, it was not unusual for a pre-filing conference to be 
requested. Most problems tended to be worked out, and there were 
relatively few denials, abandonments, or withdrawals. 
As one of the conditions previously discussed,161 permits increas-
ingly contained a requirement that the certificates representing the 
shares be deposited and remain in escrow until released by an order of 
the Commissioner.162 In addition, any transfers of the shares held in 
escrow required the consent of the Commissioner.163 This condition 
was initially imposed to maintain control over secondary distributions 
or resales of the securities and later out of a concern that they might 
 
 158. Id. at 216–17. 
 159. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 3.01[2]. 
 160. See id. § 6.05[3][a]. 
 161. See supra text accompanying note 56. 
 162. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[7][d]. 
 163. See id. 
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be transferred to unsophisticated persons who might not have adequate 
knowledge of the business or affairs of the issuer.164 
The Commissioner served as the escrow holder unless another 
person was designated in the permit to act in that capacity.165 Fre-
quently, lawyers representing the issuers were designated as escrow 
holders and often handled applications for the transfer or release of 
shares from escrow.166 
An application for consent to transfer typically included the name 
of the applicant and, in most cases, a description of the consideration, 
as well as an acknowledgment of each proposed purchaser’s aware-
ness of the reason for the escrow condition.167 Statements as to the 
sophistication of the purchaser and the purchaser’s knowledge of the 
business and affairs of, or positions with, the issuer were later re-
quired.168 
Recognizing the difficulties with escrows, the Commissioner in 
1967 adopted rules to include a legend condition in lieu of an escrow 
in permits for non-promotional securities.169 It was believed that a leg-
end would also be effective in controlling subsequent transfers and 
preventing the shares from being distributed or transferred to unso-
phisticated persons. In purging the escrow files, the Department found 
that almost 80 percent of the companies with securities held by the 
Commissioner in escrow were no longer in business and had dissolved 
or been suspended by the California Secretary of State for nonpayment 
of taxes.170 
 
 164. See id. 
 165. See id. § 9.03[2]. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. § 1.03[7][d]. 
 168. Id. For a time, an order permitting the transfer of securities in escrow would only be 
granted if the transferee met the qualifications for the original issuance of the securities. This some-
times became a problem in obtaining orders for transfers incident to a divorce or the death of an 
original issuee, whether by name or class. 
 169. Id. § 9.03[2]. The Commissioner still has the authority to require the deposit of securities 
in escrow as a condition to qualification, specifically in cases where it is determined that there is 
an unusual danger that promotional shares might be distributed to the public despite a legend on 
the certificates. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25141 (Deering 2020); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.141.3 
(2020). 
 170. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 9.03[2]. 
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3.  Practice Under the 1968 Law (1969 to the Present) 
The 1968 Law was intended to facilitate the raising of capital and 
to eliminate some of the problems with the 1917 Act. At the outset, 
the addition of “in this state” as a defined term changed the jurisdic-
tional reach of the securities law and provided some clarification for 
lawyers in advising their clients as to when the qualification require-
ments would be applicable.171 The 1968 Law also makes it clear that 
the qualification requirements are triggered by the offer and sale, not 
the issuance, of securities. 
A number of exemptions from qualification that apply to the offer 
and sale of stock in private offerings were added in the 1968 Law. One 
of the most significant transactional exemptions is section 25102(a), 
which exempts offers, but not sales, not involving a public offering, 
and allows issuers to enter into an agreement pursuant to the offer that 
contains specified language so long as no part of the purchase price is 
paid, and none of the securities are issued before the sale is qualified 
unless it is exempt.172 The Commissioner by rule provided that, for 
this purpose, no public offering is involved if an offer is made to not 
more than twenty-five persons, not including certain specified per-
sons.173 Although this essentially eliminated the need for negotiating 
permits, the 1968 Law also exempts offers, but not sales, pursuant to 
a negotiating permit.174 
The 1968 Law exempts any offer or sale of securities to specified 
institutional investors and to any corporation with outstanding securi-
ties registered under section 12 of the 1934 Exchange Act175 or any 
wholly-owned subsidiary that will own directly or indirectly all of the 
outstanding stock of the issuer, subject to delivery of an investment 
 
 171. Because of the breadth of the definition of “offer” under the 1968 Law, the Commissioner 
in 1996 issued an order exempting offers on or through the Internet that meet certain conditions. 
Cal. Dep’t of Crops., Offers of Securities Made on the Internet, Commissioner’s Release No. 100-
C (Nov. 5, 1996), https://dfpi.ca.gov/commissioners-release-100-c/. 
 172. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(a). 
 173. Cal. Dep’t of Corps., Guidelines for Determining When Securities Are Being “Offered to 
the Public,” Commissioner’s Release No. 5-C (Jan. 31, 1969), https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/up-
loads/sites/337/2019/03/5C.pdf. The number of persons was later increased to 35. See CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 10, § 260.102.1. 
 174. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(c); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.102. 
 175. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 12, 48 Stat. 881, 892–94 (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq); see 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2018). 
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representation.176 This, for the first time, allowed public companies 
and their wholly-owned subsidiaries to form subsidiaries without re-
quiring a permit. The Commissioner, by rule, later added to this list 
corporations with a consolidated net worth of at least $14 million, sub-
ject to nexus and other limitations.177 Also later exempted by rule were 
the offer and sale of common shares, or any warrant or right to sub-
scribe to those shares, by an issuer that has securities registered under 
section 12 of the 1934 Exchange Act, subject to certain listing, finan-
cial and other conditions.178 
For the first time, an exemption was adopted specifically for small 
offerings. It had been estimated that sales of stock to an individual or 
an individual and spouse were responsible for almost one third of the 
workload of the Commissioner’s staff and represented in excess of 
7,000 of the 22,000 permits issued during the Department’s 1968 fis-
cal year.179 This exemption was added as section 25102(h),180 which, 
as initially adopted, contained the following conditions, all of which 
were required to be met: 
• the issuer is a California corporation, 
• having only common stock outstanding, 
• which, after giving effect to the proposed sale, is benefi-
cially owned by no more than five persons, 
• no advertising is published and no selling expenses are in-
curred, 
• no promotional consideration is involved, 
• with certain provisos, the shares are issued for (i) assets 
(subject to liabilities) of an existing business transferred 
to the issuer upon its initial organization, or (ii) cash or 
cancellation of indebtedness for money borrowed, or both, 
upon initial organization, or (iii) cash following initial 
 
 176. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(i). 
 177. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.102.10(b). 
 178. See id. § 260.105.17(a). 
 179. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[8][c]. There was testimony before an Assembly 
committee in January 1960 to the effect that the amount for new securities cleared for sale in Cali-
fornia was approaching $1 billion per month and that every month the Department had issued in 
excess of 1,800 permits. See Edwards, supra note 70, at 814 n.1. This was a significant increase 
from the 477 permits issued by the Department for the sale of securities in 1928. See Dalton II, 
supra note 57, at 256. 
 180. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(h). 
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organization in a sale to existing shareholders, or (iv) any 
other legal consideration if there is only one shareholder, 
• the share certificates have been legended in accordance 
with the Commissioner’s rules, 
• a notice is filed with the Commissioner signed by all the 
officers and directors and the issuees, and 
• availability of the exemption is confirmed by an opinion 
of California counsel.181 
It is obvious that these conditions were carefully crafted to cap-
ture the types of transactions that were thought to be less likely to need 
regulatory scrutiny.182 While section 25102(h) certainly reduced the 
number of permits sought, it was still very narrow, and was considered 
to be the most restrictive of similar exemptions in other states.183 
One of the conditions for reliance on this exemption was that the 
share certificates bear a legend restricting transfer without the consent 
of the Commissioner.184 As indicated previously, this had already been 
adopted by the Commissioner in lieu of an escrow as a condition for 
permits.185 
There was a question about what to do with the previous permits 
that had required an escrow. The Commissioner adopted a rule to the 
effect that permits, other than those also providing for promotional 
shares subject to dividend waivers, were deemed amended to delete 
the escrow condition and to substitute a legend restricting transfer.186 
Escrow holders could stamp or print the legend on the certificates and 
distribute them to the holders.187 A release of shares from escrow was 
only required for those who requested that the certificates be legended 
or delivered once legended so as to avoid the difficulty of being unable 
to locate the holders.188 With thousands of escrows in existence, this 
required a considerable effort by issuers and escrow holders. 
While the change to a restrictive legend was welcomed, it re-
mained a burden because the consent of the Commissioner was still 
 
 181. See Olson, supra note 67, at 86–87. 
 182. See generally Bickford, supra note 23, at 510–18 (discussing the restrictive nature of the 
“small issue” exemption created by section 25102(h)). 
 183. See id. at 511. 
 184. Id. at 512, 515. 
 185. See supra text accompanying note 169. 
 186. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.141.13 (2020). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 9.04[1]. 
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required for any subsequent sales or transfers of the shares, and an 
order was required for removal of the legend. It was not unusual for 
lawyers to discover at the last minute before a proposed sale or transfer 
of stock that the certificates had been imprinted with a restrictive leg-
end and that consent of the Commissioner would be required before 
the sale or transfer could be completed. 
Eventually, changes were made by the legislature to expand the 
utility of section 25102(h). In 1973, the number of beneficial owners 
was increased from five to ten and the exemption was extended to cor-
porations formed in other states.189 In 1983, the number of beneficial 
owners was again increased to thirty-five.190 
The notice condition was also amended to remove the necessity 
of obtaining the signatures of the officers and directors of the issuer 
and of the issuees.191 This had posed a logistical problem for issuers, 
as well as requiring them to convince these persons to sign the form. 
However, an opinion of counsel is still required to this day.192 
Finally, section 25102(h) was amended in 1996 to require that the 
purchasers provide an investment representation in lieu of imprinting 
legends on the share certificates.193 The 1996 amendment also pro-
vided that shares that had been issued previously in reliance on section 
25102(h) were no longer subject to the restrictions on transfer and is-
suers could remove the legends without the consent of the Commis-
sioner.194 This again required that lawyers and their clients make ar-
rangements with the shareholders for the exchange of certificates, but 
 
 189. Act of Sept. 5, 1973, ch. 390, § 2, 1973 Cal. Stat. 839, 840 (codified as amended at CAL. 
CORP. CODE § 25102). 
 190. Act of July 28, 1983, ch. 442, § 1, 1983 Cal. Stat. 1750, 1750–54 (codified as amended at 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102). 
 191. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 4.02[12]. 
 192. The purpose of this requirement was said to be that the involvement of a lawyer would not 
only tend to avoid abuse by persons claiming the exemption when it was inapplicable, but that it 
would also reduce the possibility of an accidental failure to meet all of its conditions. See id. 
§ 4.02[13][c]. Many believed, however, that this requirement was unnecessary, and it was rumored 
at the time that it was actually imposed in response to a lobbying effort on behalf of general prac-
titioners who insisted on remaining involved in the incorporation process. 
 193. Act of May 6, 1996, ch. 41, § 1, 1996 Cal. Stat. 154, 154–62 (codified at CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 25102). This change was consistent with the exemption in CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(f) (Deering 
2020) that had been amended in 1981 to require an investment representation. See infra text ac-
companying note 211. 
 194. Act of May 6, 1996 § 1. 
 
(6) 54.1_BROCKMEYER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/21  2:51 PM 
34 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1 
it had finally eliminated the involvement of the Commissioner in sales 
and transfers of these shares. 
In the 1970s, Congress and the SEC also had been considering 
adding exemptions to registration for small and limited offerings in 
order to facilitate the raising of capital. The exemption typically relied 
on by issuers in private offerings had been section 4(2) of the 1933 
Securities Act (later redesignated as section 4(a)(2) by the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act)195 that exempts from registration “transac-
tions by an issuer not involving any public offering.”196 The intrastate 
offering exemption in section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Securities Act197 
had also been used by some for private offerings, but created some 
compliance risks.198 The question of what constitutes a “public offer-
ing” was left to judicial and SEC interpretations and created consider-
able uncertainty for lawyers advising their clients. 
To facilitate the raising of capital, the SEC adopted several ex-
emptions and “safe harbors” for certain limited or small offerings.199 
In the process, concepts were introduced that influenced the regulation 
of securities in California and other states. The rules containing these 
exemptions and “safe harbors” were the following:200 
• SEC Rule 146201 was adopted in 1974 to permit issuers to 
raise an unlimited amount of capital.202 Reliance was con-
ditioned on an issuer’s reasonable belief as to the requisite 
 
 195. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
 196. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, § 4(2), 48 Stat. 74, 84 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa); 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2018). 
 197. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11); 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11). 
 198. See Sidney Sosin, The Intrastate Exemption: Public Offerings and the Issue Concept, 16 
CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 110, 112 (1964). 
 199. For a description of these exemptions, see Symposium, Recent Developments in Corporate 
and Securities Law, 14 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79, 120–24 (1980). 
 200. See generally U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION 
OF “ACCREDITED INVESTOR” 12–14 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/files/review-definition-of-ac-
credited-investor-12-18-2015.pdf (summarizing the small business exemptions prior to Regulation 
D). For a historical perspective of the limited methods available for raising private capital under 
the 1933 Securities Act prior to the adoption of SEC Rule 146, see generally Stanley Schwartz, Jr., 
Rule 146: The Private Offering Exemption—Historical Perspective and Analysis, 35 OHIO STATE 
L.J. 738 (1974); Tom A. Alberg & Martin E. Lybecker, New SEC Rules 146 and 147: The Non-
public and Intrastate Offering Exemptions from Registration for the Sale of Securities, 74 COLUM. 
L. REV. 622 (1974). 
 201. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (rescinded 1982); see Transactions by an Issuer Deemed Not to In-
volve Any Public Offering, Securities Act Release No. 5487, 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (May 2, 1974). 
    202. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146. 
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knowledge and experience of offerees in financial matters 
and their ability to evaluate the risks and merits or bear 
the economic risk of the prospective investment. In addi-
tion, it imposed a ceiling of thirty-five persons who could 
purchase the securities. 
• SEC Rule 240203 was adopted in 1975 to permit offerings 
of up to $100,000 for small businesses with no more than 
100 beneficial owners. 
• SEC Rule 242204 was adopted in 1980 to provide an ex-
emption under section 3(b) of the 1933 Securities Act205 
for offerings of up to $2 million and, for the first time, 
introduced an “accredited investor” definition for offer-
ees. Offers could be made to an unlimited number of ac-
credited investors and up to thirty-five nonaccredited in-
vestors. 
To further facilitate these types of offerings, Congress enacted the 
Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980,206 the Omnibus 
Small Business Capital Formation Act of 1980,207 and the Small Busi-
ness Issuers’ Simplification Act of 1980.208 These Acts raised the dol-
lar limit for the SEC’s authority to create small offering exemptions 
under section 3(b) of the 1933 Securities Act from $2 million to $5 
million, provided an exemption from registration for up to the amount 
allowed under section 3(b), added an “accredited investor” definition 
in section 2(a)(15) of the 1933 Securities Act that deferred to the rules 
of the SEC, provided for a forum to consider small business capital 
formation, and authorized cooperation to effectuate greater uniformity 
in federal-state securities matters.209 
 
 203. 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (rescinded 1982); see Exemption for Closely Held Issuers, Securities 
Act Release No. 5560, 40 Fed. Reg. 6484 (Feb. 12, 1975). 
 204. 17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (rescinded 1982); see Exemption of Limited Offers and Sales by 
Qualified Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6180, 45 Fed. Reg. 6362 (Jan. 28, 1980). 
 205. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, § 3(b), 48 Stat. 74, 83 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa); 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1) (2018). 
 206. Small Business Investment Incentive Act, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a–80a-64). 
 207. Omnibus Small Business Capital Formation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 
2291 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80c–80c-3). 
 208. Small Business Issuers’ Simplification Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2294 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 209. Small Business Investment Incentive Act §§ 301, 503, 505, 603. 
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With all these developments at the federal level, it still took 
twelve years for the California legislature to adopt a more useful ex-
emption to facilitate raising capital through limited or small offerings. 
This exemption was adopted in 1981 as an amendment to section 
25102(f) that originally had exempted partnership, joint venture, and 
certain trust interests offered or sold in a transaction not involving a 
public offering.210 As amended, it exempted the sale of securities 
meeting the following conditions: 
• sales are not made to more than thirty-five persons, with 
certain exclusions, 
• all purchasers either have a preexisting personal or busi-
ness relationship with the offeror or certain specified per-
sons or, by reason of their business or financial experience 
or that of their professional advisors, the purchasers could 
be reasonably assumed to have the capacity to protect 
their own interests in connection with the transaction, 
• each purchaser represents that the purchase is being made 
for the purchaser’s own account (or trust account) and not 
with a view to or for sale in connection with any distribu-
tion of the security, 
• the offer and sale are not accomplished by the publication 
of any advertisement, and 
• a notice must be filed if required by rule of the Commis-
sioner.211 
This amendment to section 25102(f) was characterized by Profes-
sor Marsh and Robert H. Volk in their treatise on California securities 
regulation as “the most significant change made by the Legislature in 
the securities law since the enactment of the Corporate Securities Law 
 
 210. Act of Oct. 2, 1981, ch. 1120, § 1, 1981 Cal. Stat. 4387, 4387–91 (codified at CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 25102(f)). 
 211. See William J. Ward, Note, California Corporate Securities Law: Small Business Capital 
Formation and Investor Protection, 13 PAC. L.J. 459, 470–79 (1982); Cal. Dep’t of Corps., Limited 
Offering Exemption Corporations Code Section 25102(f), Commissioner’s Release No. 67-C 
(Oct. 20, 1981), https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2019/03/67c.pdf. The Commis-
sioner adopted an emergency regulation to take effect the same day requiring the filing of a notice 
and providing that the availability of the exemption is not conditioned upon the filing. CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 10, § 260.102.14 (2020). A provision to the same effect was later added to CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 25102(f) (Deering 2020) and eliminated from the regulations. 
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of 1968 and the most significant single amendment adopted since the 
original enactment of the Corporate Securities Law in 1917.”212 
This new exemption has a much broader scope than section 
25102(h).213 For example, it is not limited by the type of issuer or se-
curities.214 It also increased the limit on purchasers to thirty-five, a 
number that had been used by the SEC in several of the exemptions it 
had adopted.215 There were no limitations on the number or qualifica-
tions of offerees or the type of consideration that could be received in 
the transaction.216 While a notice is required to be filed, no opinion of 
counsel is required.217 
A year after the section 25102(f) exemption became effective in 
California, the SEC adopted Regulation D.218 This Regulation re-
placed SEC Rules 146, 240 and 242 and unified much of the SEC’s 
exemption scheme into a single regulation with common definitions, 
terms, and conditions. The new exemptions and “safe harbors” as 
adopted under Regulation D were as follows:219 
• SEC Rule 504220 permitted the sale of up to $500,000 of 
securities in a consecutive twelve-month period, had no 
limit on the number of investors, and did not have any dis-
closure requirements, thereby shifting the regulation of 
these smaller offerings to state regulators. SEC Rule 504 
imposed restrictions on the manner of offering, but issuers 
are permitted to use general solicitation and advertising 
 
 212. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 4.02A[1][a]. 
 213. For descriptions and comparisons of the exemption in section 25102(h) and the newly 
adopted exemption in section 25102(f), see Ward, supra note 211, at 470–79. For a discussion of 
the factors as to why an issuer would choose to rely on either exemption, see MARSH & VOLK, 
supra note 1, § 4.02[3]. 
 214. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 4.02A[1][c][4]. 
 215. Id. § 4.02A[2][b]. 
 216. Id. §§ 4.02A[1][c][1], [1][c][2], [1][c][5]. 
 217. Id. § 4.02A[5]. 
 218. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.500–.508 (2019); see Revisions of Certain Exemptions from Registra-
tion for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. 
Reg. 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982).  
 219. Revisions of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited 
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6839, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982). 
 220. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2019). In 1988, the SEC increased the dollar limit to $1 million, 
Regulation D Revisions, Securities Act Release No. 6758, 53 Fed. Reg. 7,866 (Mar. 10, 1988), and 
in 2017 again increased it to $5 million, Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities 
Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 10,238A, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,067 (Feb. 28, 2017). 
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for certain offers and sales registered or exempt from reg-
istration under state law. 
• SEC Rule 505221 permitted the sale of up to $5 million of 
securities in any consecutive twelve-month period to a 
maximum of thirty-five nonaccredited investors and an 
unlimited number of accredited investors. 
• SEC Rule 506222 permitted the sale to up to thirty-five 
nonaccredited investors and an unlimited number of ac-
credited investors, but had no dollar limitation. The non-
accredited investors, alone or with a purchaser representa-
tive, must be sophisticated—that is, they must have had 
sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and busi-
ness matters to make them capable of evaluating the mer-
its and risks of the prospective investment. 
SEC Rules 504 and 505 were adopted pursuant to section 3(b) 
and SEC Rule 506 was adopted pursuant to section 4(2) (now section 
4(a)(2)) of the 1933 Securities Act. Notices on Form D were required 
to be filed with the SEC for reliance on each of these Rules. Ulti-
mately, the Commissioner allowed the filing of a copy of a Form D in 
lieu of the notice required by section 25102(f) for offerings also made 
in reliance on one of the rules under Regulation D.223 
In 1990, the SEC adopted Regulation S that provides a safe harbor 
from the registration requirements under the 1933 Securities Act for 
offers and sales of securities that occur outside the United States.224 
While this can apply to both private and public offerings, it will be 
discussed below in connection with public stock offerings.225 
In 1994, the California legislature added section 25102(n) as an-
other exemption from qualification.226 Section 25102(n) exempts 
 
 221. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (rescinded 2017). SEC Rule 505 was rescinded in 2017. See Exemp-
tions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 10,238A, 
82 Fed. Reg. 12,067 (Feb. 28, 2017). 
 222. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2019). 
 223. See Cal. Dep’t of Corps., Notice Filing and Fee Payment Requirements for Securities Of-
ferings Under SEC Rule 506, Commissioner’s Release No. 103-C (Dec. 12, 1996), 
https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2019/03/103c.pdf. 
 224. Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306 (May 2, 
1990). 
 225. See infra text accompanying notes 438–41. 
 226. Act of Sept. 27, 1994, ch. 828, § 3, 1994 Cal. Stat. 4097, 4108–09 (codified at CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 25102(n)). 
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offers or sales of securities in transactions that generally meet the fol-
lowing requirements: 
• the issuer is a California corporation, any other form of 
business entity organized in California, or a foreign cor-
poration with a specified California nexus, 
• sales are made only to “qualified purchasers or other per-
sons the issuer reasonably believes, after reasonable in-
quiry, to be qualified purchasers,” which include specified 
organizations, entities, and natural persons meeting cer-
tain net worth and/or gross income thresholds, 
• each purchaser signs an investment representation, and 
• a notice is filed with the Commissioner.227 
This exemption provides no limits on the number of offerees or pur-
chasers and allows publication of a general public announcement of 
the offering containing specified information.228 A disclosure state-
ment is also required to be delivered to prospective purchasers and a 
copy is to be filed with the Department.229 In an unusual move, the 
SEC in 1996 adopted SEC Rule 1001230 under the 1933 Securities Act 
to provide an exemption from registration of offerings of up to $5 mil-
lion that comply with section 25102(n). 
These exemptions were the most significant for private offerings, 
but other exemptions were adopted for particular types of transactions. 
For example, in the 1980s there was a significant increase in the crea-
tion of technology companies, many of which were located in Califor-
nia.231 These companies chose to compensate and incentivize their em-
ployees in part through equity awards.232 Because of the large number 
of employees receiving these awards, it became difficult to avoid 
 
 227. See Cal. Dep’t of Corps., “Qualified Purchaser” Limited Public Offering Exemption Under 
Corporations Code Section 25102(n), Commissioner’s Release No. 94-C (Sept. 27, 1994), 
https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2019/03/94c.pdf. See generally Lee R. Petillon, 
Designed to Scale: The Ability of Small Companies to Raise Capital Has Been Dramatically Eased 
by New Federal and State Securities Rules, 19 L.A. LAW. 31, 34 (1997) (describing the benefits of 
the section 25102(n) exemption). 
 228. Cal. Dep’t of Corps., “Qualified Purchaser” Limited Public Offering Exemption Under 
Corporations Code Section 25102(n), Commissioner’s Release No. 94-C (Sept. 27, 1994), 
https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2019/03/94c.pdf. 
 229. Id. 
 230. 17 C.F.R. § 230.1001 (2019). 
 231. See NICHOLAS, supra note 120, at 7. 
 232. Mark C. Anderson et al., Executive Compensation in the Information Technology Industry, 
46 MGMT. SCI. 530, 530 (2000). 
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registration under the 1933 Securities Act.233 The SEC addressed this 
issue in 1988 by adopting SEC Rule 701,234 which allows companies 
not subject to the SEC’s reporting requirements to offer and sell secu-
rities, within limits, to employees and certain others under compensa-
tory benefit plans or agreements.235 
The California legislature finally dealt with these compensatory 
offerings in 1996 with the adoption of section 25102(o).236 This sec-
tion exempted from the qualification requirements the offer or sale of 
securities by nonpublic corporations237 that comply with SEC Rule 
701, subject to rules of the Commissioner that impose certain substan-
tive requirements on equity awards under compensatory plans or 
agreements.238 Lawyers can now more easily draft plans and agree-
ments for compensatory equity issuances that avoid registration under 
the 1933 Securities Act and qualification under the 1968 Law. 
A development that had a significant impact on private offerings 
was the enactment by Congress of NSMIA in 1996.239 This legislation 
preempts state law to the extent it requires registration, or prohibits, 
limits, or imposes conditions based on the merits, of the offer or sale 
of a “covered security.”240 It does not preempt a state’s antifraud en-
forcement authority.241 Included as a “covered security” are securities 
 
 233. The revised definition of “sale” in the 1968 Law that included an offer or sale of a warrant 
or right to subscribe to another security also raised an issue as to whether the grant of options to 
employees might require qualification. See Bickford, supra note 23, at 524–25. 
 234. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2019); see Compensatory Benefit Plans and Contracts, Securities 
Act Release No. 6768, 53 Fed. Reg. 12,918 (Apr. 20, 1988). 
 235. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701. 
 236. Act of May 6, 1996, ch. 41, § 1, 1996 Cal. Stat. 154, 154–62 (codified at CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 25102); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 260.102.10(b), 260.105.8 (2020) (incentive stock 
options). There were already several exemptions to qualification in California that applied to public 
companies with securities registered under Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 12. See Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 12, 48 Stat. 881, 892–94 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq); 15 U.S.C. § 78l (2018). 
 237. The legislature amended § 25102(o) in 2000 to add limited liability companies to the en-
tities that could rely on the exemption. Act of Sept. 27, 2000, ch. 705, § 4, 2000 Cal. Stat. 4642, 
4644–57 (codified at CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(o)). 
 238. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 260.140.41–.42, .45–.46. 
 239. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 
3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 240. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a) (2018). See generally Robert N. Rapp & Fritz E. Berckmueller, Testing 
the Limits of NSMIA Preemption: State Authority to Determine the Validity of Covered Securities 
and to Regulate Disclosure, 63 BUS. LAW. 809 (2008) (discussing how NSMIA’s preemption af-
fects state authority over the registration and qualification of securities offerings). 
 241. Rapp & Berckmueller, supra note 240, at 813. 
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sold in transactions exempt from registration in reliance on SEC rules 
adopted under section 4(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities Act, which in-
cludes securities sold or offered for sale under SEC Rule 506 of Reg-
ulation D.242 In addition to allowing private companies to raise funds 
without state registration and merit review, it facilitated private place-
ments of equity securities by public companies (PIPEs, for Private In-
vestment in Public Equity) to “accredited investors.”243 Section 
25102.1(d) was adopted by the legislature to recognize the preemption 
of SEC Rule 506 offerings and to provide for the filing with the De-
partment of a copy of the notice filed with the SEC on Form D and the 
payment of a filing fee, both of which are specifically permitted by 
NSMIA.244 
In 1998, section 25102(p)245 was adopted by the legislature to ex-
empt the offer and sale of securities to those meeting the definition of 
an “accredited investor” in section 28031246 by persons licensed under 
the Capital Access Company Law.247 The Capital Access Company 
Law is intended to facilitate California small businesses obtaining fi-
nancing by enabling certain investment companies to rely on an ex-
emption from registration under the Investment Company Act.248 
In recent years, there have been several developments that affect 
private offerings of equity. In April 2012, Congress enacted the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act)249 in support of en-
trepreneurship and small business growth.250 “[T]he JOBS Act 
 
 242. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 § 102. 
 243. See Marc I. Steinberg & Emanuel U. Obi, Examining the Pipeline: A Contemporary 
Assessment of Private Investment in Public Equity (“PIPEs”), 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 3–4 (2008). 
 244. Act of Aug. 26, 1997, ch. 391, § 9, 1997 Cal. Stat. 2614, 2632–33 (codified as amended 
at CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102.1(d)); see Cal. Dep’t of Corps., New Filing Requirements for Regu-
lation D Offerings, Commissioner’s Release No. 120-C (Mar. 24, 2009); Cal. Dep’t of Corps., No-
tice Filings Under the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 Conforming Amend-
ments to the Corporate Securities Law of 1968, Commissioner’s Release No. 109-C (Revised) 
(Feb. 5, 2007), https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2019/03/109c.pdf. 
 245. Act of Sept. 21, 1998, ch. 668, § 1, 1998 Cal. Stat. 4321, 4321–29 (codified at CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 25102(p)). 
 246. CAL. CORP. CODE § 28031 (Deering 2020). 
 247. Act of Sept. 21, 1998 § 3. 
 248. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2018). 
 249. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 250. See generally Mark Hiraide, Ready Capital, 39 L.A. LAW., Dec. 2016, at 18 [hereinafter 
Hiraide, Ready Capital Part I] (discussing how the JOBS Act has enabled businesses to raise capital 
without registering an offering with the SEC and state securities regulators). 
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requires the SEC to eliminate the prohibition on using general solici-
tation under SEC Rule 506 where all purchasers of the securities are 
accredited investors . . . .”251 The SEC implemented this legislation by 
adopting SEC Rule 506(c) in 2013 to permit general solicitation and 
provide “reasonable steps” to verify the “accredited investor” status of 
purchasers.252 The original exemption was redesignated as SEC Rule 
506(b) and continues to be available for issuers that do not wish to 
limit sales to “accredited investors.”253 Offerings made in reliance on 
SEC Rule 506(b) and (c) are preempted from state registration and 
merit review.254 
The JOBS Act also expanded the exemption for Regulation A of-
ferings and exempted equity crowdfunding offerings, subject to im-
plementation by the SEC in what became Regulation Crowdfund-
ing.255 Although these exemptions may apply as well to private 
offerings, they will be discussed below in connection with public stock 
offerings.256 
Another development during this period related to securities ac-
quired in unregistered, private sales from the issuer or an affiliate of 
the issuer, such as those acquired in reliance on SEC Rule 506 and are 
deemed to be “restricted securities” for purposes of the federal securi-
ties law.257 To afford greater liquidity for holders of these securities, 
Congress in 2015, as part of the Fixing America’s Surface Transpor-
tation (FAST) Act, added section 4(a)(7) to the 1933 Securities Act to 
exempt from registration private resales of “restricted securities,” pro-
vided, among other things, that each purchaser is an “accredited 
 
 251. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in SEC 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/info/small-
bus/secg/general-solicitation-small-entity-compliance-guide.htm (last modified Sept. 20, 2013). 
 252. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,471 (July 24, 
2013). 
 253. See Hiraide, Ready Capital Part I, supra note 250, at 21. 
 254. See Overview of Exemptions, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/small-
business/exemptofferings/exemptofferingschart (last modified Feb. 12, 2019). 
 255. Hiraide, Ready Capital Part I, supra note 250, at 21; Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regula-
tion A and the JOBS Act: A Failure to Resuscitate, 7 OHIO STATE ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 317, 319 
(2012) [hereinafter Campbell, Regulation A and the JOBS Act]. 
 256. See infra text accompanying notes 442–59. 
 257. See “Restricted” Securities: Removing the Restrictive Legend, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersrestrichtm.html (last updated Jan. 16, 2013). 
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investor” and there is no general solicitation or advertising.258 The Act 
also added these securities as “covered securities” so they are 
preempted from state registration and merit review.259 
In June 2019, the SEC issued a Concept Release on Harmoniza-
tion of Securities Offering Exemptions (the “Concept Release”) in 
which it solicited comment “on possible ways to simplify, harmonize, 
and improve the exempt offering framework to promote capital for-
mation and expand investment opportunities while maintaining appro-
priate investor protections.”260 The exemptions or “safe harbors” from 
registration under the 1933 Securities Act for which specific comment 
was solicited were section 4(a)(2), SEC Rules 504 and 506, Regulation 
A, Regulation Crowdfunding, and section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Secu-
rities Act and related SEC Rules.261 Comments were also solicited 
with respect to the definition of “accredited investor” and the doctrine 
of “integration” whereby separate securities transactions are consid-
ered part of the same offering.262 The Concept Release appears to have 
been prompted largely by the concerns about the complexity of the 
exempt offering framework that had been expressed over time by mar-
ket participants, as well as by the Government-Business Forums on 
Small Business Capital Formation.263 The SEC often has been criti-
cized for its lack of action in addressing issues that tend to inhibit cap-
ital formation, particularly as applied to small businesses.264 
 
 258. Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 114-94, § 76,001, 129 Stat. 
1312, 1787–88 (2015). 
 259. Id. Earlier, the SEC had provided “safe harbors” in 1972 with the adoption of SEC Rule 
144 for resales of restricted securities in the public markets subject to certain conditions, see 17 
C.F.R. § 230.144 (2019); Definition of Terms “Underwriter” and “Brokers’ Transactions,” Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5223, 37 Fed. Reg. 591 (Jan. 13, 1972), and in 1990 with the adoption of SEC 
Rule 144A for private resales to “qualified institutional investors,” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2019); 
Resale of Restricted Securities, Securities Act Release No. 6862, 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933 (Apr. 30, 
1990). 
 260. Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 10,649, 84 Fed. Reg. 30,460, 30,460 (June 26, 2019) [hereinafter Concept Release]. The 
Concept Release is 211 pages in length and contains 138 requests for comment. 
 261. Id. at 30,485–86, 30,498. 
 262. Id. at 30,469, 30,511. 
 263. Id. at 30,461, 30,461 n.10. 
 264. See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The New Regulation of Small Business Capital For-
mation: The Impact—If Any—of the JOBS Act, 102 KY. L.J. 815, 832–33 (2013/2014); Campbell, 
Regulation A and the JOBS Act, supra note 255, at 317; Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of 
Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes of the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 
BUS. LAW. 919, 919 (2011); Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s 
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After allowing a period of time for comments on the issues raised 
in the Concept Release, the SEC in December 2019 proposed amend-
ments to the “accredited investor” and “qualified institutional buyer” 
definitions,265 and in August 2020 proposed amendments to its rules 
dealing with certain of the exemptions and other aspects of exempt 
offerings raised in the Concept Release.266 
In August 2020, the amendments to the “accredited investor” def-
inition in SEC Rule 501(a) and conforming amendments to the “qual-
ified institutional buyer” definition in SEC Rule 144A were adopted 
by the SEC substantially as they had been proposed.267 The definition 
of an “accredited investor” had remained largely unchanged for more 
than thirty-five years and is based exclusively on a person’s income 
and net worth. Those who do not meet the thresholds, regardless of 
their financial sophistication, have been denied the opportunity to in-
vest in private companies and certain hedge, private equity and ven-
ture capital funds that rely on various exemptions from federal regis-
tration. The SEC has now added to the definition new categories of 
natural persons who have attained specified professional certifica-
tions, designations or credentials, as well as a few new categories of 
entities that meet specified investment requirements.268 The SEC is 
also authorized to add other natural persons whose professional certi-
fications, designations or credentials meet the criteria it has estab-
lished.269 In amending the definition, the SEC chose not to raise the 
income and net worth thresholds for natural persons or adjust them for 
inflation.270 
 
Continuing Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 3–4 
(2007). 
 265. See Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, Securities Act Release No. 10,734, 
85 Fed. Reg. 2574 (Jan. 15, 2019). 
 266. See Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment Opportunities by Improving 
Access to Capital in Private Markets, Securities Act Release No. 10,763, 85 Fed. Reg. 17,956 
(Mar. 31, 2020) [hereinafter Private Markets Proposing Release]. 
 267. See Accredited Investor Definition, Securities Act Release No. 10,824, 85 Fed. Reg. 
64,234 (Oct. 9, 2020) [hereinafter Accredited Investor Release]. 
 268. Id. at 64,237, 64,241. 
 269. Id. at 64,241. 
 270. See Public Statement, Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Mod-
ernization of the Accredited Investor Definition (Aug. 26. 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-
statement/clayton-accredited-investor-2020-08-26. The thresholds for a natural person are an indi-
vidual net worth, or joint net worth with that person’s spouse, exceeding $1 million, exclusive of 
that person’s primary residence, or an individual income exceeding $200,000 in each of the two 
most recent years or exceeding $300,000 with that person’s spouse in each of those years and such 
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Then in November 2020 the amendments to the rules dealing with 
certain of the exemptions and other aspects of exempt offerings were 
adopted by the SEC substantially as they had been proposed.271 In its 
initial proposal, the SEC had stated that “[m]any of the proposed 
amendments are expected to be of greatest benefit to the capital raising 
efforts of small entities that may lack an existing network of angel and 
VC funders and appear to face the greatest constraints in obtaining 
external financing.”272 However, they appear to be more in the nature 
of changes to the current system rather than new approaches to the 
framework of exempt offerings that some had anticipated. 
The changes affect some of the exemptions previously discussed, 
including SEC Rules 504 and 506 of Regulation D, and others affect 
exemptions that are discussed below in the section on public stock of-
ferings.273 The limit for offerings under SEC Rule 504 was increased 
from $5 million to $10 million.274 In addition, the disclosure require-
ments in SEC Rule 506(b) for nonreporting companies making offers 
to nonaccredited investors have been aligned with the requirements 
for Regulation A, and offers could be made to as many as thirty-five 
sophisticated, nonaccredited investors during any ninety-day pe-
riod.275 Changes have also been made in the general solicitation re-
strictions, including adding examples to include present-day commu-
nications and permitting certain events or meetings at which issuers 
are invited to present their investment opportunities to potential inves-
tors (called “demo days”).276 The new rules also add general principles 
and “safe harbors” for integrating offerings and provide that offers and 
sales made in compliance with SEC Rule 701, pursuant to an em-
ployee benefit plan, or with Regulation S will not be integrated with 
other offerings.277 
 
person has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current year. See 17 
C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2019). 
 271. See Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment Opportunities by Improving 
Access to Capital in Private Markets, Securities Act Release No. 10,884, 86 Fed. Reg. 3496 (Jan. 
14, 2021) [hereinafter Private Markets Adopting Release]. 
 272. Private Markets Proposing Release, supra note 266, at 18,038. 
 273. See infra text accompanying note 462. 
 274. Private Markets Adopting Release, supra note 271, at 139–40. 
 275. Id. at 217. 
 276. Id. at 77–86. 
 277. Id. at 46–53. 
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Moving from exemptions to the qualification of offers and sales 
of securities, several changes were made in the 1990s to reduce the 
cost and ease the requirements for the qualification of offerings by 
smaller issuers under the 1968 Law. 
The legislature in 1992 authorized the filing of a “small company 
application” for qualification by permit.278 The purpose was to allow 
use of the simple Q&A format of the Small Corporate Offering Reg-
istration disclosure document based on Form U-7 adopted by the 
North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc. 
(NASAA).279 A “small company” is a California corporation or a for-
eign corporation that is a small business concern under federal law, 
has certain contacts to California, and meets certain other require-
ments.280 There are also conditions on the offering, including the type 
of stock offered and outstanding, the size of the offering, the offering 
price, and the use of the net proceeds.281 
In 1995, the Commissioner adopted a series of rules to ease vari-
ous requirements for qualification of offerings by “small businesses 
issuers,” which are defined generally on the basis of their annual rev-
enues and the relationship of their businesses to California.282 
B.  Real Estate Syndications 
Next we turn to the offer and sale of interests in real estate syndi-
cations, which are a means by which investors pool their funds for the 
purchase of real estate, which in some cases is intended for develop-
ment or renovation, through entities that are managed by others. 
 
 278. Act of Sept. 23, 1992, ch. 884, § 1, 1992 Cal. Stat. 4105, 4105–06 (codified at CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 25113(b)(2)). Interestingly, an application must be reviewed and signed by each member 
of the board of directors of the applicant. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.110.2 (2020). In 2019, 
only two “small company applications” were filed under section 25113(b)(2) based on spreadsheets 
provided by the Department that are on file with the author. 
 279. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 6.05[5]; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.113.1; Cal. 
Dep’t of Corps., The Small Corporate Offering Registration (SCOR) Application Process and Of-
ferings of Securities Under SEC Regulation A, Commissioner’s Release No. 93-C (Oct. 13, 1993), 
https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2019/03/93c.pdf. 
 280. Cal. Dep’t of Corps., The Small Corporate Offering Registration (SCOR) Application Pro-
cess and Offerings of Securities Under SEC Regulation A, Commissioner’s Release No. 93-C 
(Oct. 13, 1993), https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2019/03/93c.pdf. 
 281. Id. 
 282. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.001(i). 
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1.  Background 
Real estate syndications had long been popular in the eastern part 
of the United States.283 The capital was invested almost entirely by 
professionals, who were knowledgeable and experienced in real estate, 
as well as by wealthy individuals.284 By the late 1940s and 1950s, 
funds became available from other investors, and real estate was seen 
as a potentially profitable investment.285 The history of syndications 
in California has been described as follows: 
Real estate syndication activity in California began during 
the land boom of the early 1960’s with a group of Southern 
Californians who specialized in the sale of undeveloped acre-
age. By the end of the 1960’s apartment properties had 
emerged as the most popular investment for real estate syn-
dicates, although they were also being formed to develop of-
fice buildings, resort hotels, medical complexes, industrial 
parks and other projects which require substantial aggrega-
tions of capital.286 
Real estate syndications could take the form of a general partner-
ship, a corporation, or a trust, but in later years were typically struc-
tured as limited partnerships.287 This structure allowed profits and 
losses to be passed through directly to the investors in proportion to 
their interests without exposing them to personal liability, and to take 
advantage of tax benefits, including prepayment of interest, leveraging 
the investment through debt, and taking the maximum allowable de-
preciation.288 
As this type of investment evolved, the popularity became based 
largely on the appreciation of real estate and how it holds up in 
 
 283. See Harry D. Miller, Real Estate Syndication Under the California Corporate Securities 
Law of 1968, 16 UCLA L. REV. 371, 371 (1969). 
 284. Id. 
 285. See id. at 371–72. 
 286. Jane W. Hall, Comment, Investor Suitability Standards in Real Estate Syndication: Cali-
fornia’s Procrustean Bed Approach, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 476–77 (1975) (citing Stephen E. 
Roulac, Syndication: Past, Present & Future, REAL EST. TODAY, Nov. 1972, at 24–27). 
 287. See Stephen B. Hazard, Comment, Regulation of Real Estate Syndications: An Overview, 
49 WASH. L. REV. 137, 140 (1973). These syndications are to be distinguished from real estate 
investment trusts (REITs) that were created by Congress . REITs must meet certain requirements 
and distribute at least ninety percent of their taxable income to investors. See What’s a REIT (Real 
Estate Investment Trust)?, NAREIT, https://www.reit.com/what-reit (last visited Jan 4, 2021). 
 288. See Paul E. Dorroh, Comment, SEC Regulation of California Real Estate Syndicates, 61 
CALIF. L. REV. 205, 206–07 (1973). 
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comparison to other asset classes, the use of leverage and significant 
cash flow, as well as the advantages afforded investors by the federal 
tax law.289 In most syndicates, the funds invested were spread over a 
number of properties, often on a blind pool basis whereby the proper-
ties were identified after the investment.290 They are typically diversi-
fied by geography and type of property. In others, the funds were com-
mitted to one specific, identified property.291 The investment can be 
“value added” in the sense that renovation or construction are antici-
pated.292 
The tax advantages fluctuated through the years with changes in 
policy made by the various administrations. The Tax Reform Act of 
1969293 added a 10 percent minimum tax, a limitation on the deduction 
of investment income, and a maximum tax on earned income, but it 
did not seem to adversely impact tax-sheltered investments.294 The tax 
advantages became more attractive with the enactment of the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act in 1981.295 High-income investors could 
quickly write off expenses and losses against income earned from 
other sources, and profits were taxed at a lower capital gains rate.296 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986,297 however, severely reduced the ad-
vantages of real estate tax shelters, largely due to the elimination of 
the capital gains tax differential, an increase in the period for writing 
off depreciation, and a limitation on passive investment losses.298 
These tax changes, together with a period of overbuilding, caused a 
 
 289. Miller, supra note 283, at 371–72. 
 290. Dorroh, supra note 288, at 208–09. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 294. See Leo J. Pircher, Tax Sheltered Investments: What, Who, When and Which?, 28 BUS. 
LAW. 897, 914 (1973). 
 295. See Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 296. Kirstin Downey, Millions Burned as Real Estate Partnerships Fizzle: Investment: 
All Those People Who Benefited from Depreciation Now Find Those Huge Write-Offs Coming Back 
to Haunt Them in the Form of Higher Taxes., L.A. TIMES (Oct. 29, 1989, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1989-10-29-fi-568-story.html. 
 297. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 298. See Roy E. Cordato, Destroying Real Estate Through the Tax Code. (Tax Reform Act of 
1986), CPA J. ONLINE (June 1991), http://archives.cpajournal.com/old/10917112.htm; Leslie 
Berkman, Tax Law Puts Real Estate Syndication in New Light, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 1986, 12:00 
AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1986-12-07-fi-1548-story.html. 
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significant downturn in property values in the late 1980s and early 
1990s that adversely affected the real estate market.299 Some benefits 
to investors in real estate partnerships were provided by the Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act of 2017,300 including special deductions and ways to 
eliminate certain other limitations on deductibility.301 While the syn-
dication of real property continues to be popular, the tax advantages 
are no longer as favorable as they once were. 
2.  Practice Under the 1917 Act (1917 to 1968) 
The applicability of the 1917 Act to the offer and sale of partner-
ship interests depended on whether they fell within the definition of a 
“security.” The term “security” had been amended in 1929 to include 
any “beneficial interest in title to property, profits or earnings.”302 
T.W. Dahlquist wrote in 1945 that, despite the literal wording of 
the 1917 Act, there had been a consistent administrative interpretation 
to the effect that bona fide general and limited partnership member-
ships did not constitute “securities” requiring a permit.303 He added 
that, owing to the publication of an article by a senior administrator, 
doubt had been raised among some practitioners as to whether a permit 
was required for the offer and sale of partnership interests, particularly 
limited partnership interests to which the comments in the article were 
confined.304 This caused a statewide debate among lawyers, leading to 
the legislature’s addition in 1945 of an exemption for partnership in-
terests in section 2(b)(12) of the 1917 Act.305 It applied to the offer or 
sale of interests in general partnerships, or in limited partnerships 
where certificates are filed and recorded as required by the California 
Civil Code, except when offered to the public.306 
 
 299. See Downey, supra note 296. 
 300. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 301. See Bobby Burch, How Will the New Tax Law Affect Real Estate Investors?, THINK 
REALTY (Feb. 20, 2019), https://thinkrealty.com/new-tax-law-will-affect-real-estate-investors/. 
 302. Act of Aug. 14, 1929, ch. 707, § 2, 1929 Cal. Stat. 1251, 1254–56 (repealed 1949). 
 303. Dahlquist I, supra note 25, at 361. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Act of May 18, 1945, ch. 399, § 1, 1945 Cal. Stat. 853, 853 (repealed 1949). Because this 
was an exemption from the permit requirements, some thought that it supported the position that 
partnership interests came within the definition of “securities.” See Dahlquist I, supra note 25, at 
361–62. 
 306. Act of May 18, 1945 § 1. 
 
(6) 54.1_BROCKMEYER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/21  2:51 PM 
50 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1 
With the adoption of this exemption, the question became 
whether these partnership interests were being offered to the public.307 
In many real estate syndications, it was difficult to establish that a pub-
lic offering was not involved. However, some syndicators, particularly 
those coming from a real estate background, continued to avoid the 
permit requirements by claiming that these interests were not “securi-
ties” or by taking a much broader view of what would constitute an 
offering to the public.308 Beginning in the 1960s, it became generally 
accepted that when the investors had limited control over partnership 
affairs and were at risk in the investment, the partnership interests 
were securities and in most cases were being offered to the public.309 
As discussed previously with respect to private stock offerings, 
an issuer could apply for a negotiating or “offering” permit for prelim-
inary acts (i.e., offers, negotiations, or subscriptions) to insure compli-
ance with the 1917 Act.310 To obtain a negotiating permit, syndicators 
had to satisfy the Department as to the sophistication of the offerees.311 
This was somewhat of a catch-22, in that offers or negotiations were 
not permitted without a permit, but in order to get the requisite infor-
mation, the syndicators invariably had to discuss the nature and terms 
of the investment opportunity with the prospective investors. 
To support sophistication, the applications normally included the 
names of the offerees and their occupations, annual income, net worth, 
 
 307. See generally Lindell L. Marsh, Note, The Availability to the Syndicator of the Private 
Offering Exemption to the California Corporate Securities Law, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 792 (1966) (dis-
cussing the requirements of the private offering exemption and the availability of the exemption to 
a syndicator). Similar issues were presented in determining whether real estate syndications were 
subject to registration under the 1933 Securities Act. If the offer and sale of the interests came 
within the definition of a “security” under section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77b(a)(1) (2012), registration would be required unless an exemption was available. The exemp-
tion most relied upon was section 4(2) (now section 4(a)(2)) of the 1933 Securities Act, id. 
§ 77d(a)(2), that exempts from registration “transactions by an issuer not involving any public of-
fering,” followed by section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Securities Act, id. § 77c(a)(11), that exempts 
intrastate offerings. See Linda A. Wertheimer & Stephen S. Mark, Special Problems of Unregis-
tered Real Estate Securities, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1219, 1221–25 (1975). 
 308. Noncompliance with the registration requirements of the 1933 Securities Act was also 
prevalent. This was attributed to a combination of factors: the question of whether the interests 
were “securities”; the availability, real and illusory, of statutory exemptions; the apparent aversion 
of most syndicate promotors to registration; and the SEC’s failure to inject itself more positively 
into syndications. See Curtis J. Berger, Real Estate Syndication: Property, Promotion, and the Need 
for Protection, 69 YALE L.J. 725, 760 (1960). 
 309. Dahlquist I, supra note 25, at 358–59. 
 310. See Hall, supra note 286, at 478. 
 311. See id. 
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and investment and business experience.312 A significant annual in-
come or net worth was usually deemed to be sufficient on the assump-
tion that these offerees were able to bear the financial risk of the in-
vestment and therefore did not need the protection afforded by the 
securities law. Amendments to these applications had to be filed with 
some regularity as new prospective investors were identified. 
To keep this personal information out of the public records, law-
yers had to request that it be afforded confidential treatment. This was 
also required for applications for definitive permits, as well as pre- or 
post-effective amendments. Since many of these offerings were tax 
oriented, particularly those involving undeveloped real estate, the De-
partment was flooded with applications toward the end of a year. In 
many cases, this required that the lawyers appear in person before a 
supervisor to make a request for priority. It was awkward when they 
had to request several priorities from the same supervisor in a short 
period of time. Much of this activity centered in Southern California 
causing a backlog in the Department’s Los Angeles office, which was 
alleviated to some extent by filing applications in the Department’s 
San Francisco and San Diego offices. 
This procedure became unworkable with the substantial increase 
in the number of applications. Lawyers engaged in this practice ulti-
mately prevailed upon the Department to issue negotiating permits 
where the applications set forth the financial and other criteria that of-
ferees had to meet as a class, without having to disclose the names of 
the potential investors, their net worth or income, or other information 
supporting their sophistication. 
3.  Practice Under the 1968 Law (1969 to the Present) 
Although the clause “beneficial interest in title to property, prof-
its, or earnings” was dropped from the definition of “security” in the 
1968 Law,313 the uncertainty over the treatment of limited partnership 
interests continued, and the courts used a number of tests to determine 
 
 312. See id. 
 313. Act of May 9, 1968, ch. 88, § 2, 1968 Cal. Stat. 242, 243–56 (codified as amended at CAL. 
CORP. CODE §§ 25000–25804). 
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whether the offer and sale of a particular investment vehicle involved 
a security.314 
However, the 1968 Law had a significant effect on the process for 
dealing with real estate syndicates. For example, it eliminated the re-
quirement for a negotiating permit for any offer (but not a sale) of 
securities not involving a public offering and permitted entering into 
any agreement for a sale of securities conditioned on qualification be-
ing obtained.315 The Commissioner also adopted a rule providing that, 
for this purpose, no public offering is involved if an offer is made to 
not more than twenty-five potential investors, exclusive of certain 
specified persons.316 
Section 25102(f) had exempted partnership, joint venture, and 
certain trust interests offered or sold in a transaction not involving a 
public offering.317 Along with a release providing guidelines for when 
securities are being offered to the public, the Commissioner adopted a 
rule to the effect that offers and sales of partnership interests do not 
involve a public offering if offers are not made to more than twenty-
five persons and sales are not consummated to more than ten such per-
sons, if all the offerees meet certain suitability standards.318 In another 
release, the Department stated that in appropriate cases it would ac-
cept, in lieu of a condition in a permit, that the issuer limit the offering 
to persons whom it had reasonable grounds to believe were suitable 
 
 314. See Daniel B. Higgins, Comment, Is a Limited Partnership Interest a “Security”?: The 
Current State of the California and Federal Definitions Add a Legal Dimension to Economic Spec-
ulation, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 311, 316–27 (1976). There has been a belief in some quarters 
that if, for example, a real estate syndicate invests in existing income property acquired when the 
investors release their funds (and place them at risk of loss), that is an economic, not a securities, 
risk because the earnings are dependent on market conditions in the future. This differs from an 
investment in property that will be improved by construction or development by the syndicator—a 
promise of added value—that is a security. See Real Estate Syndication and Securities Law, FIRST 
TUESDAY J. (Oct. 17, 2016), https://journal.firsttuesday.us/real-estate-syndication-and-securities-
law/55096/. For an earlier variation of this interpretation, see Miller, supra note 283, at 384. 
 315. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(a) (Deering 2020). 
 316. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.102.1 (2020), which reflects that the number of per-
sons was later increased to thirty-five. 
 317. See generally Sherman S.M. Wong, Comment, Limited Partnerships and the California 
Securities Law: Restricting the Public Sale of Limited Partnership Interests, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
618 (1980) (examining the treatment of limited partnerships under the California securities law and 
proposing limiting restrictions on the public sale of limited partnership interests). 
 318. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.102.2; Cal. Dep’t of Corps., Guidelines for Determin-
ing When Securities Are Being “Offered to the Public,” Commissioner’s Release No. 5-C (Jan. 31, 
1969), https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2019/03/5C.pdf. This rule was made inap-
plicable to section 25102(f) upon its amendment in 1981. 
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investors, and that it would give instructions to the same effect to any 
broker-dealer employed to assist in the distribution.319 These releases 
and rules brought greater clarity for lawyers and their clients, particu-
larly for those involved with the smaller syndications.320 The amend-
ment of section 25102(f) in 1981, however, was even more helpful in 
avoiding qualification for the offer and sale of partnership interests. 
The Commissioner adopted rules under the 1968 Law to establish 
standards of presumptive fairness to serve as guidelines to syndica-
tors.321 The standards pertaining to granting permits for real estate pro-
grams are quite extensive.322 They cover such matters as presumptive 
suitability, compensation and fees, conflicts of interest, rights and ob-
ligations of participants, and disclosures.323 For those syndications in 
which the general partner was an affiliate of a broker-dealer, clearance 
with the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) was 
required, in which case its regulation of underwriting compensation 
also became an issue.324 
Dissatisfaction of the real estate industry with the standards im-
posed by the Commissioner for real estate syndications led to the pas-
sage of the Real Estate Syndicate Act in 1969.325 Jurisdiction was 
transferred to the Real Estate Commissioner for smaller real estate 
syndicates, being those with no more than one hundred beneficial 
 
 319. Cal. Dep’t of Corps., Suitability of Securities, Commissioner’s Release No. 8-C (Feb. 27, 
1969), https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/296/2019/03/8C.pdf. 
 320. In 1974, the Department considered whether to adopt an exemption similar to SEC Rule 
146 and determined that it would not be appropriate, citing the state’s keen interests in local secu-
rities transactions and the fundamental differences between a disclosure standard and a fair, just, 
and equitable standard. Report, Regulation of Real Estate Securities, Including the Applicability of 
Federal Rule 146 and Its Use in State Blue Sky Laws, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 841, 851 
(1978). 
 321. See Dorroh, supra note 288, at 211–13. 
 322. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 260.140.110.1–.119.1. Whereas the Commissioner had 
actively discouraged the use of large limited partnerships, except in private offerings to sophisti-
cated investors, these new rules caused a reversal of this policy. See Ronald R. Hrusoff & Carlos 
A. Cazares, Formation of the Public Limited Partnership, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 87, 88 (1970). 
 323. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 260.140.110.1–.119.1. 
 324. The NASD was a self-regulatory organization that had been formed to increase oversight 
of over-the-counter brokers and dealers. See infra note 403. 
 325. Act of Aug. 27, 1969, ch. 928, § 3, 1969 Cal. Stat. 1855, 1856–65 (codified at CAL. BUS. 
& PROF. CODE §§ 10250–10340). Harry Miller recommended adoption of the Real Estate Syndi-
cate Act because “the present regulation still does not meet all public needs,” and “the Real Estate 
Commissioner may be able to supervise the regulation more efficiently because of the knowledge 
and experience of his staff with real estate, the real estate market and its procedures.” See Miller, 
supra note 283, at 394, 402. 
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owners that were formed for the sole purpose of, and engaged solely 
in, investment in real estate.326 While the investor suitability standards 
of the Department of Real Estate were generally lower than those ap-
plied by the Commissioner, this Act was not considered to have caused 
any substantial change in the regulation of real estate programs.327 In 
any event, the Act was repealed in 1978, at which point regulation over 
real estate syndications again became the responsibility of the Depart-
ment.328 
With its adoption in 1982, the exemption in SEC Rule 506 be-
came available for use by syndicators to comply with the 1933 Secu-
rities Act.329 When NSMIA was enacted in 1996, reliance on SEC 
Rule 506 became even more prevalent because of the preemption of 
state registration, and this was later aided by the change in 2013 per-
mitting general solicitation under SEC Rule 506(c).330 
With the adoption of the Beverly-Killea Limited Liability Com-
pany Act that became effective in 1994, limited liability companies 
began to be used for some real estate investments. The legislature also 
amended the definition of “security” in section 25019 to exclude in-
terests in limited liability companies in which it can be proved that all 
of the members are actively engaged in management.331 
As discussed below in more detail,332 the JOBS Act in 2012 ex-
empted equity crowdfunding and expanded the exemption for Regu-
lation A offerings, both of which have been used by some real estate 
developers as an alternative to more traditional means of financing real 
 
 326. See Hall, supra note 286, at 479–80. The Department issued guidelines that addressed the 
respective jurisdictions of the Department and the Department of Real Estate over the offer and 
sale of real estate securities. See Cal. Dep’t of Corps., Jurisdiction of Real Estate Syndication Qual-
ification, Commissioner’s Release No. 32-C (June 27, 1973) (superseded by Cal. Dep’t of Corps., 
Guidelines for Determining When Real Estate Brokers Selling Interests in Entities Owning Real 
Property Are Exempt from the Certification Requirements of the Corporate Securities Law of 1968, 
Commissioner’s Release No. 62-C (July 2, 1980)). 
 327. See Hall, supra note 286, at 480. 
 328. Act of Sept. 23, 1977, ch. 991, § 3, 1977 Cal. Stat. 2977, 2979. 
 329. See Revisions of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Lim-
ited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982). 
 330. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 
506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,471 (July 24, 
2013). 
 331. Act of Sept. 30, 1994, ch. 1200, § 29, 1994 Cal. Stat. 7362. 
 332. See infra text accompanying notes 442–59. 
 
(6) 54.1_BROCKMEYER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/21  2:51 PM 
2020] REGULATING SECURITIES OFFERINGS IN CALIFORNIA 55 
estate investments.333 For the smaller real estate investments, crowd-
funding is available without the necessity of qualifying the offering 
under California law.334 Crowdfunding platforms have also been used 
to solicit investments from “accredited investors” through general ad-
vertising in reliance on SEC Rule 506(c).335 
In 2013, the legislature adopted a requirement that a form be filed 
with the Department by issuers in certain exempt real estate offer-
ings.336 This form was intended to provide the Department with infor-
mation regarding those controlling these offerings, the disclosure doc-
uments provided to prospective purchasers, the licenses required, and 
the licensed persons who undertake these activities.337 No filing is re-
quired for an offering that involves the offer or sale of securities to any 
person who is an “accredited investor” in a transaction not registered 
with the SEC under the 1933 Securities Act.338 
C.  Public Stock Offerings 
The final issuer transactions to be discussed are public stock of-
ferings. For this purpose, a public stock offering is the offer and sale 
 
 333. See Michele Bresnick Walsh, Avoiding Securities Law Pitfalls in Real Estate Transac-
tions, GORDON FEINBLATT LLC (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.gfrlaw.com/what-we-do/in-
sights/avoiding-securities-law-pitfalls-real-estate-transactions. 
 334. See infra text accompanying notes 452–55. Because of the limitations in the SEC regula-
tions pertaining to crowdfunding, it can only be used by the smaller syndicates. See generally Mark 
Hiraide, Ready Capital, 39 L.A. LAW., no. 4, Feb. 2017, at 21 [hereinafter Hiraide, Ready Capital 
Part II] (describing the requirements for utilizing the exemption for crowdfunding). For recent rule 
amendments liberalizing the limitations, see infra text accompanying notes 462–63. 
 335. See Andrew A. Schwartz, Inclusive Crowdfunding, 2016 UTAH L. REV. 661, 666–67.   
 336. S.B. 978 ch. 669, § 5, 2011–2012 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (codified at CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 25102.2); see Cal. Dep’t of Corps., New Filing Requirements for Certain Securities Issuers Ex-
empt from the Corporate Securities Law of 1968, Commissioner’s Release No. 121-C (Dec. 5, 
2012), https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2019/03/121-C.pdf. The number of notices 
filed, many of which are multiple filings by the same companies, has steadily declined from twenty-
eight in 2015 to two in 2019. See Self-Service Portal, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN. PROT. & INNOVATION, 
https://docqnet.dfpi.ca.gov/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2020) [hereinafter Self-Service Portal]. The Self-
Service Portal was launched in 2014 to facilitate the filing of applications and notices and payment 
of fees. The data in this note were derived by searching the Self-Service Portal online at 
https://docqnet.dfpi.ca.gov/search/ (in “Application Type” select “Real Estate Related Infor-
mation,” check filings for each year from 2015 to 2019 and click “Search”). 
 337. Cal. Dep’t of Corps., New Filing Requirements for Certain Securities Issuers Exempt from 
the Corporate Securities Law of 1968, Commissioner’s Release No. 121-C (Dec. 5, 2012), 
https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2019/03/121-C.pdf. 
 338. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102.2 (Deering 2020). 
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of stock to the public generally, without restriction as to persons or 
class of persons.339 
1.  Background 
In the years before 1890, the dominant securities exchange—the 
New York Stock Exchange—listed securities of only a few industrial 
companies.340 During the first four decades of the twentieth century, a 
growing population of middle-class investors, influenced by the pro-
spects of gain and increasing dividends, began committing resources 
to industrial and utility stock investments.341 This transition was facil-
itated by large-scale business enterprises controlled by professional 
management in both the manufacturing and utilities sectors that began 
to fully flourish during the 1920s after World War I.342 
One of the problems investors encountered was determining the 
value of a public enterprise.343 Skepticism of common stock remained 
high because of the difficulty of assessing future earnings trends, the 
lack of adequate financial information, and the suspicion about the 
honesty of corporate promoters.344 For a time, dividend returns be-
came the prevailing factor in valuing stock.345 During the 1920s, the 
broadening of public ownership was facilitated by the growth of sev-
eral types of intermediaries, including commercial banks that served 
as underwriters, and financial advisors and retail brokerage firms that 
earned commissions from selling shares directly to middle class inves-
tors.346 
After the stock market crash in 1929, various actions were under-
taken by the New York Stock Exchange and the public accounting 
profession to protect investor interests by requiring the public disclo-
sure of more reliable information on financial performance and 
 
 339. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.001(f) (2020) (“‘Open Qualification’ means a quali-
fication which authorizes the offer and sale of securities to the public generally, without restrictions 
as to persons or class of persons.”). 
 340. See Gene Smiley, The Expansion of the New York Securities Market at the Turn of the 
Century, 55 BUS. HIST. REV. 75, 84 (1981). 
 341. See BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 128, at 167. 
 342. See id. at 167–68. 
 343. Id. at 189–90. 
 344. Id. at 189. 
 345. Id. at 190. 
 346. See id. at 196. 
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management stewardship.347 There were also significant governmen-
tal reforms in the 1930s, including the enactment by Congress of the 
1933 Securities Act, the 1934 Exchange Act, and the 1933 Banking 
Act.348 The 1933 Banking Act separated commercial banking from un-
derwriting and securities trading, following which public offerings 
were underwritten by new securities firms that had been organized 
separately or spun off by commercial banks.349 That portion of the Act 
was largely repealed in 1999.350 
Increased confidence in the continuance of prosperity and a grow-
ing informational base about public companies helped to revive the 
financial markets.351 In later years, efficiencies were derived from the 
great scale and scope of the operations of companies, which became 
diversified and relied on research and development to discover new 
opportunities for utilizing their pools of technological and manage-
ment skills.352 By the 1950s and 1960s, dividend yield was increas-
ingly overshadowed by the prospects of gain from these invest-
ments.353 
By this time, the securities of most of the nation’s major compa-
nies were listed on the New York Stock Exchange, which in 1967 
transacted almost 78 percent of the dollar volume of all exchanges fol-
lowed by the American Stock Exchange at about 14 percent.354 There 
were also some regional exchanges, most notably the Midwest Stock 
Exchange and the Pacific Coast Stock Exchange.355 These exchanges, 
as self-regulatory organizations, provided a vehicle for raising capital 
for their listed companies and established standards that these compa-
nies were required to meet for initial listing and maintaining the listing 
of their securities.356 
As described previously with respect to private stock offerings, 
the emergence of private equity and venture capital firms led to 
 
 347. See id. at 197–201. 
 348. Id. at 201–04. 
 349. Id. at 204 
 350. See supra note 128. 
 351. See BASKIN & MIRANTI, supra note 128, at 232. 
 352. See id. at 235. 
 353. See id. at 233. 
 354. See ROBERT SOBEL, N.Y.S.E.: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 1935–
1975, at 300 (1975). 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 303. 
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investments in companies with heightened risk and greater potential 
reward.357 Many of these companies eventually offered stock to the 
public that allowed investors to realize gains from their investments, 
while the companies were able to raise capital from the public.358 This 
was facilitated in 1971 when NASDAQ (an acronym for the NASD’s 
Automated Quotation System) became operational as an over-the-
counter trading network and soon emerged as the second largest secu-
rities market in the United States.359 Many emerging technology com-
panies began listing their stock on NASDAQ rather than on the New 
York Stock Exchange.360 
“Going public” was of course not without risk. Adding to the nor-
mal volatility in the securities markets, there have been four market 
crashes since 1929.361 These market crashes occurred in 1987 follow-
ing a boom led by takeovers, buyouts, and the use of highly-leveraged, 
questionable financing tools; in 1999–2000 following a boom in the 
stock of technology and so-called new technology companies; in 2008 
fueled by the widespread use of mortgage-backed securities;362 and in 
2020 caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. 
In recent years, Congress has adopted legislation aimed at 
stronger investor protection and securities regulation pertaining pri-
marily to public companies. This includes the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002363 and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 2010.364 
2.  Practice Under the 1917 Act (1917 to 1968) 
Under the 1917 Act, an issuer could apply to the Department for 
what was called an “open permit” that would allow securities to be 
sold to the public.365 In the early years, most corporations applying for 
 
 357. See supra text accompanying notes 141–43. 
 358. See NICHOLAS, supra note 120, at 239. 
 359. See SOBEL, supra note 354, at 341–43. 
 360. MARK INGEBRETSEN, NASDAQ: A HISTORY OF THE MARKET THAT CHANGED THE 
WORLD 9–10 (2002). 
 361. Brian O’Connell, Biggest Stock Market Crashes Throughout History, THESTREET 
(Feb. 29, 2020, 8:45 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/markets/history-of-stock-market-crashes-
14702941. 
 362. See id. 
 363. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
 364. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 365. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 6.05[3][a]. 
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open permits were newly organized and used by a promoter “as a 
means by which he may exchange his assets, whether tangible or in-
tangible, for stock and exploit these assets by the capital raised from 
numerous scattered stockholders.”366 A smaller number of applica-
tions for open permits were filed by corporations that had a financial 
and business history.367 To protect existing shareholders against dilu-
tion, the Department often required that the new shares be offered pro-
portionately to the shareholders first before they could be offered to 
the general public.368 
For those issuers with an earnings history and in a solvent posi-
tion, the price would be considered in light of their net worth and cap-
italized earnings.369 The Department’s treatment of issuers without 
earning power was similar to that used in dealing with promotional 
schemes.370 When promoters were involved, the valuations of property 
and awards for services of the promoter had to be satisfactory before 
a permit would be issued.371 Depending on the outcome of the exami-
nation, the Department could require that the proceeds be impounded 
or escrowed or that the promoters submit to a waiver of dividends or 
liquidating distributions until certain financial or other results were 
achieved.372 The Department could allow the issuance of stock to a 
promoter for those assets that could be valued with ordinary certainty, 
but not for assets of an intangible value.373 Additional stock could then 
be issued once the issuer showed an earnings record that justified a 
higher value.374 
By 1929, many public offerings were conducted through syndi-
cation, whereby securities were sold on a “firm-commitment” basis to 
a syndicate of underwriters and then resold in a number of states either 
directly or through selected dealers.375 If the issuer was a California 
corporation or its principal place of business was in California, a 
 
 366. John E. Dalton, The California Corporate Securities Act, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 373, 384 
(1930) [hereinafter Dalton III]. 
 367. Id. 
 368. See Dalton II, supra note 57, at 263. 
 369. See id. at 384. 
 370. Id. at 385. 
 371. See id. at 376–77. 
 372. Id. at 377–79. 
 373. Id. at 376–77. 
 374. See id. at 377. 
 375. See id. at 391. 
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permit would be required to offer and sell the securities.376 For other 
issuers when the closing took place outside California, no permit 
would be required for the offer and sale of the securities in California 
because this constituted a nonissuer transaction.377 Instead, the man-
aging underwriter would file the preliminary prospectus and any ad-
vertising material to be used in California with the Department. The 
review by the Department focused primarily on the truthfulness of the 
material and, if not satisfactory, the burden was on the Commissioner 
to forbid sales by brokers and dealers.378 If the Commissioner deter-
mined that the standards were met, the underwriters were advised that 
the material could be used upon supplying any missing data, including 
the price.379 John E. Dalton wrote about this practice in 1930 as fol-
lows: 
At the present time, more than one-half of the securities pur-
chased through investment bankers and dealers are qualified 
for sale by the simplified method of presentation of advertis-
ing material. Although this offers adequate protection, it 
places local corporations and bankers under a greater burden 
in qualifying securities of the same type which are sold 
through identical channels. In this regard, the California law 
is an anomaly.380 
The enactment by Congress of the 1933 Securities Act brought 
about dual state and federal regulation of public offerings.381 The 1933 
Securities Act prohibited the offer or sale of securities using the means 
or instrumentalities of interstate commerce unless a registration state-
ment is filed with the SEC and is in effect or the offer or sale is 
 
 376. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[8][e].  
 377. Id. This is to be distinguished from an offering in California by a foreign issuer on a “best 
efforts” or “all-or-none” basis, for which a permit would be required. See Howard D. Sterling, 
California Corporate Securities Law of 1968: Underwritings and Corporate Reorganizations, 23 
BUS. LAW. 645, 645 (1968). 
 378. See Dalton III, supra note 366, at 399. 
 379. See Jennings, supra note 19, at 218. 
 380. Dalton III, supra note 366, at 395. An attempt was made by the Commissioner to address 
this issue in the early 1960s. After reviewing the situation, the Commissioner issued orders to block 
the sale by brokers licensed in California of shares in certain specified foreign corporations doing 
business in California. Thereafter, the Department’s staff regularly reviewed registration statements 
filed with the SEC to determine which of these corporations had not applied for a permit, after 
which the problem seemed to be under control. See Sobieski, supra note 12, at 16–18. 
 381. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 77a–77aa). 
 
(6) 54.1_BROCKMEYER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/19/21  2:51 PM 
2020] REGULATING SECURITIES OFFERINGS IN CALIFORNIA 61 
exempt.382 The federal regulatory scheme is based on the adequacy of 
disclosure rather than merit review.383 
At the outset, the process of registering securities with the SEC in 
Washington, D.C. was fairly simple and could be accomplished easily. 
As the years went on, the process became more complicated and time 
consuming, the required disclosures more extensive, and the review 
by the SEC staff more intense.384 As explained by Professor Louis 
Loss, “[w]hile in theory the Commission’s staff merely ‘suggests’ 
amendments, the practicabilities of financing do not allow any real al-
ternative of complying.”385 
The 1933 Securities Act contained several exemptions from reg-
istration that would permit offerings to the public, namely intrastate 
offerings under section 3(a)(11)386 and small offerings under section 
3(b).387 In intrastate offerings, offers and sales are limited to persons 
residing within a single state or territory where the issuer is resident or 
incorporated and doing business within that state or territory.388 Reg-
ulation A was adopted by the SEC in 1936389 as an exemption for of-
ferings pursuant to the authority granted in section 3(b). It initially 
permitted offerings of up to $100,000, which was increased to 
$300,000 in 1945, $500,000 in 1970, $1.5 million and later $2 million 
in 1978, and $5 million in 1980.390 While Regulation A offerings 
avoided registration, the filing and qualification of an offering circular 
with the SEC was still required.391 
 
 382. See id. 
 383. Id. 
 384. See generally Neal H. Brockmeyer, Looking Back: Reflections of a California Securities 
Lawyer, BUS. L. NEWS, no. 3, 2011, at 6, 9–12 (a description of the registration process and changes 
in the regulation of public offerings in the early years). For years, the large New York City law 
firms dominated the public offering practice, particularly in the representation of major underwrit-
ers and established companies. The New York firms were also better equipped to qualify an offer-
ing under the securities laws of multiple states. Relatively few California law firms or lawyers 
engaged in this practice and those that did were primarily based in San Francisco and Los Angeles. 
Beginning in the late 1960s, more firms and lawyers throughout California began representing re-
gional companies and underwriters, and eventually the large companies and major underwriters. 
 385. Jennings, supra note 19, at 211 (quoting LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 175 
(1951)). 
 386. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11); 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2018). 
 387. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b); 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(1). 
 388. Securities Act of 1933 § 3(a)(11); 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11). 
 389. Securities Act Release No. 627, 1936 WL 30895 (Jan. 21, 1936); see 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 230.251–.263 (2019). 
 390. See Concept Release, supra note 260, at 30,486 n.272. 
 391. Id. at 30,460. 
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Notwithstanding this new level of federal regulation, public of-
ferings in California, whether registered or exempt under the 1933 Se-
curities Act, continued to be subject to the permit requirements of the 
1917 Act and the “fair, just, and equitable” standard.392 T.W. 
Dahlquist stated that the 1917 Act  
is not a registration act but a specific permit act. It goes far 
beyond the disclosure theory of the Securities Act of 1933, 
and it also reaches far beyond the prevention of fraud. It is 
designed to prevent deception, the exploitation of ignorance, 
and all unfair dealings in the issue of securities.393 
If a permit was required, the lawyers would prepare and file an 
application with the Department.394 The Department’s staff would ex-
amine the proposed plan of business, the method of transacting the 
business, the securities proposed to be issued, and the methods to be 
used in issuing and disposing of them.395 The issues addressed typi-
cally involved promotional consideration, sales expenses, salaries, of-
fering materials, and the price of the stock.396 The resolution of these 
issues was sometimes difficult and often required the lawyers to meet 
with the Department’s examiners and sometimes with a supervisor or 
a Deputy or Assistant Commissioner. 
As the market for IPOs developed, this opportunity for liquidity 
was utilized by many corporations that had been in existence for a rel-
atively short period of time and had been financed by groups of inves-
tors.397 This presented “cheap stock” issues for the Department in 
those situations in which the investors received stock proximate to the 
offering at a significant discount from the proposed offering price.398 
The Department also sought to restrict the price/earnings ratio of the 
pricing that was set in negotiations by the issuer and underwriters.399 
To overcome this problem, an issuer would be required to show the 
growth of the business or a significant improvement in its prospects.400 
 
 392. Dahlquist I, supra note 25, at 348. 
 393. Id. 
 394. See Dalton I, supra note 23, at 130. 
 395. Id. 
 396. Id. at 125. 
 397. See supra text accompanying notes 152–54. 
 398. A.B.A. Report, supra note 2, at 810–11. 
 399. See MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 8.07[1]. 
 400. Id. § 8.07[2][b]. 
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It became apparent, however, that forcing a reduction in the offering 
price could not only be to the detriment of the issuer and cause greater 
dilution for existing shareholders, but it might also allow customers of 
the brokers who were able to purchase shares in the initial offering to 
take a quick profit once the price increased, as it usually did, in the 
aftermarket.401 
During this period, both the Department and the NASD began 
questioning underwriting compensation and reviewing the discounts, 
commissions, and noncash components for reasonableness.402 The 
NASD had found that in some cases underwriters had received unfair 
and unreasonable compensation that it determined to be inconsistent 
with its requirement that underwriters operate their businesses in ob-
servance of “just and equitable principles of trade.”403 In 1962, the 
NASD began reviewing underwriting compensation for offerings by 
unseasoned companies.404 Shortly thereafter, it began issuing interpre-
tations specifying the factors that it would take into account in deter-
mining the reasonableness of underwriting compensation, including 
the size of the offering, the type of underwriting (firm commitment or 
best efforts), and the type of securities offered.405 
3.  Practice Under the 1968 Law (1969 to the Present) 
The 1968 Law made it clear that it is the offer or sale, not the 
issuance, of securities that requires qualification, and it clarified the 
jurisdictional reach by adding the defined term “in this state.”406 It 
overruled the long-standing position that a firm-commitment under-
written offering of a foreign issue was a nonissuer transaction and 
therefore was not subject to the permit requirements.407 
 
 401. See id. § 8.07[1]. The sale of these securities in the aftermarket at a substantial premium 
caused other regulatory problems. See generally Comment, Securities Regulation: Legislative and 
Administrative Treatment of the “Hot Issue” Phenomenon, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1137 (discussing how 
federal and state security laws and the rules of the NASD deal with “hot issues” and suggesting 
revisions). 
 402. William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Untold Story of Underwriting Compensation Regulation, 44 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 625, 627 (2010). 
 403. Id. The NASD, which was founded in 1939, adopted Rules of Fair Practice that proscribed 
various unfair practices by members and required that members observe high standards of com-
mercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade. Id. at 633–34. 
 404. See id. at 635. 
 405. Id. at 636. 
 406. See supra text accompanying notes 78–80. 
 407. See Volk, supra note 73, at 77–78; Levin, supra note 31, at 88. 
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As previously discussed, the 1968 Law introduced a simplified 
process for qualification by coordination for offerings in which a reg-
istration statement has been filed with the SEC under the 1933 Secu-
rities Act.408 While qualification by coordination becomes effective 
automatically, subject to certain conditions having been met, the Com-
missioner can issue a stop order denying, suspending, or revoking ef-
fectiveness on a finding that, among other things, the proposed plan of 
business or issuance is not “fair, just, and equitable.”409 More often, 
however, an application would be withdrawn or abandoned. During 
the waiting period, the staff of the Department has an opportunity to 
review the application and resolve any problems. It is also necessary 
to qualify the offering in the other states and jurisdictions in which the 
securities were to be offered and sold. The Department permits the 
filing to be made on the Uniform Application to Register Securities 
(Form U-1)410 in order to facilitate the process in multi-state offer-
ings.411 
For many years, California had been known as one of the most 
difficult states in which to qualify a public offering. The 1968 Law 
specifically addressed the issue of “cheap stock,” which had been a 
particular problem under the 1917 Act. There is an express limitation 
in the 1968 Law on the power of the Commissioner to pass upon the 
fairness of the price of securities that are publicly offered for cash in a 
registered, firm-commitment offering, with an exception for “unrea-
sonable discounts, commissions or other compensation to underwrit-
ers, sellers or others, unreasonable promoters’ profits or participations 
or unreasonable amounts or kinds of options.”412 
The rules under the 1968 Law establish guidelines for dealing 
with compensation to underwriters, sellers or others, and promotional 
shares.413 While the potential of questions regarding underwriting 
compensation being raised by the Department remained, the shifting 
 
 408. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25111 (Deering 2020), which provides for qualification by coordina-
tion, was amended in 1996 to apply as well to an offering statement filed under Regulation A. Act 
of May 6, 1996, ch. 41, 1996 Cal. Stat. 154. 
 409. Jennings, supra note 19, at 214. 
 410. Uniform Form Library, NASAA, https://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/uniform-
forms/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 411. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.111(a) (2020). 
 412. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140(d). 
 413. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, §§ 260.140.20–.21, .30–.33. 
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of the burden and listing of the factors to be considered tended to make 
this less of a problem than it had been previously. 
Underwriting compensation and arrangements also continued to 
be regulated by the NASD (now the Financial Industry Regulation Au-
thority).414 In 1992, the NASD adopted a Corporate Financing Rule 
that refined and updated the interpretations that had been developed 
over the years.415 There were some differences between the Corporate 
Financing Rule and the Commissioner’s rules. For example, the defi-
nition of selling expenses in the Commissioner’s rules includes dis-
counts and commissions (including fees of the underwriters’ attorneys 
paid by the issuer) and all other expenses incurred by the issuer di-
rectly related to the offering, but excludes fees of the issuer’s account-
ants’ and attorneys and options to underwriters.416 Options to the un-
derwriters are excluded because the Department, unlike the NASD, 
did not want to be involved in valuing options for this purpose.417 Be-
cause of the difference in approach, the maximum amount of compen-
sation that is considered reasonable by the NASD as a percentage of 
the gross offering price varies from the amount as determined by the 
Commissioner to be acceptable.418 
While the qualification process was simplified by the 1968 Law, 
it applied to fewer preliminary acts by virtue of several exemptions 
that were adopted. For example, the 1968 Law exempted from the 
qualification requirements offers, but not sales, of a security for which 
a registration statement has been filed under the 1933 Securities Act 
but has not yet become effective.419 In addition, any transactions or 
agreements between an issuer and an underwriter or among 
 
 414. In 1983, Congress amended the 1934 Exchange Act to require that virtually all brokers 
and dealers operating in the United States become members of a self-regulatory organization, such 
as the NASD or a securities exchange. Act of June 6, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-38, § 3, 97 Stat. 205, 
206–07 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)). In 2007, the NASD was consolidated with 
the member regulation, enforcement, and arbitration functions of the New York Stock Exchange to 
create the Financial Industry Regulation Authority (FINRA). Sjostrom, supra note 402, at 635. 
 415. Sjostrom, supra note 402, at 636. 
 416. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.140.20(a). 
 417. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 8.04[3]. 
 418. See Sjostrom, supra note 402, at 640–41. 
 419. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(b) (Deering 2020). This change is consistent with section 
5(c) of the 1933 Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2018). Section 25102(b) was amended in 1993 
to add an exemption for an offer (but not a sale) for which an offering circular under Regulation A 
has been filed with the SEC but has not yet been qualified. See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, 
§ 260.105.29. 
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underwriters are exempt if the sale of the securities is qualified or ex-
empt from qualification at the time of distribution in California.420 
One of the most significant changes in the 1968 Law was the 
adoption of a marketplace exemption that reflected a growing reliance 
on the listing standards imposed by the national securities exchanges, 
as well as enforcement by the SEC of its disclosure requirements.421 
Exempted from qualification are securities listed or authorized for is-
suance upon notice of issuance on a national securities exchange cer-
tified by the Commissioner as maintaining specified minimum listing 
and delisting standards.422 Also exempted were warrants or rights to 
subscribe to these securities, and only later were securities senior to 
the listed securities added.423 An earlier study had shown that the 
Commissioner had taken no action to disapprove or change any of the 
terms or conditions of offerings by companies of additional shares of 
stock listed on the New York Stock Exchange.424 
The Commissioner initially certified the New York Stock Ex-
change and the American Stock Exchange,425 and later, tiers of various 
regional exchanges.426 When NASDAQ became operational in 1971, 
it consisted of the National Market and the Capital Market. In 1989, 
the Commissioner certified the National Market,427 which had been 
permitted by a statutory amendment. In 2006, the SEC approved the 
application of the Nasdaq Stock Market, LLC to become a national 
 
 420. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102(d). 
 421. Id. § 25100(o). For a summary of the development of the marketplace exemption in Cali-
fornia, see Therese H. Maynard, Commentary: The Future of California’s Blue Sky Law, 30 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1531, 1539–41 (1997). Professor Maynard has been a member of the faculty at Loyola 
Law School, Los Angeles, since 1983. 
 422. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25100(o). 
 423. In 1983, the Commissioner exempted by rule securities senior to those listed on a certified 
exchange. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.105.33. 
 424. MARSH & VOLK, supra note 1, § 1.03[8][c]. 
 425. Cal. Dep’t of Corps., Certification of the New York Stock Exchange and the American 
Stock Exchange Under Section 25100(o) of the Corporations Code, Commissioner’s Release No. 
27-C (Revised) (Mar. 9, 1992). 
 426. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Corps., Exemption from Qualification Requirements for Securities 
Listed on Tier I (Select Market Companies) of the Pacific Stock Exchange, Commissioner’s Re-
lease No. 95-C (Dec. 27, 1994); Cal. Dep’t of Corps., Exemption from Qualification Requirements 
for Securities Listed on Tier I of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Commissioner’s Release No. 
96-C (Sept. 12, 1995). 
 427. See Cal. Dep’t of Corps., Exemption from Qualification Requirements for NASDAQ 
Global Market and NASDAQ Capital Market Securities Under Corporations Code Sec-
tion 25100(o), Commissioner’s Release No. 87-C (Revised) (Aug. 17, 2009), https://dfpi.ca.gov/ 
wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2019/03/87c.pdf. 
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securities exchange.428 The National Market was renamed the 
NASDAQ Global Market and contained two tiers (the NASDAQ 
Global Market and the NASDAQ Global Select Market), both of 
which were certified by the Commissioner in 2007.429 The NASDAQ 
Capital Market was later certified by the Commissioner.430 
Since NSMIA became law in 1996, the California marketplace 
exemption has had only limited importance.431 NSMIA preempted 
from state registration and merit review securities listed or authorized 
for listing on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Ex-
change, or any national securities exchange determined by the SEC to 
have substantially similar listing standards to those markets, or any 
security of the same issuer that is equal in seniority or that is senior to 
such security.432 The California Legislature in 1997 added section 
25100.1 to the 1968 Law recognizing this federal preemption.433 
The SEC later designated as exempt securities those quoted or 
authorized for quotation in the NASDAQ National Market and Capital 
Market,434 and ultimately those listed or authorized for listing on the 
Nasdaq Stock Market, LLC when it became a national securities ex-
change. Congress in 2018, as part of the Economic Growth, Regula-
tory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act,435 expanded this exemption 
to include as a “covered security” any security qualified for trading in 
the national market system that is listed or authorized for listing on a 
national securities exchange (or tier or segment thereof) or any secu-
rity of the same issuer that is equal in seniority or that is senior to such 
security.436 
 
 428. Id. 
 429. Id.  
 430. Id.  
 431. The California exemption, unlike the federal exemption, exempts warrants and other rights 
to acquire a security, CAL. CORP. CODE § 25100(o) (Deering 2020), and provides an exemption 
from the California usury law for evidence of indebtedness, id. § 25117(a)(2). 
 432. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 102, 
110 Stat. 3416, 3417–18 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 17r). 
 433. Act of Aug. 26, 1997, ch. 391, § 6, 1997 Cal. Stat. 2614, 2631 (codified at CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 25100.1). 
 434. Covered Securities Pursuant to Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Act 
Release No. 8791, 72 Fed. Reg. 20,410 (Apr. 24, 2007). 
 435. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 
132 Stat. 1296 (2018). 
 436. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, §§ 18(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), 48 Stat. 74, 106; 
15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A)–(B) (2018). A “national securities exchange” is an exchange that has been 
registered by the SEC under section 6 of the 1934 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2018). 
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As the global nature of the securities markets increased, the SEC 
had also provided guidance for foreign offerings.437 To more defini-
tively reflect the SEC’s position about the territorial reach of the reg-
istration requirements, the SEC in 1990 adopted Regulation S.438 It 
provides a safe harbor from the registration requirements under the 
1933 Securities Act for certain offers and sales of securities that occur 
outside the United States.439 Some U.S. companies have used Regula-
tion S to offer securities on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), 
which is a submarket of the London Stock Exchange launched in 1995 
to facilitate the raising of capital by smaller companies from any coun-
try or industry sector.440 The SEC also made it clear that foreign offer-
ings can be structured to take advantage of a combination of exemp-
tions.441 
In 2012, the JOBS Act expanded the exemption from registration 
under the 1933 Securities Act for Regulation A offerings and added a 
new exemption for equity crowdfunding, the terms of which were em-
bodied in Regulation Crowdfunding adopted by the SEC.442 This was 
intended to increase access to capital for small and medium-sized 
companies without having to bear the cost of registration under the 
1933 Securities Act.443 
Prior to the JOBS Act, Regulation A had not been widely used. 
The maximum dollar amount authorized for these offerings in section 
3(b) of the 1933 Securities Act had been increased to $5 million in 
 
 437. See Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 
4708, 29 Fed. Reg. 9828 (July 22, 1964). 
 438. See Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306 
(May 2, 1990). Regulation S consists of SEC Rules 901 to 905, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901–.905 (2019). 
 439. Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6863, 55 Fed. Reg. 18,306 (May 2, 
1990). For a discussion of the jurisdictional reach of the California securities law and its application 
to Regulation S offerings, see Keith Paul Bishop, California’s Blue Sky Law Problems for Foreign 
Issues and Foreign Issuers, 23 INSIGHTS, no. 7, July 2009, at 28. 
 440. See AIM, LONDON STOCK EXCH., https://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-
and-advisors/aim/aim/aim.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 441. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771 (July 24, 
2013). The rules adopted by the SEC in November 2020 provide that foreign offerings under Reg-
ulation S will not be integrated with other offerings. See Private Markets Adopting Release, supra 
note 271, at 3,511. 
 442. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE COMMISSION: REGULATION 
CROWDFUNDING 6 (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/regulation-crowdfunding-2019_0.pdf [here-
inafter REPORT TO COMMISSION ON REGULATION CROWDFUNDING]. 
 443. Id. at 5. 
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1980.444 The SEC was directed by Congress in the JOBS Act to add a 
class of securities to those exempted under section 3(b) for offerings 
of up to $50 million.445 The SEC adopted rules in 2015 to provide for 
two tiers of offerings under Regulation A (now commonly referred to 
as Regulation A+): Tier 1 for a maximum of $20 million and Tier 2 
for a maximum of $50 million.446 For Tier 1 offerings, there are no 
investor qualifications and audited financial statements are not re-
quired.447 For Tier 2 offerings, audited financial statements are re-
quired, and sales are limited to accredited investors or nonaccredited 
investors who invest no more than 10 percent of their annual income 
or net worth.448 
The JOBS Act also added as a “covered security” a security that 
is offered or sold to a “qualified purchaser” as defined by the SEC.449 
The rules adopted by the SEC define a “qualified purchaser” as any 
person to whom securities are offered or sold pursuant to a Tier 2 of-
fering.450 As a result, Tier 2 offerings are preempted from state regis-
tration and merit review. The California legislature in 1997 added sec-
tion 25102.1(a) recognizing the exemption from qualification for an 
offer or sale to a “qualified purchaser” as defined by the SEC and pro-
vided for the filing of a notice and payment of a fee.451 This covers 
 
 444. See supra text accompanying note 390. 
 445. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 401(b), 126 Stat. 306, 323–
24 (2012) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)). Congress in 2018, as part of the Economic 
Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 
(2018), directed the SEC to make Regulation A available to companies subject to reporting under 
sections 13 or 15(d) of the 1934 Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) (2018). 
 446. See Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806 (Apr. 20, 2015). 
 447. See Philip A. Feigin, SEC’s New Regulation A+ and the States’ M Word (Merit Review), 
5 NAT’L L. REV., no. 85, Mar. 26, 2015, at 1–2. 
 448. Id. 
 449. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, § 18(b)(3), 48 Stat. 74, 107; 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77r(b)(3). 
 450. 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2019). 
 451. Act of Aug. 26, 1997, ch. 391, § 9, 1997 Cal. Stat. 2614, 2632–33 (codified at CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 25102.1(a)); see Cal. Dep’t of Bus. Oversight, Notice Filing Requirements for Regulation 
A—Tier 2 Offerings, Commissioner’s Release No. 122-C (Sept. 15, 2015), https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-
content/uploads/sites/337/2019/03/122-C.pdf. The Commissioner had initially declared this ex-
emption inoperative because the SEC had never defined a “qualified purchaser.” That changed in 
2015 when the SEC applied this definition to Regulation A. See Keith Paul Bishop, California’s 
Regulation A Notice Filing Requirement, ALLEN MATKINS (July 11, 2017), https://www.calcorpo-
ratelaw.com/2017/07/californias-regulation-a-notice-filing-requirement. 
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only Tier 2 offerings, while Tier 1 offerings remain subject to qualifi-
cation in California. 
In addition, the JOBS Act added section 4(a)(6) to the 1933 Se-
curities Act to permit equity crowdfunding, whereby issuers can raise 
initially up to $1 million in a twelve-month period, subject to certain 
financial limitations and other requirements.452 Crowdfunding is a 
means by which a project or business venture can be funded by raising 
small amounts of money from a large number of investors, typically 
through the Internet. While online crowdfunding had been around 
since the early 2000s, anything that might be the offer or sale of a 
“security” under state or federal law was required to be registered.453 
Under the JOBS Act, states are preempted from requiring the registra-
tion or merit review of equity crowdfunding offerings.454 This preemp-
tion from qualification in California is recognized in section 
25102.1(c).455 
The final rules implementing section 4(a)(6) were adopted by the 
SEC in October 2015 as Regulation Crowdfunding and became effec-
tive in May 2016.456 Regulation Crowdfunding provides a framework 
for these offerings, as well as the regulation of registered funding por-
tals and brokers that issuers use as intermediaries for the offerings.457 
Issuers are required to file the offering statement and other information 
with the SEC.458 While states are permitted to assess a filing fee and 
require filing of a notice, California has not yet done so.459 
Some states have enacted crowdfunding exemptions linked to the 
federal exemptions for interstate offerings in section 3(a)(11) of the 
 
 452. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(a)(6); 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6). 
 453. See Christopher H. Pierce-Wright, Comment, State Equity Crowdfunding and Investor 
Protection, 91 WASH. L. REV. 847, 848 n.5 (2016). 
 454. Securities Act of 1933 § 18(b)(4); 15 U.S.C. 77r(b)(4). 
 455. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102.1(c) (Deering 2020). 
 456. 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.100–.503 (2019); see Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9974, 
80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015). See generally Hiraide, Ready Capital Part II, supra note 334, 
at 22. For recent rule amendments, see infra text accompanying notes 562–63. 
 457. Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9974, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,388 (Nov. 16, 
2015). 
 458. Id. at 71,398. 
 459. The Department has issued several advisories for investors and small businesses describ-
ing equity crowdfunding and pointing out certain concerns and risks. See, e.g., Informed Investor 
Advisory: Crowdfunding, NASAA, https://www.nasaa.org/12842/informed-investor-advisory-
crowdfunding/ (last revised Aug. 2017); Small Business Advisory: Crowdfunding, NASAA, 
https://www.nasaa.org/13676/small-business-advisory-crowdfunding/ (last revised Aug. 2017).  
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1933 Securities Act and the corresponding SEC Rule 147, and for of-
ferings under SEC Rule 504 of Regulation D.460 To date, efforts to 
pass legislation to permit local equity crowdfunding in California have 
been unsuccessful.461 
As previously discussed, the SEC in November 2020 adopted rule 
amendments to deal with exemptions and other aspects of exempt of-
ferings that had been raised in the Concept Release.462 These amend-
ments are intended to make offerings under Regulation A and Regu-
lation Crowdfunding more attractive by, among other things, 
increasing the limit for offerings under Tier 2 of Regulation A from 
$50 million to $75 million, for Tier 2 secondary offerings from $15 
million to $22.5 million, and for Regulation Crowdfunding offerings 
from $1.07 million to $5 million and removing or revising certain in-
vestment limits.463 The rules also provide general principles and “safe 
harbors” for integration with other offerings that permit the solicita-
tion of indications of interest by an issuer in an exempt offering prior 
to determining which exemption it would rely on, such as Regulation 
A or Regulation Crowdfunding and provide that offers and sales made 
in compliance with Rule 701 or with Regulation S will not be inte-
grated with other offerings.464 
The qualification process was also impacted by the JOBS Act. 
For a new class of issuer, the emerging growth company, the solicita-
tion of indications of interest (called “testing the waters”) from certain 
institutional investors was permitted before or after the filing of a 
 
 460. Intrastate Crowdfunding Resources, NASAA, https://www.nasaa.org/industry-
resources/securities-issuers/instrastate-crowdfunding-resources/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
 461. See JD Alois, California Expected to Attempt Intrastate Crowdfunding Legislation Once 
Again, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Dec. 11, 2018, 3:31 PM), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/201
8/12/142262-california-expected-to-attempt-intrastate-crowdfunding-legislation-once-again/; JD 
Alois, Is California the State Where Crowdfunding Goes to Die? Maybe Not, as Intrastate Legis-
lation Resurfaces, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Jan. 24, 2018, 3:00 PM), https://www.crowdfundin-
sider.com/2018/01/127522-california-state-crowdfunding-goes-die-maybe-not-intrastate-legisla-
tion-resurfaces/. 
 462. See supra text accompanying notes 271–77. 
 463. See Private Markets Adopting Release, supra note 271. The SEC had earlier adopted tem-
porary final rules intended to expedite the offering process under Regulation Crowdfunding for 
smaller, previously established companies affected by COVID-19. See Temporary Amendments to 
Regulation Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 10,781, 85 Fed. Reg. 27,116 (May 7, 2020); 
Temporary Amendments to Regulation Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 10,829, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 54,483 (Sept. 2, 2020) (extension to September 1, 2021). 
 464. See Private Markets Adopting Release, supra note 271. 
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registration statement with the SEC.465 In 2019, the SEC expanded this 
by rule to all issuers.466 In 2015, the SEC had also permitted the solic-
itation of indications of interest in Regulation A offerings before the 
submission or filing of an offering statement.467 Solicitation is 
preempted from state registration and merit review if the securities 
will be “covered securities” upon completion of the offering.468 This 
preemption applies to registered offerings of securities qualified for 
trading in the national market system and Tier 2 offerings, but not Tier 
1 offerings, under Regulation A.469 
IV.  THE CURRENT STATUS OF QUALIFICATION AND MERIT REVIEW 
To determine the extent to which the requirement of qualification 
and the application of merit review currently play a role in regulating 
the offer and sale of securities in California, it is instructive to examine 
data showing the number of filings with the Department by issuers that 
are relying on exemptions from qualification, as well as the number of 
applications filed with the Department for qualification by coordina-
tion, notification, and permit. The data do not reflect offers and sales 
of securities that do not require qualification due to exclusions in the 
definitions470 or exemptions for securities or transactions for which 
notices are not required to be filed with the Department.471 
A.  Securities and Transactions Exempt from Qualification 
As previously discussed, the 1968 Law contains a number of ex-
emptions from qualification, many of which require that notices be 
 
 465. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, § 5(d), 48 Stat. 74, 86; 15 U.S.C. 77e(d) 
(2018). 
 466. 17 C.F.R. § 230.163B (2019); see Solicitations of Interests Prior to a Registered Offering, 
Securities Act Release No. 10,699, 84 Fed. Reg. 53,011 (Oct. 4, 2019). 
 467. Keith Paul Bishop, California Lags Behind the SEC in Permitting Testing of the Waters 
in Regulation A Offerings, ALLEN MATKINS (July 6, 2017), https://www.calcorporatelaw.com/ 
2017/07/california-securities-rules-impede-regulation-a-offerings. 
 468. See Securities Act of 1933 § 18(a)(1)(B); 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1)(B). 
 469. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3). 
 470. Examples are exclusions from the definitions of “sale” in CAL. CORP. CODE § 25017(f) 
(Deering 2020) and “security” in § 25019. 
 471. Examples are exemptions for changes in rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions in 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25103(e), (g), for nonissuer transactions in § 25104, and for transactions ex-
empted by rule of the Commissioner pursuant to § 25105. 
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filed with, and fees paid to, the Department.472 The transactions for 
which the notices are filed represent offers and sales that, but for these 
exemptions, might otherwise be subject to qualification and merit re-
view. While the Department’s review of these notices is somewhat 
limited, letters pointing out deficiencies in compliance with the filing 
requirements are occasionally sent to issuers by the Department.473 
The following is a breakdown of the type and number of notices 
filed with the Department in 2019 for offers and sales of securities 
exempt under the 1968 Law, other than those offers and sales that are 
not subject to qualification in California by virtue of federal preemp-
tion:474 
Table 1 
Notices for Exempt Offers and Sales (Other Than Federal 
Preemption) Filed in 2019 
 
Code/Rules Section and 
Description 
Number of Notices 
Filed 
Code Section 25102(h) Small Issue 193 
Code Section 25102(f) Limited Offer 18,598 
Code Section 25102(n) Qualified Purchas-
ers-1st Notice 14 
Rules Section 260.103 Changes in and Ex-
changes of Securities Otherwise Exempt 36 
Code Section 25102(o) Compensatory 
Stock Purchase and Option Plans 3,409 
Code Section 25103(h) Exchanges Incident 




 472. The fees for notices filed with the Department are set forth in CAL. CORP. CODE § 25608. 
Some are fixed amounts and others are set within a range depending on the value of the securities 
proposed to be sold. 
 473. Ward, supra note 211, at 460–61. 
 474. The data in Table 1 for the number of notices filed are derived from spreadsheets provided 
by the Department that are on file with the author. The notices filed by reason of CAL. CODE REGS. 
tit. 10, § 260.103 (2020) are for (1) changes in rights, preferences, privileges, or restrictions and (2) 
exchanges of securities with existing security holders that otherwise would have been exempt under 
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102 or CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.105.14. 
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Other California exemptions from qualification recognize Con-
gress’s preemption of state registration and merit review for certain 
offers and sales that are exempt from registration under the 1933 Se-
curities Act. These exemptions cover securities offered or sold pursu-
ant to SEC Rule 506,475 Tier 2 of Regulation A,476 and section 4(a)(6) 
of the 1933 Securities Act,477 as well as securities issued by investment 
companies that are registered or have filed a registration statement un-
der the Investment Company Act478 and registered offerings by com-
panies having securities qualified for trading on the national market 
system.479 Some of these exemptions require the filing of notices with, 
and payment of fees to, the Department. The following is a breakdown 
of the number and type of these notices filed with the Department in 
2019:480 
Table 2 
Notices for Offers and Sales Exempt by Federal  
Preemption Filed in 2019 
 
Code Section and Description Number of Notices Filed 
Section 25102.1(d) SEC Rule 506 1,972 
Section 25102.1(a) Regulation A Tier 2 50 




 475. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25102.1(d). 
 476. See id. § 25102.1(a). 
 477. See id. § 25100.1(a). 
 478. Id. § 25100.1(b). 
 479. Id. § 25100.1(a). 
 480. The data in Table 2 for the number of notices filed are derived from spreadsheets provided 
by the Department that are on file with the author. The data for the SEC Rule 506 filings may not 
totally reflect the actual number of filings due to a failure of some issuers to file Form Ds with the 
SEC and the Department. See Keith Paul Bishop, No Form D Filing—Now What?, ALLEN 
MATKINS (Aug. 10, 2010), https://www.calcorporatelaw.com/2010/08/no-form-d-filing-now-
what. It has been estimated that Form D filings are not made for as many as 10 percent of unregis-
tered offerings made under Regulation D. See Study, Scott Bauguess et al., U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Capital Raising in the U.S.: An Analysis of the Market for Unregistered Securities Of-
ferings, 2009–2017, at 7 n.18 (Aug. 2018). 
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To put this in perspective, it is helpful to examine the number of 
filings for these exemptions with the SEC and the significance of Cal-
ifornia in both the number of filings and amounts raised.481 
SEC Rule 506(b) dominates the market for exempt offerings.482 
In 2019 there were 24,636 offerings under Rule 506(b) in which 
$1,492 billion was reported raised, and 2,269 offerings under SEC 
Rule 506(c) in which $66 billion was reported raised.483 From 2009 to 
2018, the largest number of issuers in the Rule 506 offerings desig-
nated their principal place of business to be in California,484 and Cali-
fornia was one of the largest states in terms of the amount raised by 
issuer location.485 
From June 19, 2015 to December 31, 2019, there were 277 offer-
ings qualified under Tier 2 of Regulation A in which $2,216 million 
was reported raised, and 105 offerings under Tier 1 in which $230 
million was reported raised.486 California was one of the largest states 
in terms of the capital sought and proceeds reported by issuer loca-
tion.487 
No notice filings or fee payments are required for Regulation 
Crowdfunding offerings in California. From May 16, 2016 to Decem-
ber 31, 2019, there were 2,003 offerings of securities under Regulation 
Crowdfunding in which the targeted amount sought was $126.9 mil-
lion.488 It was estimated that in 2019 there were 735 Regulation 
Crowdfunding offerings in which $137 million had been raised, com-
pared with $86 million in 2018.489 Through 2018, California was one 
of the largest states in which the issuers of securities offered under 
Regulation Crowdfunding were located.490 
 
 481. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019, supra note 
154, at 14–15. 
 482. See Private Markets Adopting Release, supra note 271, at 205 tbl.5. 
 483. Id. at 206 tbl.6. 
 484. Concept Release, supra note 260, at 30,505. 
 485. See id. at 30,485 fig.6. 
 486. Private Markets Adopting Release, supra note 271, at 281–82 tbl.14. 
 487. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE COMMISSION: REGULATION A 
LOOKBACK STUDY AND OFFERING LIMIT REVIEW ANALYSIS 20, figs.5a & 5b (2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/regulationa-2020.pdf [hereinafter REGULATION A STUDY]. 
 488. Private Markets Adopting Release, supra note 271, at 207 tbl.8. 
 489. Brian Belley, 2019 US Equity Crowdfunding Stats—Year in Review, CROWDWISE: BLOG 
(Jan. 10, 2020), https://crowdwise.org/funding-portals/2019-equity-crowdfunding-stats-data/. 
 490. REPORT TO COMMISSION ON REGULATION CROWDFUNDING, supra note 442, at 15 tbls.1 
& 20 fig.2. 
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B.  Transactions Subject to Qualification 
Under the 1968 Law, securities can be qualified by coordination, 
notification, or permit.491 The following is a breakdown of the number 
of applications for qualification filed with the Department in 2019:492 
Table 3 
Applications for Qualification Filed in 2019 
 
Code Section and Description Number of Appli-cations Filed 
Section 25111 Coordination 109 
Section 25112 Issuer Notification 0 
Section 25131 Nonissuer Notification 7 
Section 25113 Issuer Permit 109 
Section 25162 Post-Effective Amendment 23 
Section 25121 Exchange Permit 5 
Section 25142 Fairness Hearings Permit 4 
Total 257 
 
Offerings for which applications are filed for qualification by co-
ordination or notification (including securities to be offered or sold in 
nonissuer transactions pursuant to section 25131) become effective, 
subject to the issuance of a stop order by the Commissioner based on, 
among other things, a failure to meet the “fair, just and equitable” 
standard.493 The number of applications filed for qualification by co-
ordination has decreased substantially due to the marketplace exemp-
tion in the 1968 Law and later the preemption by Congress of certain 
 
 491. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25110, 25121, 25131 (Deering 2020). 
 492. The data in Table 3 for the number of applications filed are derived from spreadsheets 
provided by the Department that are on file with the author. Applications for post-effective amend-
ments under CAL. CORP. CODE § 25162, for qualification by coordination under § 25111 and by 
permit under § 25113 are included separately. Only two of the applications for issuer permits were 
filed as small company applications under § 25113(b)(2). 
 493. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140. No stop orders were issued by the Commissioner for offerings 
qualified by coordination or notification in 2018 or 2019 (through October 31st). The source of this 
information is a communication from the Department dated Oct. 31, 2019 on file with the author. 
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publicly-traded securities that now extends to any security qualified 
for trading in the national market system.494 Only seven applications 
were filed for qualification by notification, all of which were for nonis-
suer transactions. 
Offerings for which applications are filed for qualification by per-
mit are subject to review by the Department and, for a permit to be 
issued, there must be an affirmative finding that, among other things, 
the business and issuance meet the “fair, just, and equitable” stand-
ard.495 
Included in the table are three types of issuer transactions for 
which qualification by permit is applicable: issuer permit, exchange 
permit, and fairness hearing permit. 
The first permit is for the typical issuer transaction under section 
25113. The number of applications filed and permits issued under that 
section has dropped dramatically since the 1960s. As stated earlier, it 
was estimated that twenty-two thousand permits had been issued in 
the fiscal year ending June 3, 1968, just before the 1968 Law became 
effective.496 For the twelve months ended January 31, 1999, the De-
partment reported that 551 offerings were not exempt and therefore 
subject to California regulation.497 In more recent years, the number 
of permits issued under section 25113 has declined further. Table 4 
shows the number of permits issued by the Department under section 
25113 in each of the years 2014 through 2019, showing a slight in-
crease in 2019 from the prior year but an overall decline during that 
period:498 
 
 494. Maynard, supra note 421, at 1539–40, 1545. 
 495. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140(b). 
 496. See supra text accompanying note 179. 
 497. ROSA MARIA MOLLER, SECURITIES REGULATIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON SMALL 
BUSINESSES 1, 5 (Cal. Rsch. Bureau 2000). 
 498. CAL. DEP’T OF BUS. OVERSIGHT, COMMISSIONER’S REPORT ON THE OFFER OR SALE OF 
SECURITIES BY PERMIT UNDER CORPORATIONS CODE SECTION 25113 FOR 2019, at 7 (2020), 
https://dfpi.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/337/2020/12/2020-Commissioners-Report-on-the-
Offer-or-Sale-of-Securities-by-Permit.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSIONER’S PERMIT REPORT]. Since 
2013, the Commissioner has been required by CAL. CORP. CODE § 25113(d) to prepare an annual 
report summarizing the data collected from issuers to which the Department issues permits, includ-
ing the general categories of investments, the net worth and experience requirements, the total 
amount of money sought to be raised by category, and the number and nature of enforcement ac-
tions. It is interesting to note that no enforcement action had been taken by the Department against 
any of the issuers that received a permit in the years reported on through 2018, but for 2019 the 
Department reported that nineteen enforcement actions were taken against permit holders in viola-
tion of CAL. CORP. CODE § 25401. 
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Table 4 
Permits Issued Under Section 25113 From 2014 to 2019 
 
 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Number of Permits 
Issued 139 138 131 126 104 110 
 
From a review of the Self-Service Portal, it appears that eighty-
seven applications for permit under section 25113 were filed in 2020, 
excluding eleven applications for post-effective amendments, but the 
official number of permits actually issued is generally not reported by 
the Department until the end of the following year.499 
A review of applicants’ files for permits that were issued in 2019 
under section 25113 shows that about forty-seven included one or 
more written communications between the Department and the issu-
ers, consisting of comment letters and issuers’ responses to com-
ments.500 Some of these permits contained legend conditions restrict-
ing transfer and orders withholding the exemption from nonissuer 
qualification in section 25104(h).501 This latter section provides an ex-
emption from qualification if the offer or sale of any securities of the 
same class has been qualified and become effective within a specified 
period of time, but it can be withheld by the Commissioner in a limited 
offering qualification.502 
In addition to the number of permits issued, it is interesting to 
examine the types of issuers that are seeking qualification by permit 
under section 25113. During the years 2014 through 2019, offerings 
of church extension fund securities and church debt accounted for 
from 29 to 44 percent of the permits issued, and church extension fund 
securities offerings consistently accounted for the largest amount 
sought to be raised in these offerings.503 Table 5 shows the number of 
 
 499. Self-Service Portal, supra note 336 (under “Application Type” select “Permit”, select the 
date range from 03/01/2018 to 12/31/2019, and then click Search). 
 500. Id. 
 501. Id. 
 502. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25104. 
 503. This data are derived from a review of each of the Commissioner’s Reports on the Offer 
or Sale of Securities by Permit under Corporations Code Section 25113 for the years 2014 through 
2019. See Publications—Corporate Securities Law 1968, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN. PROT. & 
INNOVATION, https://dfpi.ca.gov/publications-corporate-securities-law/ (last updated Dec. 29, 
2020, 12:21 PM). 
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permits issued under section 25113 and amount sought to be raised by 
category of issuer in 2019:504 
Table 5 
Permits Issued and Amounts Sought to be Raised by Category of 







Amounts Sought to 
be Raised 
Church Extension Funds 29 $5,937,000,000 
Financing 18 $1,259,500,000 
Hard Money Lending 10 $710,000,000 
Church Debt 14 $329,850,000 
Mobile Home Parks 9 $5,344,316 
Country Clubs 3 $124,500,000 
Mutual Water Companies 5 $479,378 
Cooperatives 7 $14,340,226 
Agricultural 1 $700,000 
Retail 1 $10,258,000 
REITs 2 $1,017,524,000 
Sports and Recreation 5 $505,150,000 
Food and Drink 2 $1,500,000 
Educational Services 1 $450,000 
Manufacturing 1 $363,655,336 
Pharmaceuticals 1 $260,700,000 
Banking 1 $9,639,193 
 
 
 504. COMMISSIONER’S PERMIT REPORT, supra note 498, at 3, 7. 
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This clearly does not represent the same cross section of small 
businesses that sought permits in earlier years. For example, only one 
permit was issued in each of the manufacturing and retail categories 
in 2019 and none in the technology category.  
Qualification by permit is also required by other sections of the 
1968 Law, but relatively few permits are issued under these sections. 
Section 25121505 requires qualification by permit for the offer or sale 
of securities in connection with changes in the rights, preferences, 
privileges, and restrictions of or on outstanding securities, exchanges 
of securities by an issuer with its security holders, exchanges in con-
nection with any merger, consolidation or sale of assets, and entity 
conversion transactions.506 
Another section requiring qualification by permit applies to those 
seeking a “fairness hearing” under section 25142.507 This section al-
lows companies proposing to issue securities in exchange for out-
standing securities to request a hearing at which the Commissioner can 
approve the terms and conditions and the fairness of the transaction.508 
An application can be filed even if the transaction may be eligible for 
qualification by coordination or notification or is exempt from quali-
fication.509 The benefit is that if a permit is issued, the offer and sale 
of the securities may qualify for the exemption from registration under 
the 1933 Securities Act pursuant to section 3(a)(10).510 
 
 505. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25121 (Deering 2020). 
 506. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 260.121 (2020). 
 507. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25142. 
 508. This process is often used for exchanges of securities in mergers and acquisitions. The 
hearings provide transactional lawyers with an opportunity to examine witnesses and introduce 
exhibits to support the fairness of the terms and conditions of an offering. See, e.g., Craig D. Miller, 
What’s Fair Is Fair for Bank Holding Companies: Using Fairness Hearings in Mergers to Avoid 
SEC Registration, MANATT, PHELPS & PHILLIPS, LLP (Apr. 10, 2012), https://www.jdsu-
pra.com/legalnews/whats-fair-is-fair-for-bank-holding-com-59173/. 
 509. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25113(a). 
 510. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, § 3(a)(10), 48 Stat. 74, 83; 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77c(a)(10) (2018). See generally Division of Corporation Finance: Revised Staff Legal Bulletin 
No. 3 (CF) (Oct. 20, 1999), https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb3r.htm (providing guidance re-
garding reliance on the exemption for fairness hearings); Richard B. Glickman, The State Admin-
istrative Fairness Hearing and Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Act—Some Questions, 45 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 644 (1971) (discussing questions regarding application of the exemption for fair-
ness hearings in California and other states). When NSMIA was enacted, there was a question as 
to whether it had the effect of preempting the Department from holding a “fairness hearing.” This 
was remedied by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 
§ 302, 112 Stat. 3227, 3237 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(C)); see Cal. Dep’t of 
Corps., Fairness Hearings Under the Corporate Securities Law of 1968 After the Enactment of the 
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As discussed above, the use of negotiating permits was essentially 
eliminated by the 1968 Law.511 No applications for a negotiating per-
mit have been filed during the seven years from 2014 through 2020.512 
In summary, there has been a significant shift in recent years from 
the qualification of offerings under the California securities law to re-
liance on new and expanded securities and transactional exemptions. 
Of the applications being filed, qualification for many of the offerings 
now becomes effective automatically and requires a negative finding 
by the Commissioner for a stop order to be issued. 
Among the transactions that may still require qualification by per-
mit in California are those exempt from registration with the SEC pur-
suant to SEC Rule 504, Tier 1 of Regulation A and section 3(a)(11) of 
the 1933 Securities Act, as well as public offerings of securities that 
are traded over-the-counter through a broker-dealer network, such as 
the OTC Bulletin Board electronic platform or the markets operated 
by the OTC Markets Group LLC. In addition, qualification may be 
required for offerings that otherwise do not come within an exemption 
under the 1968 Law, including offerings of stock and options to em-
ployees that do not meet the requirements of SEC Rule 701 or the 
Commissioner’s regulations. 
This shift away from qualification is also evident anecdotally 
from the changes that have occurred in the practice of transactional 
lawyers before the Department.513 For those lawyers involved with 
private offerings, the practice has evolved from preparing, filing, and 
processing applications for negotiating and definitive permits to 
simply preparing and filing notices evidencing reliance on exemp-
tions.514 For those involved with public offerings, qualification in Cal-
ifornia is now seldom required as a result of federal preemption of 
state registration and merit review for “covered securities” or, if re-
quired, a simplified form for qualification is applicable.515 While this 
has substantially decreased the time that these lawyers practice before 
 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Commissioner’s Release: No. 102-C (Re-
vised) (Dec. 1, 1998), https://dfpi.ca.gov/commissioners-release-102-c-revised/. 
 511. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
 512. Self-Service Portal, supra note 336 (in “Application Type” select “Negotiating Permit,” 
check filings for Jan. 1, 2014 through Dec. 31, 2020 and click “Search”). 
 513. Petillon, supra note 227, at 32. 
 514. See id. 
 515. Id. 
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the Department, it has been more than made up for by the additional 
time they are now required to devote to structuring, documenting, and 
processing private offerings and dealing with the increasing complex-
ity of the compliance and disclosure requirements of federal law that 
are applicable to public offerings and publicly-held companies.516 
V.  RATIONALE FOR REVISITING THE METHOD OF REGULATING THE 
OFFER AND SALE OF SECURITIES IN CALIFORNIA 
Given the significant role that California businesses and investors 
play in the United States and international capital markets and the time 
that has elapsed since the enactment of the 1968 Law, it is appropriate 
to examine whether the intervening changes in circumstances warrant 
revisiting the method of regulating the offer and sale of securities in 
California and, in that connection, determining whether the system of 
merit review has outgrown any usefulness it may have had originally. 
The only significant attempt to revise the 1968 Law was in 1996 
with the introduction of A.B. 2465 in the 1995–1996 Regular Session 
of the California legislature.517 The principal draftsman of this bill was 
Keith Paul Bishop, who served as Commissioner from May 1996 to 
September 1997.518 In November 1996, committees of both houses of 
the legislature conducted a two-day joint hearing, the purpose of 
which was to provide committee members with an opportunity to ex-
plore the framework of the statutory and administrative requirements 
that California law imposes on the capital formation process.519 The 
bill was approved by the Assembly, but failed to be voted out of a 
Senate committee.520 
Senate Bill (S.B.) 1205,521 which was introduced the next year, 
contained substantially the same provisions as A.B. 2465.522 First, 
S.B. 1205 substituted the term “registration” in the 1968 Law for 
“qualification” of the offer and sale of securities.523 Next, the bill 
 
 516. Id. 
 517. Assemb. B. 2465, 1995–1996 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1996); Maynard, supra note 421, at 1531–
33. 
 518. Maynard, supra note 421, at 1531. 
 519. Id. at 1531–32. 
 520. See id. 
 521. S.B. 1205, 1997–1998 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1997). 
 522. Maynard, supra note 421, at 1556 n.78. 
 523. S.B. 1205. 
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provided that, if no delaying amendment or stop order was in effect, 
an application for registration by permit became effective automati-
cally upon the thirtieth business day after filing of the application or 
the last amendment.524 Finally, the provisions granting authority to the 
Commissioner for the issuance of a stop order were consolidated and 
made applicable to each type of registration—coordination, notifica-
tion, and permit.525 A finding that a plan of business or the issuance or 
sale was either “fair, just, and equitable” or, in the case of qualification 
by coordination or notification, was not “fair, just, or equitable,” was 
no longer required.526 In order to issue a stop order, the Commissioner 
would have to find that (1) the offer or sale is or is about to be made 
by means of a communication that includes a material misstatement or 
omission, (2) the stop order is in the public interest, (3) the issuer does 
not intend to transact business fairly and honestly or intends to transact 
business in a fraudulent manner, or (4) the method of offering or sell-
ing the securities will tend to work a fraud upon the purchasers.527 
S.B. 1205 was amended in April 1997 to simply direct the Legis-
lative Analyst to conduct a comprehensive study of the state’s system 
of consumer protection and new securities offerings, and it later died 
in committee.528 While this occurred some years ago, it illustrates the 
difficulty in achieving any meaningful change in the California ap-
proach to the regulation of securities offerings and limiting the system 
of merit regulation. 
In an article written around the time these changes were being 
proposed, Professor Therese H. Maynard came to the conclusion that 
“merit review has outgrown whatever usefulness it may have had orig-
inally.”529 She made a compelling argument for the elimination of 
merit review in California, supported by changes in the regulatory 
framework that she believed had rendered merit review obsolete as a 
practical matter, dramatic changes in the world’s financial and capital 
 
 524. Id. 
 525. Id. 
 526. Id. 
 527. Id. 
 528. Id. 
 529. Maynard supra note 421, at 1533. See generally Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky, 
62 U. CIN. L. REV. 471 (1993). Years earlier, Professor Sargent had authored an article examining 
the viability of state securities regulation in general and merit review in particular. See Mark A. 
Sargent, Blue Sky Law: The Challenge to Merit Regulation—Part I, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 276 (1984). 
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markets since 1968, and the increasing perception that the costs of 
compliance with the requirements imposed by merit review dispropor-
tionately burdened the capital formation process for small-business in-
terests.530 Professor Maynard suggested that the failure to eliminate 
merit review also does a disservice to both California’s business inter-
ests and investors, stressing the contention of critics that the likely 
success of an issuer and an investment depend on matters that the merit 
review standards do not address.531 She added that those issuers mak-
ing every effort to comply with the registration and exemption require-
ments are not the primary source of fraudulent securities offerings532 
and furthermore that investors may be encouraged to rely on a review 
by the Commissioner for a greater measure of protection that can ac-
tually be provided.533 It was her belief that “California’s scarce admin-
istrative resources would be better utilized by concentrating them on 
efforts to enhance the state’s current enforcement activities.”534 
Several years later, an extensive study was undertaken at the re-
quest of a California Senator to “describe the regulatory process for 
private and public securities offerings, emphasizing the impact of this 
process on small businesses.”535 The author of the study, Dr. Rosa Ma-
ria Moller, examined two “strong” arguments against merit review, 
namely that it discriminates against small businesses and that the eco-
nomic costs of merit review may not outweigh its benefits, the main 
benefit being fraud prevention.536 
Not surprisingly, Dr. Moller found that the lawyers and regulators 
she consulted disagreed as to whether there was a lack of fairness from 
offerings by small businesses being subject to merit review, with the 
regulators believing that the problem was not the system but its imple-
mentation and therefore merit review should be retained.537 She also 
determined that the economic costs to businesses of merit review were 
hard to assess. Finally, she did not believe there was enough empirical 
 
 530. Maynard, supra note 421, at 1556. 
 531. Id. at 1548. 
 532. Id. at 1552. 
 533. Id. at 1549. 
 534. Id. at 1534; see also Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky, supra note 529, at 505 (Professor 
Sargent similarly concluded that “[if] blue sky law has a future, it will be principally in more vig-
orous prosecution of antifraud enforcement”). 
 535. MOLLER, supra note 497, at 1. 
 536. Id. at 5. 
 537. Id. at 6. 
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data to perform a statistical analysis that could prove or disprove the 
ability of the merit review system to prevent fraud and protect inves-
tors.538 Her recommendations included ways to improve, but not elim-
inate, the merit review system, and she suggested various changes that 
might be made to the Department’s regulations.539 No legislation re-
sulted from this study. 
Over twenty years have now passed since the last effort was made 
to make substantive revisions to the 1968 Law. Rather than repeating 
Professor Maynard’s analysis, it will be more productive to review the 
additional changes that have occurred since her article was written in 
three areas, namely (a) the regulatory framework, (b) the financial and 
capital markets, and (c) the burden that qualification and merit review 
imposes on the capital formation process for small businesses. 
Regulatory Framework. Before her article was published, Con-
gress had enacted NSMIA, which for the first time preempted state 
registration and merit review as applied to certain federal exemp-
tions.540 In approving NSMIA, the Congressional Conference Com-
mittee stated that “[t]he system of dual Federal and state securities 
regulation has resulted in a degree of duplicative and unnecessary reg-
ulation . . . that, in many instances, is redundant, costly, and ineffec-
tive.”541 In reallocating responsibility over the regulation of the na-
tion’s securities markets in a more logical fashion, the states under the 
legislation were to “continue to exercise their police power to prevent 
fraud and broker-dealer sales abuses,” but abstain from regulation of 
“the securities registration and offering process.”542 NSMIA specifi-
cally preserved the authority of state securities regulators to not only 
investigate and bring enforcement actions, but also to require the filing 
of documents that have been filed with the SEC pursuant to the 1933 
Securities Act and, with certain limitations and exceptions, to continue 
to collect filing or registration fees with respect to these securities or 
 
 538. Id. at 5. 
 539. Id. at 6–7. 
 540. See Maynard, supra note 421, at 1547 n. 62. 
 541. Stephen M. Cutler, Remarks, F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium, 
81 WASH. U. L.Q. 545, 548 (2003) (alterations in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 39 
(1996) (Conf. Rep.)). 
 542. Id. at 548–49 (H.R. REP. NO. 104-864, at 40). 
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transactions.543 Also noteworthy was that Congress significantly en-
hanced the rule-making power of the SEC to exempt any person, se-
curity, or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, securities, or 
transactions, from any provision of the 1933 Securities Act.544 
Since then, the regulatory framework has undergone many 
changes, including additional legislation by Congress that further lim-
its the offerings that are subject to registration and merit review by 
state regulators, as well as rules adopted by the SEC implementing or 
expanding the scope of that legislation. 
As previously discussed, Congress adopted legislation that 
preempts registration and merit review for offerings under Tier 2 of 
Regulation A, Regulation Crowdfunding offerings under section 
4(a)(6) of the 1933 Securities Act, private resales of “restricted secu-
rities” to “accredited investors” under section 4(a)(7) of the 1933 Se-
curities Act, and offerings of securities qualified for trading in the na-
tional market system that are listed or qualified for listing on a national 
securities exchange under the 1933 Securities Act. 
Meanwhile, the SEC continues to expand federal preemption of 
state registration through its rule making that implements Congres-
sional legislation or increases the categories of exempt securities or 
transactions. These actions include the adoption or amendment of 
rules defining as a “qualified person” any person to whom securities 
are offered or sold pursuant to Tier 2 of Regulation A, setting forth the 
terms and conditions for Regulation Crowdfunding offerings, permit-
ting general solicitation of “accredited investors” under SEC Rule 
506(c), adding certain natural persons and entities to the definition of 
“accredited investors” in SEC Rule 501(a) and of entities to the defi-
nition of “qualified institutional buyer” in SEC Rule 144A, and, most 
recently, increasing the limit for offerings under Tier 2 of Regulation 
A from $50 million to $75 million, for Tier 2 secondary offerings from 
$15 million to $22.5 million, and for Regulation Crowdfunding offer-
ings from $1.07 million to $5 million. 
The expansion of those who would qualify as potential investors 
under the definition of an “accredited investor” has been particularly 
significant. For example, it has been estimated that the number of U.S. 
 
 543. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 111-229, § 18(c), 48 Stat. 74, 91; 15 U.S.C. 
§ 77r(c) (2018). 
 544. See Securities Act of 1933 § 28-3; 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3. 
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households that qualify as “accredited investors” has grown from ap-
proximately 2 percent of the population in 1983 to 13 percent in 2019 
simply as a result of inflation.545 By the SEC choosing not to raise the 
income and net worth thresholds or adjust them for inflation and then 
adding new categories of natural persons and entities, the number of 
those who will qualify to participate in the offerings under SEC Rule 
506 should continue to increase. It is likely that other groups repre-
senting holders of certifications, designations or credentials that may 
evidence financial literacy will also seek accredited investor status un-
der the new criteria established by the SEC. 
Eventually, Congress might preempt registration from state regu-
lation entirely, rather than continuing to do so in steps. This has been 
advocated for some time by members of the SEC staff, a former SEC 
Commissioner, and others.546 More recently, Professor Rutheford B. 
Campbell Jr. wrote that the efficient regulation of capital formation 
can be further enhanced by the states reallocating their resources to the 
enforcement of state antifraud provisions with complete preemption 
of state authority by the federal government over registration.547 He 
believes that “[s]tates, certainly, will not voluntarily surrender their 
authority over registration, and there is no indication that the  [SEC] 
can overcome its longstanding reluctance to extend preemption by 
regulation,” meaning that “[a]ny improvement in the efficient 
 
 545. See Accredited Investor Release, supra note 267.  
 546. See, e.g., Cutler, supra note 541; Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regu-
lation of Securities: A Case for Reallocation of Regulatory Responsibilities, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 
504 (2000); Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Com-
merce?, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 105, 112 (1987); see also Marianne M. Jennings et al., Federalism to 
an Advantage: The Demise of State Blue Sky Laws Under the Uniform Securities Act, 19 AKRON 
L. REV. 395, 416 (1986) (“If state regulators do not become more aware of the need for capital and 
the changed structure of the securities market, their regulatory grip could strangle capital ventures 
growth, unless and until federalism removes their authority.”). 
 547. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Case for Federal Preemption of State Blue Sky Laws, 
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 18, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/05/18/the-case-
for-federal-preemption-of-state-blue-sky-laws/; see also Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., The Role of 
Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA and the JOBS Act, 66 DUKE L.J. 605, 631 (2016) [hereinafter Camp-
bell, Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA and the JOBS Act]; Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Federalism Gone 
Amuck: The Case for Reallocating Governmental Authority over the Capital Formation Activities 
of Businesses, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 573, 582 (2011) (pointing out that the original legislation that 
led to NSMIA would have preempted state authority over the registration of securities, except of-
ferings made under the federal interstate exemption). 
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regulation of capital formation, especially small-business capital for-
mation, will require congressional action.”548 
While the SEC has recently shown a willingness to extend 
preemption of state registration and merit review by rulemaking, there 
is no indication that the states are likely to surrender their regulatory 
authority. This was particularly evident in NASAA’s reaction to the 
SEC’s proposed rules implementing the JOBS Act as it applies to of-
ferings under Regulation A. In the release proposing these rules, the 
SEC commented that “[c]ompliance with blue sky requirements can 
impose significant costs, predominantly as a result of having to coor-
dinate independent reviews across multiple regulatory regimes when 
issuers are offering securities to investors in multiple states.”549 
NASAA objected to the SEC’s attempt to preempt state authority over 
any offerings under Regulation A as being beyond the SEC’s statutory 
authority and failing to adequately consider all relevant costs and po-
tential harm to issuers and investors.550 More recently, NASAA ob-
jected to the SEC expanding the availability of private offerings and 
the definition of “accredited investor” with its focus on the private 
markets551 and asked to “pause” major SEC rulemaking, especially on 
efforts to expand private offerings and private markets, stating that 
despite profound changes in the economy, “the SEC so-far appears 
intent on proceeding with a deregulatory agenda, as if little has 
changed.”552 
 
 548. See Campbell, Blue Sky Laws After NSMIA and the JOBS Act, supra note 547, at 631. 
 549. See Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Sec-
tion 3(b) of the Securities Act, Securities Act Release No. 9497, 79 Fed. Reg. 3,926, 3,991 (Jan. 23, 
2014). 
 550. See Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, NASAA, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-75.pdf; 
Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, NASAA, et al., to Hon. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n 1 (Feb. 19, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-12.pdf; see 
also Feigin, supra note 447. 
 551. See, e.g., Letter from Christopher Gerold, President, NASAA, to Vanessa Countryman, 
Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-
19/s72519-6960323-212740.pdf; Letter from Christopher Gerold, President, NASAA, to Vanessa 
Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4–5 (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/com-
ments/s7-08-19/s70819-6288085-193367.pdf. 
 552. Christopher Gerold, President, NASAA, Statement on Examining the Impacts of the 
COVID-19 Pandemic on U.S. Capital Markets before the U.S. House Financial Services Commit-
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The California Attorney General also objected to some of these 
changes. Writing on behalf of himself and the Attorneys General of 
certain other jurisdictions, he submitted comments in response to the 
Concept Release and the SEC’s proposal to expand the definition of 
“accredited investor.”553 The expansion of the definition was said to 
ignore the serious risk that private placements pose for individual in-
vestors. In that regard, a distinction was drawn between institutional 
investors who participate in private offerings and generally have suf-
ficient resources to spread their risk over numerous private invest-
ments and individual investors who are far less likely to have suffi-
cient wealth or income to diversify their risk.554 It was also proposed 
that a sophistication requirement be added for investors under Rule 
506(b) and that, at a minimum, the financial thresholds for an “accred-
ited investor” be raised and indexed to account for inflation, thereby 
limiting the investors who would qualify.555 
Financial and Capital Markets. In addition to these changes in 
the regulatory framework, we have witnessed significant changes in 
the world’s financial and capital markets. In recent years, there has 
been a significant movement of capital into the private markets.556 It 
has been reported that worldwide pools of private capital, including 
private equity and private debt, as well as unlisted real-estate and 
hedge-fund assets, grew by 44 percent in the five years through 
2019.557 
This movement of capital has resulted in a substantial increase in 
the reliance by issuers on exempt offerings.558 In fact, the SEC staff 
 
 553. See Letter from Xavier Becerra, Cal. Att’y Gen., et al., to Vanessa A. Countryman, Sec’y, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1 (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-25-19/s72519-
6960384-212775.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Xavier Becerra of March 16, 2020]; see also Letter 
from Xavier Becerra, Cal. Att’y Gen., et al., to Vanessa Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 1 (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-19/s70819-6193375-
192522.pdf. 
 554. Letter from Xavier Becerra of March 16, 2020, supra note 553, at 6. 
 555. Id. at 9. 
 556. See MICHAEL J. MAUBOUSSIN & DAN CALLAHAN, MORGAN STANLEY, PUBLIC TO 
PRIVATE IN THE UNITED STATES: A LONG-TERM LOOK 4 (2020), https://www.morganstan-
ley.com/im/publication/insights/articles/articles_publictoprivateequityintheusalongterm-
look_us.pdf?1596549853128. 
 557. See Privacy and Its Limits—Everyone Now Believes That Private Markets Are Better Than 
Public Ones, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-econom-
ics/2020/01/30/everyone-now-believes-that-private-markets-are-better-than-public-ones. 
 558. Private Markets Proposing Release, supra note 266, at 17,957. 
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estimated that in 2019 registered offerings accounted for $1.2 trillion 
(30.8 percent) of new capital compared with approximately $2.7 tril-
lion (69.2 percent) that was raised through exempt offerings.559 This 
resulted in a large increase in cash raised and not yet invested by ven-
ture capital and private equity firms in the last several years.560 Mean-
while, growing companies are staying private substantially longer. 
The public equity markets are being used more for liquidity by venture 
capital and private equity firms than for accessing new growth capi-
tal.561 Interestingly, the stock of most of the companies that went pub-
lic in 2019 was trading toward the end of the year below the last pri-
vate valuations and pre-IPO expectations of pricing.562 For those 
companies choosing to become publicly owned, new techniques are 
being used with increasing frequency to bring securities to market, in-
cluding direct listings,563 auctioning shares to the highest bidders, 
bought deals (sometimes referred to as “overnight deals”), registered 
 
 559. Id. 
 560. See Marc Vartabedian, Banking & Finance: Venture Firms’ Cash Pile Hits Record Level, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2020, at B10. 
 561. See Jay Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Testimony on Oversight of the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Ur-
ban Affairs (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-clayton-2019-12-10 
[hereinafter Clayton Testimony]. Promoters of private investing say that the new IPO is the FPO—
the final private offering—and some private rounds are said to be so large that they upend the IPOs. 
See Alistair Barr et al., The Big Money in Startups Comes from Investing Before the IPO, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 22, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2019-10-22/the-big-money-in-startups-comes-from-investing-before-the-ipo. 
 562. See Maureen Farrell, IPOs Fell Short of Expectations in 2019—Investors’ New Focus on 
Profits Stung Hotly Anticipated Debuts Like Uber, Lyft and Slack, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2019, at 
B1. See generally Frank Partnoy, The Death of the IPO, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/private-inequity/570808/ (discussing how 
the declining number of IPOs is negatively affecting small investors). However, in 2020 a record 
$167.2 billion was raised in 454 IPOs through December 24th due to a substantial increase in the 
fourth quarter. See Maureen Farrell, U.S. IPO Market Reaches Record Total, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 
2020, at A1. 
 563. Direct listings involve the listing of shares on an exchange and the registration with the 
SEC of shares for resale by existing shareholders without conducting a firm commitment under-
written offering. Both the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ filed proposed rule changes 
with the SEC to permit listed companies to conduct concurrent primary offerings of shares as part 
of a direct listing. See generally Laura Anthony, NYSE Continues to Struggle With Direct Listing 
Rule Changes, LAWCAST (Sept. 18, 2020), http://lawcast.com/2020/09/18/nyse-continues-to-
struggle-with-direct-listing-rule-changes/ (analyzing direct listings in relation to alternatives and 
discussion of status of regulatory approvals). On December 22, 2020, the SEC approved the rule 
changes proposed by the New York Stock Exchange. See Alexander Osipovich, SEC Approves 
NYSE’s Plan for New IPO Alternative, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2020, 2:50 PM), https://www.wsj.c
om/articles/sec-approves-nyses-plan-for-new-ipo-alternative-11608665152. 
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direct offerings,564 and sales to special-purpose acquisition companies 
(SPACs).565 Some companies with international operations are choos-
ing to conduct their IPOs through listings on foreign securities ex-
changes.566 Another change is that the number of public companies 
has been decreasing in the last twenty years, but the total value of pub-
lic companies has increased.567 
These developments have had a profound impact on California. 
Not only have California businesses created a significant demand for 
capital, but individual and institutional investors based in California 
have been one of the largest sources of capital for businesses located 
in the United States and abroad. Nationally, issuers based in California 
have been one of the largest filers for exemptions with the SEC, as 
well as being among the highest in amounts raised.568 
The securities markets have become truly international in nature, 
both for exempt and registered offerings. The markets have been af-
fected by continuing advances in technology that impact trading, as 
well as the advent of instant communication between and among issu-
ers, potential investors, broker-dealers, and other market participants. 
The issues that regulators are now dealing with include innovative in-
vestment products, such as coin, token and other digital currency and 
cryptocurrency-related offerings;569 trading of cryptocurrency and 
 
 564. Registered direct offerings are public offerings of securities sold on a best-efforts basis 
through a placement agent. 
 565. SPACs (sometimes called “blank-check” companies) are formed by their sponsors for the 
purpose of raising funds from the public to make acquisitions of existing businesses. The volume 
of these transactions has increased in each of the last five years, reaching an all-time high in 2020 
of 143 IPOs with an average size of $385 million and over $55 billion in gross proceeds through 
October 16th. See SPAC IPO Transactions—Summary by Year, SPACINSIDER, https://spacin-
sider.com/stats/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2020). 
 566. See, e.g., David Carnevali et al., How Pandemic Fueled a Banner Year for IPOs, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 31, 2020, at A6. 
 567. See Partnoy, supra note 562. The SEC staff had estimated that there were roughly half the 
number of publicly-traded companies in 2018 than there were twenty years ago. See Clayton Tes-
timony, supra note 561. 
 568. See Concept Release, supra note 260, at 30,485, figs.5 & 6; REGULATION A STUDY, supra 
note  487, at 19, figs.5a & 5b; REPORT TO COMMISSION ON REGULATION CROWDFUNDING, supra 
note 442, at 15, tbls.1 & 20, fig.2. 
 569. See generally ANDREW P. SCOTT, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46333, FINTECH: OVERVIEW OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATORS AND RECENT POLICY APPROACHES 1 (2020) (discussing how regulators 
are approaching issues involving new technologies in the financial services sector); U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S CYBER DIGITAL TASK FORCE, CRYPTOCURRENCY: 
ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK vi (2020) (describing emerging threats and enforcement challenges 
associated with cryptocurrency); Bill Hinman, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., & Valerie Szczepanik, 
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digital assets, with some dealers intending to launch exchange-like 
electronic trading platforms;570 and the organization and SEC approval 
of new national securities exchanges.571 
 Burden on Small Businesses. The third issue is whether the effort 
and costs of qualification and merit review adversely affect capital for-
mation for small businesses. The data show that qualification by per-
mit in California is largely limited to smaller businesses.572 Moreover, 
offering costs of private placements have increased significantly over 
the years. One estimate put the front-end offering commissions and 
other expenses for private placements at around 12 percent of the gross 
offering proceeds.573 Some of these costs, however, are not based 
solely on the gross proceeds and therefore have a disproportionate im-
pact on the smaller offerings that can inhibit the ability of these small 
 
Senior Advisor for Digit. Assets and Innovation, Statement on Framework for “Investment Con-
tract” Analysis of Digital Assets (Apr. 3, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/state-
ment-framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets (discussing how a technology frame-
work for investment contracts may be a useful “analytical tool to help market participants assess 
whether the federal securities laws apply to the offer, sale, or resale of a particular digital asset”). 
On June 26, 2020, the SEC announced that it had obtained court approval of settlements relating to 
an unregistered offering of digital tokens that included substantial amounts ordered to be returned 
to investors and payable as a civil penalty. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Telegram 
to Return $1.2 Billion to Investors and Pay $18.5 Million Penalty to Settle SEC Charges (June 26, 
2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-146. On July 11, 2019, the SEC qualified a 
Regulation A offering circular for the distribution of up to $40 million of crypto tokens. See 
Muneeb Ali, Blockstack Token Sale Becomes the First SEC-Qualified Offering in U.S. History, 
BLOCKSTACK (July 10, 2019), https://blog.blockstack.org/blockstack-token-sale-sec-qualified/. 
 570. See Dennis Chu, Note, Broker-Dealers for Virtual Currency: Regulating Cryptocurrency 
Wallets and Exchanges, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2323, 2338 (2018); Order Disapproving a Proposed 
Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 88,284, 85 Fed. Reg. 12,595, 12,596 (Mar. 3, 2020) (dis-
approving of listing and trading shares of U.S. Bitcoin & Treasury Investment Trust on NYSE 
Arca, Inc.); Carl A. Fornaris et al., SEC Issues No-Action Letter Facilitating the Secondary Trading 
of Digital Assets, NAT’L L. REV. (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/sec-issues-
no-action-letter-facilitating-secondary-trading-digital-assets. 
 571. See generally In the Matter of the Application of Long Term Stock Exchange, Inc., Ex-
change Act Release No. 85,828, 84 Fed. Reg. 21,841 (May 15, 2019) (discussing the procedural 
history, statutory standards, and governance of the Long Term Stock Exchange in relation to its 
registration under the 1934 Exchange Act). The Long Term Stock Exchange, the registration of 
which was approved by the SEC on May 10, 2019, was organized by a technology entrepreneur to 
give high-growth technology companies more options to list their shares than afforded by the tra-
ditional exchanges. See THE LONG-TERM STOCK EXCHANGE, http://ltse.com (last visited Oct. 4, 
2020). 
 572. See, e.g., COMMISSIONER’S PERMIT REPORT, supra note 498, at 6 (minimum, maximum, 
and average net worth required of issuers or sponsors and amounts sought to be raised by category 
for permits issued in 2018). 
 573. Russell Putnam, Private Placements Explained: Part 4 (Fees and Expenses), FACTRIGHT 
(Jan. 3, 2018), http://blog.factright.com/private-placements-explained-part-4-fees-and-expenses. 
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businesses to raise capital. For example, a random sampling of attor-
neys’ fees for the preparation of a private placement memorandum 
showed a range of from $10,000 to $40,000, depending on the amount 
of work involved and the hourly rate charged. While many of these 
costs would be incurred in any private placement, being subject to 
qualification by permit and merit review adds filing fees and addi-
tional legal costs that would not be incurred if an exemption were 
available. 
 There are other factors that add to the burden on small busi-
nesses. Professor James D. Cox noted that “[i]t is ironic, if not para-
doxical, that the hotbed of entrepreneurism, and one of the most resil-
ient economies during the [2008] financial crisis, California, is among 
the most restrictive states in the scope of its exemptions.”574 He 
pointed out that under section 25102(f) sales are limited to thirty-five 
persons, general solicitation and advertising are prohibited, and all 
purchasers must meet certain standards as to personal or business re-
lationships with the issuer or affiliates or as to their business or finan-
cial experience or that of their professional advisors.575 Many smaller 
enterprises are unable to reach potential investors who meet these 
standards, as well as the standards of SEC Rule 506.576 In addition, 
their reliance on the exemptions in section 25102(h) and (n) is limited, 
so the only way to raise funds may be through qualification by permit 
with the attendant cost. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed and on the basis of the data presented, 
I believe that it is time for a change in the method of regulating the 
offer and sale of securities in California that would eliminate or limit 
the system of merit review, with a view to enhancing the antifraud 
enforcement of the California securities law. 
Before considering the changes that might be made, it is im-
portant to consider the role that California and the other states play in 
the enforcement of the securities laws, particularly antifraud enforce-
ment. We appear to be moving closer to a dual regulatory system in 
 
 574. James D. Cox, Who Can’t Raise Capital?: The Scylla and Charybdis of Capital For-
mation, 102 KY. L.J. 849, 858 (2013/2014). 
 575. See id. 
 576. See id. 
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which registration and merit review of offerings by the states will be 
further limited or eliminated in favor of a greater emphasis on enforce-
ment.577 It has been argued that, while reducing the cost of capital, the 
combination of federal preemption of the regulatory authority of states 
and the expansion of exemptions from registration at the federal level 
may also lead to more pervasive securities fraud.578 States have always 
been active in the civil and criminal enforcement of the antifraud pro-
visions, particularly at the local and regional level, and that is likely to 
increase.579 
In California, the Department is authorized to issue administrative 
and civil enforcement orders and actions to enforce the various laws 
that it administers. Of the 501 administrative and civil enforcement 
orders and actions by the Department in 2019, only twenty-three in-
volved the offer and sale of securities, primarily cease and desist and 
consent orders.580 Another fifty orders and actions involved 
 
 577. See generally James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Secu-
rities Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 123 (2012) (comparing centralized, supervised, and decen-
tralized models of securities enforcement). But see Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach 
to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2010) (“[A] 
superior approach would be to consolidate the enforcement authority now shared between federal 
regulators, state regulators, and class action lawyers in a federal agency, such as the SEC, and to 
grant that agency exclusive authority to prosecute national securities frauds—while simultaneously 
enacting reforms to align that agency’s enforcement incentives more closely with the public inter-
est.”). 
 578. See Carlos Berdejó, Small Investments, Big Losses: The States’ Role in Protecting Local 
Investors from Securities Fraud, 92 WASH. L. REV. 567, 572 (2017); Jennifer J. Johnson, Private 
Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 151, 153–54 (2010). 
 579. See Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky, supra note 529, at 504. NASAA reported that from 
2014 through 2018 its U.S. members initiated 23,416 investigations, conducted 12,403 enforcement 
actions, and were responsible for the ordering of $2.2 billion in restitution and $1.6 billion in fines 
and penalties. In addition, they were responsible for the ordering of 5,885 years of incarceration 
and 2,567 years of probation for securities violations. See NASAA, NASAA 2019 ENFORCEMENT 
REPORT 4, 11 (2019), https://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/2019-Enforcement-Re-
port-Based-on-2018-Data-FINAL.pdf. In comparison, the SEC in fiscal 2020 brought 715 enforce-
ment actions, opened close to 1,200 inquiries and investigations, and obtained judgments and orders 
totaling more than $4.7 billion in disgorgement and penalties, while returning $602 million to in-
vestors. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 7, at 16–18 (2020), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2020.pdf. 
 580. See Summary of Actions and Orders—Listed by Month, CAL. DEP’T OF FIN. PROT. & 
INNOVATION, https://dfpi.ca.gov/actions-and-orders-listed-by-month/ (last updated Dec. 17, 2020) 
[hereinafter Cal. Dep’t Summary of Actions and Orders]. See generally Botong Shang, The SEC’s 
Deterrence Effect on Corporate Fraud 1 (Nov. 6, 2020), https:/ssrn.com/abstract=3710224 (un-
published paper) (analyzing evidence supporting the proposition that firms decide to commit fraud 
strategically in response to the probability of detection by regulators). 
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investment advisors and a few involved broker-dealers.581 The rest re-
lated to the financing, escrow, and franchise investment laws and 
mortgage lending for which the Department is responsible.582 The De-
partment also assists in the criminal investigation and prosecution of 
violations of these laws and refers criminal violations to United States 
Attorneys, the California Attorney General, and District Attorneys for 
prosecution. In that regard, the SEC and the Department have some-
what complementary tools to deal with securities fraud and other vio-
lations.583 
With the passage of the California Consumer Financial Protection 
Law by the California legislature and the reorganization of the Depart-
ment, increasing the Department’s emphasis on antifraud enforcement 
under the California securities law may complement the Governor’s 
focus on enforcement of consumer protection with respect to financial 
products and services.584 
There are several approaches that could be taken to change the 
method of regulation of securities offerings in California. One possi-
bility would be to adopt a revised version of the Uniform Securities 
Act, as had been attempted sixty years ago.585 Versions of the Uniform 
Securities Act have been adopted by thirty-nine states and the District 
of Columbia.586 However, given the long history and familiarity of 
California practitioners and regulators with the 1968 Law, that would 
probably be the preferred starting point rather than dealing with a dif-
ferent statutory scheme. Another approach would be to eliminate the 
qualification of securities offerings and merit review entirely and sub-
stitute a notice requirement. However, this would likely be viewed by 
the legislature as being too radical at this time. 
 
 581. See Cal. Dep’t Summary of Actions and Orders, supra note 580. 
 582. See id. 
 583. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25530–25536 (Deering 2020) (authorizing actions to en-
join or enforce compliance, seek ancillary relief, conduct investigations, and obtain desist and re-
frain orders), with 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1, 77t (2018) (authorizing prosecutions of offenses, cease-and-
desist proceedings, investigations, and injunctions). The SEC can work in parallel with the states, 
such as in situations in which it may be better equipped to seek a temporary restraining order, seize 
assets, or seek appointment of a receiver in cases of ongoing fraud. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2019), https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-
2019.pdf.  
 584. See supra text accompanying notes 7–9. 
 585. See Edwards, supra note 70, at 835. 
 586. See Securities Law Research Guide (U.S. and International), GEO. L. LIBR., https://gui 
des.ll.georgetown.edu/c.php?g=365494&p=2469255 (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
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The approach that might have the greatest chance of gaining trac-
tion would be to start with the changes proposed over twenty years 
ago in S.B. 1205, which would involve providing for automatic effec-
tiveness of applications for permit after a specified period of time and 
revising the circumstances under which the Commissioner can issue a 
stop order.587 The affirmative and negative “fair, just, and equitable” 
standards would be eliminated, but other criteria could be added or 
retained as proposed in S.B. 1205.588 These changes would leave the 
Commissioner with less discretion and make it less likely that this dis-
cretion will be exercised. A less satisfactory alternative would be to 
make the same changes, but require the Commissioner to determine 
that the proposed plan of business or the issuance or sale of the secu-
rities is not “fair, just, or equitable” to warrant the issuance of a stop 
order in all three types of qualifications. This is one of the options for 
issuance of a stop order that states can select in adopting the Uniform 
Securities Act.589 
These changes need not affect the requirements for filing notices 
and applications for qualification with the Department. It is important 
that the fee income generated from these filings, as well as from the 
licensing of securities professionals, including broker-dealers, agents, 
and investment advisors, continue to be used to support the Depart-
ment. Of course, some changes in budgetary allocations and the reas-
signment of personnel would be required. These filings can also con-
tinue to be a source of information for enforcement purposes. 
 
 587. An advantage of retaining the qualification requirements would be that for those who are 
required to file an application for the sale of securities and fail to do so, a fairly straight-forward 
civil or criminal action could be filed under CAL. CORP. CODE § 25503 or § 25540, whereas an 
action for fraud or misrepresentation under CAL. CORP. CODE § 25501 or § 25540 would be more 
difficult and costly. For a discussion of the distinction between rule-based enforcement (such as for 
a failure to register) and principle-based enforcement (such as for fraud), see Park, supra note 577, 
at 130–43. 
 588. See supra text accompanying notes 521–27. 
 589. The Uniform Securities Act of 2002 provides for registration by coordination or qualifi-
cation, the latter of which generally becomes effective thirty days after filing, subject to the issuance 
of a stop order. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 304(c)(1) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002) (amended 2005). A stop order 
may be issued, among other things, if the offering (a) would work a fraud on the purchasers, (b) 
has unreasonable amounts of underwriters’ and sellers’ compensation or promoters’ profits or par-
ticipations, or (c) is being made on terms that are unfair, unjust, or inequitable. See UNIF. SEC. ACT 
§ 306(a)(7) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2002) (amended 2005). States and other jurisdictions can select all, 
some, or none of these provisions when they adopt the Act. See UNIF. SEC. ACT at 5, 83–84. 
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Whatever the approach that is adopted, other changes in the 1968 
Law and regulations are also warranted.590 At the outset, changes 
should be made to achieve better coordination with federal law. For 
example, sections have been added to the 1968 Law on a piecemeal 
basis to recognize the federal exemptions for which state authority has 
been preempted.591 For greater clarity, these should be integrated with 
the other securities and transactional exemptions in Part 2 and appro-
priate definitions should be added in Part 1. In addition, an effort 
should be made to harmonize the securities and transactional exemp-
tions by expanding or adding some new exemptions and eliminating 
others that are seldom used, as well as giving consideration to whether 
changes in the qualification process are warranted, including the 
amount of information required for applications. One area of inquiry 
should be the expansion of the exemption in section 25102(f), includ-
ing the limit on the number of purchasers, the ban on general solicita-
tion or advertising, and the suitability of purchasers.592 In addition, this 
effort should include an examination of case law in which application 
of the 1968 Law has been considered to determine whether any 
changes in the statute or rules might be required. Substantial changes 
will be required in the Commissioner’s rules, particularly those deal-
ing with the procedure for qualification and the standards for the ex-
ercise of the Commissioner’s authority. Finally, the sections dealing 
with the process of enforcement, including fraudulent and prohibited 
practices, should be reviewed with a view to providing the Department 
with the necessary tools for enforcement and facilitating coordination 
with federal and other state and local enforcement efforts. 
To gain support for this project, it is recommended that, as was 
the case with the effort to replace the 1917 Act, a working group of 
prominent practitioners, legislators, regulators, and academicians be 
formed to begin consideration of changes to the 1968 Law. The for-
mation of such a group could be initiated, for example, by the Com-
missioner, by members of the legislature, or by the leadership of the 
 
 590. See, e.g., Keith Paul Bishop, California’s Corporations Code and Securities Rules Are 
Rife with Errors, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/california-
s-corporations-code-and-securities-rules-are-rife-errors. The errors pointed out in the Corporations 
Code have been corrected, but most of the errors in the Commissioner’s rules remain. 
 591. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25100.1, 25101.1, 25102.1. 
 592. See Cox, supra note 574, at 858. 
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Business Law Section of the California Lawyers Committee or its Cor-
porations Committee. 
 
